Continuous Organismic Sentience as the integration of Core Affect and Vitality

In consciousness studies there is a growing tendency to consider experience as (i) fundamentally affective and (ii) deeply interlinked with interoceptive and homeostatic bodily processes. However, this view still needs further development to be part of any rigorous theory of consciousness. To advance in this direction, we ask: 1) is there any affective type that is always present in consciousness? 2) is it related to interoception and homeostasis? and, 3) what are its properties? Here we analyze and compare Jim Russell’s core affect and Thomas Fuchs’ concept of vitality, and propose a more encompassing notion that subsumes both: Continuous Organismic Sentience. It provides affirmative answers to questions 1 and 2, and, regarding question 3, a preliminary list of thirteen properties divided into ontological, phenomenological and functional categories. This is the first of a series of studies that will systematically address different notions of a fundamental, homeostatically-rooted affective type, to achieve a rigorous, unified concept for consciousness science

Moving beyond the lab: investigating empathy through the Empirical 5E approach

Empathy is a complex and multifaceted phenomenon that plays a crucial role in human social interactions. Recent developments in social neuroscience have provided valuable insights into the neural underpinnings and bodily mechanisms underlying empathy. This methodology often prioritizes precision, replicability, internal validity, and confound control. However, fully understanding the complexity of empathy seems unattainable by solely relying on artificial and controlled laboratory settings, while overlooking a comprehensive view of empathy through an ecological experimental approach. In this article, we propose articulating an integrative theoretical and methodological framework based on the 5E approach (the “E”s stand for embodied, embedded, enacted, emotional, and extended perspectives of empathy), highlighting the relevance of studying empathy as an active interaction between embodied agents, embedded in a shared real-world environment. In addition, we illustrate how a novel multimodal approach including mobile brain and body imaging (MoBi) combined with phenomenological methods, and the implementation of interactive paradigms in a natural context, are adequate procedures to study empathy from the 5E approach. In doing so, we present the Empirical 5E approach (E5E) as an integrative scientific framework to bridge brain/body and phenomenological attributes in an interbody interactive setting. Progressing toward an E5E approach can be crucial to understanding empathy in accordance with the complexity of how it is experienced in the real world

Commentary: Attentional control and the self: The Self-Attention Network (SAN)

The Self-Attention Network (SAN) model (Humphreys & Sui, 2015) is a recent neurocognitive model to account for self-biases in the allocation of attention. It emerges from psychological, neuropsychological, and neuroimaging evidence on three phenomena: own-name effects, own-face effects, and self-biases in associative matching. Specifically, it posits that our responses to self-related stimuli are differentially subserved by a network comprising three nodes: (i) a general-purpose top-down attentional control network which involves the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex and the intra-parietal sulcus; (ii) a self-representation hub located in the ventromedial prefrontal cortex (vmPFC), and (iii) a bottom-up orientating mechanism which depends on the posterior superior temporal sulcus (pSTS). Accordingly, attentional shifts upon hearing our own name or seeing our own face would rely on interactions among such nodes, mimicking perceptual-saliency effects and determining emergent behavior.Though attractive, this proposal features two major caveats. First, the evidence for own-name effects is inconsistent and undermined by psycholinguistic confounds. Second, the node proposed to subserve self-specific information lacks neurofunctional specificity. Here we discuss both issues and advance relevant methodological recommendations.Fil: García, Adolfo Martín. Universidad Nacional de Cuyo. Facultad de Educación Elemental y Especial; Argentina. Universidad Diego Portales; Chile. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas. Oficina de Coordinación Administrativa Houssay. Instituto de Neurociencia Cognitiva. Fundación Favaloro. Instituto de Neurociencia Cognitiva; ArgentinaFil: Huepe, David. Universidad Diego Portales; ChileFil: Martínez Pernía, David. Universidad Diego Portales; ChileFil: Morales, Juan P.. Universidad Diego Portales; ChileFil: Huepe, Daniela. Universidad Diego Portales; ChileFil: Hurtado, Esteban. Universidad Diego Portales; ChileFil: Calvo Garbarino, Noelia Belén. Universidad Nacional de Córdoba. Facultad de Psicología; ArgentinaFil: Ibanez Barassi, Agustin Mariano. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas. Oficina de Coordinación Administrativa Houssay. Instituto de Neurociencia Cognitiva. Fundación Favaloro. Instituto de Neurociencia Cognitiva; Argentina. Universidad Nacional de Cuyo. Facultad de Educación Elemental y Especial; Argentina. Universidad Diego Portales; Chile. Centre of Excellence in Cognition and its Disorders; Australi

"I am feeling tension in my whole body": An experimental phenomenological study of empathy for pain

Introduction: Traditionally, empathy has been studied from two main perspectives: the theory-theory approach and the simulation theory approach. These theories claim that social emotions are fundamentally constituted by mind states in the brain. In contrast, classical phenomenology and recent research based on enactive theories consider empathy as the basic process of contacting others’ emotional experiences through direct bodily perception and sensation. Objective: This study aims to enrich knowledge of the empathic experience of pain by using an experimental phenomenological method. Method: Implementing an experimental paradigm used in affective neuroscience, we exposed 28 healthy adults to a video of sportspersons suffering physical accidents while practicing extreme sports. Immediately after watching the video, each participant underwent a phenomenological interview to gather data on embodied, multi-layered dimensions (bodily sensations, emotions, and motivations) and temporal aspects of empathic experience. We also performed quantitative analyses of the phenomenological categories. Results: Experiential access to the other person’s painful experience involves four main-themes. Bodily resonance: participants felt a multiplicity of bodily, affective, and kinesthetic sensations. Attentional focus: some participants centered their attention more on their own personal discomfort and sensations of rejection, while others on the pain and suffering experienced by the sportspersons. Kinesthetic motivation: some participants experienced the feeling in their bodies to avoid or escape from watching the video, while others experienced the need to help the sportspersons avoid suffering any injury while practicing extreme sports. Temporality of experience: participants witnessed temporal fluctuations in their experiences, bringing intensity changes in their bodily resonance, attentional focus, and kinesthetic motivation. Finally, two experiential structures were found: one structure is self-centered empathic experience, characterized by bodily resonance, attentional focus centered on the participant’s own experience of seeing the sportsperson suffering, and self-protective kinesthetic motivation; the other structure is other-centered empathic experience, characterized by bodily resonance, attentional focus centered on the sportsperson, and prosocial kinesthetic motivation to help them. Discussion: We show how phenomenological data may contribute to comprehending empathy for pain in social neuroscience. In addition, we address the phenomenological aspect of the enactive approach to the three dimensions of embodiment of human consciousness, especially the intersubjective dimension. Also, based on our results, we suggest an extension of the enactive theory for non-interactive social experience

Standardization and diagnostic utility of the frontal assessment battery for healthy people and patients with dementia in the Chilean population

Background: The Frontal Assessment Battery (FAB) is a screening test that measures executive functions. Although this instrument has been validated in several countries, its diagnostic utility in a Chilean population has not been studied yet. Objectives: (1) To adapt FAB in a Chilean population; (2) To study the psychometric properties of the FAB in a Chilean population; (3) to assess the sociodemographic influence in the performance of the FAB in a sample of healthy controls, and (4) to develop normative data for this last group. Methods: A healthy control (n = 344) and a group of patients with dementia (n = 156) were assessed with the Chilean version of FAB. Results: FAB showed good internal consistency (Cronbach's alpha = 0.79) and acceptable validity based on the relationship with other variables. Factor analysis showed the unidimensionality of the instrument. Significant differences were found in the total FAB value between the healthy control and dementia groups. With the matched sample, the established cut-off point was 13.5, showing a sensitivity of 80.8% and a specificity of 90.4%. Regression analysis showed that education and age significantly predicted FAB performance in the healthy group. Finally, normative data are provided. Conclusions: The present study has shown that FAB is a useful tool to discriminate between healthy people and people with dementia. However, further studies are needed to explore the capacity of the instrument to characterize the dysexecutive syndrome in people with dementia in the Chilean population

In your phase: neural phase synchronisation underlies visual imagery of faces

Abstract: Mental imagery is the process through which we retrieve and recombine information from our memory to elicit the subjective impression of “seeing with the mind’s eye”. In the social domain, we imagine other individuals while recalling our encounters with them or modelling alternative social interactions in future. Many studies using imaging and neurophysiological techniques have shown several similarities in brain activity between visual imagery and visual perception, and have identified frontoparietal, occipital and temporal neural components of visual imagery. However, the neural connectivity between these regions during visual imagery of socially relevant stimuli has not been studied. Here we used electroencephalography to investigate neural connectivity and its dynamics between frontal, parietal, occipital and temporal electrodes during visual imagery of faces. We found that voluntary visual imagery of faces is associated with long-range phase synchronisation in the gamma frequency range between frontoparietal electrode pairs and between occipitoparietal electrode pairs. In contrast, no effect of imagery was observed in the connectivity between occipitotemporal electrode pairs. Gamma range synchronisation between occipitoparietal electrode pairs predicted subjective ratings of the contour definition of imagined faces. Furthermore, we found that visual imagery of faces is associated with an increase of short-range frontal synchronisation in the theta frequency range, which temporally preceded the long-range increase in the gamma synchronisation. We speculate that the local frontal synchrony in the theta frequency range might be associated with an effortful top-down mnemonic reactivation of faces. In contrast, the long-range connectivity in the gamma frequency range along the fronto-parieto-occipital axis might be related to the endogenous binding and subjective clarity of facial visual features

Filosofía de la neurorrehabilitación: de los modelos tradicionales (mecanicismo y funcionalismo) al enfoque experiencial

Antecedentes: Si bien la disciplina de filosofía de la mente ha hecho un examen exhaustivo y detallado de la cognición pocos trabajos han llevado esta reflexión al ámbito clínico. Objetivos: El objetivo general de esta tesis doctoral es explicar cómo repercuten las ontologías mecanicistas, cognitivas y de cognición corporizada en la terapia neurológica (neurorrehabilitación). Metodología: Para lograr dicho objetivo primeramente se analizan las fortalezas y debilidades de la ontología mecanicista y cognitiva respecto de la perspectiva que mantienen de la persona con lesión neurológica, así como qué intervenciones terapéuticas son aplicables desde dichas ontologías. En segundo lugar, se propondrá al paradigma de cognición corporizada como un nuevo modelo ontológico en el campo de la neurorrehabilitación, el cual podría resolver algunas de las deficiencias que presentan la neurorrehabilitación mecanicista y cognitiva. Resultados: Presento tres principales hallazgos en esta tesis doctoral. El primero es explicar cómo la ontología mecanicista limita la rehabilitación de la persona con daño cerebral como un ente biológico de tipo corporal o conductual. El segundo resultado es explicar a la neurorrehabilitación cognitiva como un modelo terapéutico que se focaliza en la recuperación de los déficits cognitivos y cuyo origen se encuentra en la lesión cerebral. Bajo este paradigma se considera que en la cognición y el cerebro están los elementos fundamentales para la recuperación de la persona con daño cerebral

Enactive approach and dual-tasks for the treatment of severe behavioural and cognitive impairment in a person with acquired brain injury: A case study

One of the most important sequela in persons who suffer from acquired brain injury (ABI) is a behavioural disorder. To date, the primary approaches for the rehabilitation of this sequela are Applied Behaviour Analysis, Cognitive-Behaviour Therapy, and Comprehensive-Holistic Rehabilitation Programs. Despite this theoretical plurality, none of these approaches focuses on rehabilitating behavioural disorders considering the relation between affordance and environmental adaptation. To introduce this therapeutic view to neurorehabilitation, we apply the theoretical tenets of the enactive paradigm to the rehabilitation of a woman with severe behavioural and cognitive impairment. Over seventeen sessions, her behavioural and cognitive performance was assessed in relation to two seated affordances (seated on a chair and seated on a ball 65 cm in diameter) and the environmental adaptation while she was working on various cognitive tasks. These two seated affordances allowed to incorporate the theoretical assumptions of the enactive approach and to know how the behavior and the cognition were modified based on these two postural settings and the environmental adaptation. The findings indicate that the subject exhibited better behavioural (physical and verbal) and cognitive (matching success and complex task) performances when the woman worked on the therapeutic ball than when the woman was on the chair. The enactive paradigm applied in neurorehabilitation introduces a level of treatment that precedes behaviour and cognition. This theoretical consideration allowed the discovery of a better relation between a seated affordance and the environmental adaptation for the improvement behavioural and cognitive performance in our case study

Experiential neurorehabilitation: A neurological therapy based on the enactive paradigm

With the arrival of the cognitive paradigm during the latter half of the last century, the theoretical and scientific bases of neurorehabilitation have been linked to the knowledge developed in cognitive neuropsychology and cognitive neuroscience. Although the knowledge generated by these disciplines has made relevant contributions to neurological therapy, their theoretical premises may create limitations in therapeutic processes. The present manuscript has two main objectives: first, to explicitly set forth the theoretical bases of cognitive neurorehabilitation and critically analyze the repercussions that these premises have produced in clinical practice; and second, to propose the enactive paradigm to reinterpret perspectives on people with brain damage and their therapy (assessment and treatment). This analysis will show that (1) neurorehabilitation as a therapy underutilizes body-originated resources that aid in recovery from neurological sequelae (embrained therapy); (2) the therapeutic process is based exclusively on subpersonal explanation models (subpersonal therapy); and (3), neurorehabilitation does not take subjectivity of each person in their own recovery processes into account (anti-subjective therapy). Subsequently, and in order to attenuate or resolve the conception of embrained, subpersonal and anti-subjective therapy, I argue in support of incorporating the enactive paradigm in rehabilitation of neurological damage. It is proposed here under a new term, "experiential neurorehabilitation." This proposal approaches neurological disease and its sequelae as alterations in dynamic interaction between the body structure and the environment in which the meaning of the experience is also altered. Therefore, when a person is not able to walk, remember the past, communicate a thought, or maintain efficient self-care, their impairments are not only a product of an alteration in a specific cerebral area or within information processing; rather, the sequelae of their condition stem from alterations in the whole living system and its dynamics with the environment. The objective of experiential neurorehabilitation is the recovery of the singular and concrete experience of the person, composed of physical and subjective life attributes.Comisión Nacional de Investigación Científica y Tecnológica (CONICYT) CONICYT FONDECYT 1119050