39 research outputs found

    Giving more detailed information about health insurance encourages consumers to choose compromise options

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    IntroductionTo investigate how the provision of additional information about the health events and procedures covered by a healthcare plan affect the level of coverage chosen by young adults taking their first full time job.MethodsUniversity students were recruited for a study at two behavioral laboratories (one located at the University of Toronto and the other located at INSEAD-Sorbonne University in Paris) in which they imagine they are making choices about the healthcare coverage associated with the taking a new job in Chicago, Illinois. Every participant made choices in four categories: Physician Care, Clinical Care, Hospital Care, and Dental Care. Participants were randomly assigned to one of two conditions: Low Detail or High Detail coverage information and they chose between three levels of coverage: Basic, Enhanced, and Superior. The study took place in March 2017 with 120 students in Toronto and 121 students in Paris.ResultsThe provision of more detailed information about the health events and procedures covered by a healthcare plan leads to a compromise effect in which participants shift their choices significantly towards Enhanced (moderate coverage) from Basic (low coverage) and Superior (high coverage). The compromise effect was observed at both locations; however, Paris participants choose significantly higher levels of coverage than Toronto participants.DiscussionProviding more detail to employees about the health events and procedures covered by a healthcare plan will increase the fraction of employees who choose the intermediate level of coverage. It is beyond the scope of this study to conclude whether this is good or bad; however, in a context where employees gravitate to either insufficient or excessive coverage, providing additional detail may reduce these tendencies

    CD200R1 Supports HSV-1 Viral Replication and Licenses Pro-Inflammatory Signaling Functions of TLR2

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    The CD200R1:CD200 axis is traditionally considered to limit tissue inflammation by down-regulating pro-inflammatory signaling in myeloid cells bearing the receptor. We generated CD200R1−/− mice and employed them to explore both the role of CD200R1 in regulating macrophage signaling via TLR2 as well as the host response to an in vivo, TLR2-dependent model, herpes simplex virus 1 (HSV-1) infection. CD200R1−/− peritoneal macrophages demonstrated a 70–75% decrease in the generation of IL-6 and CCL5 (Rantes) in response to the TLR2 agonist Pam2CSK4 and to HSV-1. CD200R1−/− macrophages could neither up-regulate the expression of TLR2, nor assemble a functional inflammasome in response to HSV-1. CD200R1−/− mice were protected from HSV-1 infection and exhibited dysfunctional TLR2 signaling. Finally, both CD200R1−/− mice and CD200R1−/− fibroblasts and macrophages showed a markedly reduced ability to support HSV-1 replication. In summary, our data demonstrate an unanticipated and novel requirement for CD200R1 in “licensing” pro-inflammatory functions of TLR2 and in limiting viral replication that are supported by ex vivo and in vivo evidence

    It's a whole new ball-game

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    Today, a big challenge for business is dealing with the change created by the information revolution. The industrial revolution created the need of urbanization, mass production created homogeneity in consumption patterns and mass media created tremendous homogeneity in the news and information that people are exposed to. The information revolution has the created (1) the opportunity for individuals to work and buy at home, (2) the opportunity for firms to implement 'mass customization' and provide customized offerings for smaller segments of customers and (3) tremendous splintering in the channels that people use to exchange information. The information revolution effectively has the ability to reverse characteristics that are prototypical of 20th century society. To deal with these 'reversals', a successful firm will have to use information technology to understand both itself and its customers better.

    Preview Provision Under Competition

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    In certain categories, an important element of competition is the use of previews to signal information to potential consumers about product attributes. For example, the front page of a newspaper provides a preview to potential newspaper buyers before they purchase the product. In this context, a news provider can provide previews that are highly informative about the content of the news product. Conversely, a news provider can utilize a preview that is relatively uninformative. We examine the incentives that firms have to adopt different preview strategies in a context where they do not have complete control of product positioning. Our analysis shows that preview strategy can be a useful source of differentiation. However, when a firm adopts a strategy of providing informative previews, it confers a positive externality on a competitor that utilizes uninformative previews. This reinforces the incentive of the competitor to use uninformative previews and explains why the market landscape in news provision is often characterized by asymmetric competition.product positioning, preview design, information goods, information revelation, product differentiation

    Designing the Content of Advertising in a Differentiated Market (CEIBS Working Paper, No. 006/2020/MKT)

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    In many markets, consumers use detailed attribute information to assess the value they expect from purchasing a product or service. Markets that Öt this description include LED monitors, wine, some OTC healthcare products, mattresses and automobile tires. In these markets, quality di§erences exist yet many di§erences are horizontal in nature: the consumer is interested in Önding a product that meets her unique tastes. Beyond ensuring that consumers know the brand, the category and the price; in these markets, it seems advertising should provide consumers with detailed attribute information. However, a signiÖcant proportion of advertising does not provide it. In fact, within the same category, competitors respond to messages that emphasize detailed attribute information with messages that are devoid of attribute information. These messags are uniformative about product attributes. We explore how competition in a di§erentiated market is a§ected by the ability of a Örm has to choose uninformative messages. We construct a model to investigate the factors that a§ect a Örmís decision to use advertising with detailed attribute information or advertising that does not provide attribute information. The model demonstrates that content decisions about advertising are a§ected by the di§erences between products, the range of heterogeneity in consumer tastes and the degree to which costs increase as a function of the quantity of information in advertising. Surprisingly, even when the cost to increase the quantity of information in advertising is low, uninformative campaigns can be more proÖtable than campaigns with detailed attribute information. The analysis also demonstrates that Örms may be more likely to provide detailed attribute information when there are less consumers that are attribute-sensitive. Finally, the model shows that uninformative messages can create "artiÖcial di§erentiation" in some conditions
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