The feasibility of working memory tablet tasks in predicting scholastic skills in classroom settings

Cognitive assessment in natural group settings facilitates data collection but poses threats to the validity. In this study, tablet‐based working memory (WM) tasks, the counting span, and reading span were used in predicting 12‐year‐old children's (N = 837) scholastic skills and fluid intelligence in a classroom with environmental noise. WM tasks had excellent internal consistency, correlated with scholastic skills, and accounted for more of the variance in cognitive performance (grade point average, fluid intelligence, scholastic skills) compared with individually administered (n = 190) digit span task. Furthermore, the multilevel analysis revealed that compared with the classrooms with no noise, when naturally occurring speech or nonspeech types of environmental noises were present during assessment, WM scores or the reliability estimates were not lower. In contrast, when both types of noises were present, the relationships between some of the WM and achievement scores were even stronger. Thus, assessments in natural classroom contexts may promote revealing the individual differences in WM.Peer reviewe

Can cognitive psychological research on reasoning enhance the discussion around moral judgments?

In this article we will demonstrate how cognitive psychological research on reasoning and decision making could enhance discussions and theories of moral judgments. In the first part, we will present recent dual-process models of moral judgments and describe selected studies which support these approaches. However, we will also present data that contradict the model predictions, suggesting that approaches to moral judgment might be more complex. In the second part, we will show how cognitive psychological research on reasoning might be helpful in understanding moral judgments. Specifically, we will highlight approaches addressing the interaction between intuition and reflection. Our data suggest that a sequential model of engaging in deliberation might have to be revised. Therefore, we will present an approach based on Signal Detection Theory and on intuitive conflict detection. We predict that individuals arrive at the moral decisions by comparing potential action outcomes (e.g., harm caused and utilitarian gain) simultaneously. The response criterion can be influenced by intuitive processes, such as heuristic moral value processing, or considerations of harm caused

Cognitive Control and Individual Differences in Economic Ultimatum Decision-Making

Much publicity has been given to the fact that people's economic decisions often deviate from the rational predictions of standard economic models. In the classic ultimatum game, for example, most people turn down financial gains by rejecting unequal monetary splits. The present study points to neglected individual differences in this debate. After participants played the ultimatum game we tested for individual differences in cognitive control capacity of the most and least economic responders. The key finding was that people who were higher in cognitive control, as measured by behavioral (Go/No-Go performance) and neural (No-Go N2 amplitude) markers, did tend to behave more in line with the standard models and showed increased acceptance of unequal splits. Hence, the cognitively highest scoring decision-makers were more likely to maximize their monetary payoffs and adhere to the standard economic predictions. Findings question popular claims with respect to the rejection of standard economic models and the irrationality of human economic decision-making

The logic-bias effect: The role of effortful processing in the resolution of belief-logic conflict.

According to the default interventionist dual-process account of reasoning, belief-based responses to reasoning tasks are based on Type 1 processes generated by default, which must be inhibited in order to produce an effortful, Type 2 output based on the validity of an argument. However, recent research has indicated that reasoning on the basis of beliefs may not be as fast and automatic as this account claims. In three experiments, we presented participants with a reasoning task that was to be completed while they were generating random numbers (RNG). We used the novel methodology introduced by Handley, Newstead & Trippas (Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition, 37, 28-43, 2011), which required participants to make judgments based upon either the validity of a conditional argument or the believability of its conclusion. The results showed that belief-based judgments produced lower rates of accuracy overall and were influenced to a greater extent than validity judgments by the presence of a conflict between belief and logic for both simple and complex arguments. These findings were replicated in Experiment 3, in which we controlled for switching demands in a blocked design. Across all three experiments, we found a main effect of RNG, implying that both instructional sets require some effortful processing. However, in the blocked design RNG had its greatest impact on logic judgments, suggesting that distinct executive resources may be required for each type of judgment. We discuss the implications of our findings for the default interventionist account and offer a parallel competitive model as an alternative interpretation for our findings

Cognitive control in belief-laden reasoning during conclusion processing: An ERP study

Belief bias is the tendency to accept conclusions that are compatible with existing beliefs more frequently than those that contradict beliefs. It is one of the most replicated behavioral findings in the reasoning literature. Recently, neuroimaging studies using functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) and event-related potentials (ERPs) have provided a new perspective and have demonstrated neural correlates of belief bias that have been viewed as supportive of dual-process theories of belief bias. However, fMRI studies have tended to focus on conclusion processing, while ERPs studies have been concerned with the processing of premises. In the present research, the electrophysiological correlates of cognitive control were studied among 12 subjects using high-density ERPs. The analysis was focused on the conclusion presentation phase and was limited to normatively sanctioned responses to valid–believable and valid–unbelievable problems. Results showed that when participants gave normatively sanctioned responses to problems where belief and logic conflicted, a more positive ERP deflection was elicited than for normatively sanctioned responses to nonconflict problems. This was observed from −400 to −200 ms prior to the correct response being given. The positive component is argued to be analogous to the late positive component (LPC) involved in cognitive control processes. This is consistent with the inhibition of empirically anomalous information when conclusions are unbelievable. These data are important in elucidating the neural correlates of belief bias by providing evidence for electrophysiological correlates of conflict resolution during conclusion processing. Moreover, they are supportive of dual-process theories of belief bias that propose conflict detection and resolution processes as central to the explanation of belief bias

Effect of response format on cognitive reflection: Validating a two- and four-option multiple choice question version of the Cognitive Reflection Test

The Cognitive Reflection Test, measuring intuition inhibition and cognitive reflection, has become extremely popular since it reliably predicts reasoning performance, decision-making and beliefs. Across studies, the response format of CRT items sometimes differs, assuming construct equivalence of the tests with open-ended vs. multiple choice items (the equivalence hypothesis). Evidence and theoretical reasons, however, suggest that the cognitive processes measured by these response formats and their associated performances might differ (the non-equivalence hypothesis). We tested the two hypotheses experimentally by assessing the performance in tests with different response formats and by comparing their predictive and construct validity. In a between-subjects experiment (n = 452), participants answered an open-ended, a two- or a four-option response format of stem-equivalent CRT items and completed tasks on belief bias, denominator neglect and paranormal beliefs (benchmark indicators of predictive validity) as well as actively open-minded thinking and numeracy (benchmark indicators of construct validity). We found no significant differences between the three response formats in the number of correct responses, the number of intuitive responses (with the exception of the two-option version being higher than the other tests) and in the correlational patterns with the indicators of predictive and construct validity. All three test versions were similarly reliable but the multiple-choice formats were completed more quickly. We speculate that the specific nature of the CRT items helps to build construct equivalence among the different response formats. We recommend using the validated multiple-choice version of the CRT presented here, particularly the four-option CRT, for practical and methodological reasons

When fast logic meets slow belief: Evidence for a parallel-processing model of belief bias.

Two experiments pitted the default-interventionist account of belief bias against a parallel-processing model. According to the former, belief bias occurs because a fast, belief-based evaluation of the conclusion pre-empts a working-memory demanding logical analysis. In contrast, according to the latter both belief-based and logic-based responding occur in parallel. Participants were given deductive reasoning problems of variable complexity and instructed to decide whether the conclusion was valid on half the trials or to decide whether the conclusion was believable on the other half. When belief and logic conflict, the default-interventionist view predicts that it should take less time to respond on the basis of belief than logic, and that the believability of a conclusion should interfere with judgments of validity, but not the reverse. The parallel-processing view predicts that beliefs should interfere with logic judgments only if the processing required to evaluate the logical structure exceeds that required to evaluate the knowledge necessary to make a belief-based judgment, and vice versa otherwise. Consistent with this latter view, for the simplest reasoning problems (modus ponens), judgments of belief resulted in lower accuracy than judgments of validity, and believability interfered more with judgments of validity than the converse. For problems of moderate complexity (modus tollens and single-model syllogisms), the interference was symmetrical, in that validity interfered with belief judgments to the same degree that believability interfered with validity judgments. For the most complex (three-term multiple-model syllogisms), conclusion believability interfered more with judgments of validity than vice versa, in spite of the significant interference from conclusion validity on judgments of belief