Minority Representation under Cumulative and Limited Voting

We examine minority representation resulting from modified at-large elections (cumulative and limited voting) used in U.S. localities in the 1990s. Hypotheses about the relative proportionality of descriptive representation under various local election systems are presented and tested. We find that CV/LV elections produced descriptive representation of African-Americans at levels similar to those in larger single-member district places, and at levels that exceed those from some small, southern SMD places. Results for Latino representation are more qualified. Our results offer encouragement for those interested in facilitating minority representation without using the acrimonious process of drawing districts on the basis of races

Party discipline and parliamentary government

(print) ix, 304 p. : ill. ; 24 cmForeword -- Preface -- 1. Party cohesion, party discipline, and parliaments. p.3 -- 2. How political parties emerged from the primeval slime: party cohesion, party discipline, and the formation of governments. p.23 -- 3. Discipline in the British Conservative Party: the attitudes of party activists toward the role of their Members of Parliament. p.53 -- 4. Backbenchers with attitude: a seismic study of the Conservative Party and dissent on Europe. p.72 -- 5. Cohesion of party groups and interparty conflict in the Swiss parliament: roll call voting in the National Council. p.99 -- 6. Electoral systems, parliamentary committees, and party discipline: the Norwegian Storting in a comparative perspective. p.121 -- 7. Parliamentary party discipline in Spain. p.141 -- 8. The parliamentarization of the East Central European parties: party discipline in the Hungarian parliament, 1990-1996. p.167 -- 9. The challenge of diversity: party cohesion in the European Parliament. p.189 -- 10. Parties and party discipline within the European Parliament: a norms-based approach. p.208 -- 11. The costs of coalition: a five-nation comparison. p.227 -- 12. Coalition discipline, enforcement mechanisms, and intraparty politics. p.269 -- Contributors. p.289 -- Index. p.29

The democratic engagement of Britain's ethnic minorities

Democratic engagement is a multi-faceted phenomenon that embraces citizens' involvement with electoral politics, their participation in ‘conventional’ extra-parliamentary political activity, their satisfaction with democracy and trust in state institutions, and their rejection of the use of violence for political ends. Evidence from the 2010 BES and EMBES shows that there are important variations in patterns of democratic engagement across Britain's different ethnic-minority groups and across generations. Overall, ethnic-minority engagement is at a similar level to and moved by the same general factors that influence the political dispositions of whites. However, minority democratic engagement is also strongly affected by a set of distinctive ethnic-minority perceptions and experiences, associated particularly with discrimination and patterns of minority and majority cultural engagement. Second-generation minorities who grew up in Britain are less, rather than more, likely to be engaged

Explaining Institutional Change: Why Elected Politicians Implement Direct Democracy

In existing models of direct democratic institutions, the median voter benefits, but representative politicians are harmed since their policy choices can be overridden. This is a puzzle, since representative politicians were instrumental in creating these institutions. I build a model of direct democracy that explains why a representative might benefit from tying his or her own hands in this way. The key features are (1) that voters are uncertain about their representative's preferences; (2) that direct and representative elections are complementary ways for voters to control outcomes. The model shows that some politicians benefit from the introduction of direct democracy, since they are more likely to survive representative elections: direct democracy credibly prevents politicians from realising extreme outcomes. Historical evidence from the introduction of the initiative, referendum and recall in America broadly supports the theory, which also explains two empirical results that have puzzled scholars: legislators are trusted less, but reelected more, in US states with direct democracy. I conclude by discussing the potential for incomplete information and signaling models to improve our understanding of institutional change more generally

Financing Direct Democracy: Revisiting the Research on Campaign Spending and Citizen Initiatives

The conventional view in the direct democracy literature is that spending against a measure is more effective than spending in favor of a measure, but the empirical results underlying this conclusion have been questioned by recent research. We argue that the conventional finding is driven by the endogenous nature of campaign spending: initiative proponents spend more when their ballot measure is likely to fail. We address this endogeneity by using an instrumental variables approach to analyze a comprehensive dataset of ballot propositions in California from 1976 to 2004. We find that both support and opposition spending on citizen initiatives have strong, statistically significant, and countervailing effects. We confirm this finding by looking at time series data from early polling on a subset of these measures. Both analyses show that spending in favor of citizen initiatives substantially increases their chances of passage, just as opposition spending decreases this likelihood

POLICY PREFERENCE FORMATION IN LEGISLATIVE POLITICS:STRUCTURES, ACTORS, AND FOCAL POINTS

This dissertation introduces and tests a model of policy preference formation in legislative politics. Emphasizing a dynamic relationship between structure, agent, and decision-making process, it ties the question of policy choice to the dimensionality of the normative political space and the strategic actions of parliamentary agenda-setters. The model proposes that structural factors, such as ideology, shape policy preferences to the extent that legislative specialists successfully link them to specific policy proposals through the provision of informational focal points. These focal points shift attention toward particular aspects of a legislative proposal, thus shaping the dominant interpretation of its content and consequences and, in turn, individual-level policy preferences. The propositions of the focal point model are tested empirically with data from the European Parliament (EP), using both qualitative (interview data, content analyses of parliamentary debates) and quantitative methods (multinomial logit regression analyses of roll-call votes). The findings have implications for our understanding of politics and law-making in the European Union and for the study of legislative decision-making more generally