20 research outputs found
Beyond Kuhn: Methodological Contextualism and Partial Paradigms
Kuhnâs view of science is as follows. Science involves two key phases: normal and extraordinary. In normal science, disciplinary matrices (DMs) are large and pervasive. DMs
involve âbeliefs, values, techniques, and so on shared by the members of a given communityâ
(Kuhn 1996, 175). âAnd so onâ is regrettably vague, but Kuhn (1977, 1996) mentions three
other key elements: symbolic generalizations (such as F=dp/dt), models (such as Bohrâs
atomic model), and exemplars. These components of DMs overlap somewhat. For instance, symbolic generalizations may feature in techniques and beliefs, and models may exhibit values.
To be a (genuine) scientist, in the normal science phase, is to puzzle solve within the
boundaries of the DM. It is to buy into the ruling dogma (Kuhn 1963) and to accept that
âfailure to achieve a solution discredits only the scientist ... âIt is a poor carpenter who blames
his toolsââ (Kuhn 1996, 80). Puzzle solving involves a wide variety of activities, includin
'In Between Believing' and Degrees of Belief
Schwitzgebel (2001) â henceforth 'S' â offers three examples in order to convince us that there are situations in which individuals are neither accurately describable as believing that p or failing to so believe, but are rather in 'in-between states of belief'. He then argues that there are no 'Bayesian' or representational strategies for explicating these, and proposes a dispositional account.
I do not have any fundamental objection to the idea that there might be 'in-between states of belief'. What I shall argue, rather, is that: (I) S does not provide a convincing argument that there really are such states; (II) S does not show, as he claims, that 'in-between states of belief' could not be accounted for in terms of degrees of belief; (III) Sâs dispositional account of 'in-between states of belief' is more problematic than the 'degree of belief' alternative
Bertrand's Paradox and the Maximum Entropy Principle
An important suggestion of objective Bayesians is that the maximum entropy principle can replace a principle which is known to get into paradoxical difficulties: the principle of indifference. No one has previously determined whether the maximum entropy principle is better able to solve Bertrandâs chord paradox than the principle of indifference. In this paper I show that it is not. Additionally, the course of the analysis brings to light a new paradox, a revenge paradox of the chords, that is unique to the maximum entropy principle
The Instrumentalist's New Clothes
This paper develops a new version of instrumentalism, in light of progress in the realism debate in recent decades, and thereby defends the view that instrumentalism remains a viable philosophical position on science. The key idea is that talk of unobservable objects should be taken literally only when those objects are assigned properties (or described in terms of analogies involving things) with which we are experientially (or otherwise) acquainted. This is derivative from the instrumentalist tradition in so far as the distinction between unobservable and observable is taken to have significance with respect to meaning
The use and misuse of taxpayersâ money: publicly-funded educational research
How should educational research be contracted? And is there anything wrong with the way that public funding of educational research is currently administered? We endeavour to answer these questions by appeal to the work of two of the most prominent philosophers of science of the twentieth century, namely Popper and Kuhn. Although their normative views of science are radically different, we show that they would nonetheless agree on a number of key rules concerning the extent to which scientific practice should be influenced âfrom the outsideâ. We then show that these rules are often broken in the way that research is publicly funded in the UK