Investment Spending in the Netherlands: The Impact of Liquidity and Corporate Governance

This paper examines the relation between cash flow, corporate governance and fixed-investment spending. In perfect capital markets we expect no systematic relationship. However, Myers and Majluf's (1984) asymmetric information hypothesis and Jensen's (1986) managerial discretion hypothesis present imperfections and predict a positive impact of cash flow on investment in fixed assets. Aspects of corporate governance play an important role in both theories. We measure the impact of cash flow on investment for a set of Dutch firms and aim to distinguish between the asymmetric information hypothesis and the managerial discretion hypothesis. Our findings show that cash flow is an important determinant of investment expenditures. The impact of cash flow is largest for firms with low growth opportunities suggesting that the managerial discretion hypothesis is most at work in the Dutch setting. We also discern that the impact of governance characteristics on both investment and the cash flow-sensitivity of investment differ between firms having low and high growth opportunities. This implies that governance affects the managerial discretion and asymmetric information hypotheses differently.investment;corporate liquidity;cash flow;corporate governance

Investment and Internal Finance: Asymmetric Information or Managerial Discretion?

This paper examines the relation between cash-flow availability and investment spending in theNetherlands. In particular, we are interested whether managerial discretion and/or asymmetricinformation drive the positive relation between cash-flow and investment spending. This relation ispositive for both firms with low and high investment opportunities. It is however significantly larger forfirms with low investment opportunities suggesting that the managerial-discretion problem is mostimportant in the Dutch setting. Effective corporate-governance may reduce this agency problem.Specific to the Netherlands, firms with low shareholder influence posit a higher cash-flow-investmentsensitivity. The relevance of asymmetric information is confirmed as smaller firms and firms frominformation-sensitive industries show a larger cash-flow-investment sensitivity.The Netherlands;asymmetric information;Investment;financial constraints;managerial discretion

Investment Spending in the Netherlands: Asymmetric Information or Managerial Discretion?

This paper examines the relation between cash-flow availability and investment spending in the Netherlands. In particular, we are interested whether managerial discretion and/or asymmetric information underpin the positive relation between cash-flow and investment spending. This relation is significantly positive for both firms with low and high investment opportunities. It is however significantly larger for firms with low investment opportunities suggesting that the managerial-discretion problem is most important in the Dutch setting. Effective corporate-governance may reduce this agency problem. Specific to the Netherlands, firms with low shareholder influence posit a higher cash-flow-investment sensitivity. The relevance of asymmetric information is confirmed as smaller firms and firms from information-sensitive industries show a larger cash-flow-investment sensitivity.

Investment spending in the Netherlands: Assymmetric information or managerial discretion?.

Information; Investment;

Vocal Audiometry in Hearing Aid Outcome Measurements

Single word repetition in quiet differs drastically from everyday conversation, raising validity issues when quality-of-life-type predictions are made starting from classic vocal audiometry. This report addresses the predictive power of metrics derived from traditional vocal audiometry in assessing real-life outcomes of hearing aid fittings. Correlation and regressions analyses on a dataset from 45 clients show that a weighted combination of metrics correlates reasonably well(R = 0.749, p = 0.016) with questionnaire data, explaining 56% of the variance

An Empirical Analysis of Legal Insider Trading in the Netherlands

In this paper, we employ a registry of legal insider trading for Dutch listed firms to investigate the information content of trades by corporate insiders. Using a standard event-study methodology, we examine short-term stock price behavior around trades. We find that purchases are followed by economically large abnormal returns. This result is strongest for purchases by top executives and for small market capitalization firms, which is consistent with the hypothesis that legal insider trading is an important channel through which information flows to the market. We analyze also the impact of the implementation of the Market Abuse Directive (European Union Directive 2003/6/EC), which strengthens the existing regulation in the Netherlands. We show that the new regulation reduced the information content of sales by top executives.insider trading, financial market regulation

An Empirical Analysis of Legal Insider Trading in the Netherlands

In this paper, we employ a registry of legal insider trading for Dutch listed firms to investigate the information content of trades by corporate insiders. Using a standard event-study methodology, we examine short-term stock price behavior around trades. We find that purchases are followed by economically large abnormal returns. This result is strongest for purchases by top execu- tives and for small market capitalization firms, which is consistent with the hypothesis that legal insider trading is an important channel through which information flows to the market. We analyze also the impact of the implementation of the Market Abuse Directive (European Union Directive 2003/6/EC), which strengthens the existing regulation in the Netherlands. We show that the new regulation reduced the information content of sales by top executives.Insider trading;Financial market regulation

The Impact of Firm and Industry Characteristics on Small Firms' Capital Structure: Evidence from Dutch Panel Data

We investigate small firms’ capital structure, employing a proprietary database containing financial statements of Dutch small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) from 2003 to 2005. We find that the capital structure decision of Dutch SMEs is consistent with the pecking order theory: SMEs use profits to reduce their debt level, and growing firms increase their debt position since they need more funds. Furthermore, we document that profits reduce in particular short term debt, whereas growth increases long term debt. This implies that when internal funds are depleted, long term debt is next in the pecking order. We also find evidence for the maturity matching principle in SME capital structure: long term assets are financed with long term debt, while short term assets are financed with short tem debt. This implies that the maturity structure of debt is an instrument for lenders to deal with problems of asymmetric information. Finally, we find that SME capital structure varies across industries but firm characteristics are more important than industry characteristics.Capital Structure;SMEs;pecking order theory;trade-off theory

The Impact of Dark and Visible Fragmentation on Market Quality (Replaces CentER Discussion Paper 2011-051)

Two important characteristics of current European equity markets are rooted in changes in financial regulation (the Markets in Financial Instruments Directive). The regulation (i) allows new trading venues to emerge, generating a fragmented market place and (ii) allows for a substantial fraction of trading to take place in the dark, outside publicly displayed order books. This paper evaluates the impact on liquidity of fragmentation in visible order books and dark trading for a sample of 52 Dutch stocks. We consider global liquidity by consolidating the entire limit order books of all visible European trading venues, and local liquidity by considering the traditional market only. We find that fragmentation in visible order books improves global liquidity, but dark trading has a detrimental effect. In addition, local liquidity is lowered by fragmentation in visible order books.Market microstructure;Market fragmentation;Liquidity;MiFID

Investment Spending in the Netherlands:The Impact of Liquidity and Corporate Governance

This paper examines the relation between cash flow, corporate governance and fixed-investment spending. In perfect capital markets we expect no systematic relationship. However, Myers and Majluf's (1984) asymmetric information hypothesis and Jensen's (1986) managerial discretion hypothesis present imperfections and predict a positive impact of cash flow on investment in fixed assets. Aspects of corporate governance play an important role in both theories. We measure the impact of cash flow on investment for a set of Dutch firms and aim to distinguish between the asymmetric information hypothesis and the managerial discretion hypothesis. Our findings show that cash flow is an important determinant of investment expenditures. The impact of cash flow is largest for firms with low growth opportunities suggesting that the managerial discretion hypothesis is most at work in the Dutch setting. We also discern that the impact of governance characteristics on both investment and the cash flow-sensitivity of investment differ between firms having low and high growth opportunities. This implies that governance affects the managerial discretion and asymmetric information hypotheses differently.