Information parsimony in collaborative interaction

We investigate the information processing cost associated with performing a collaborative dyadic task at a specific utility level. We build our approach on the Relevant Information formalism, which combines Shannon's Information Theory and Markov Decision Processes, for modelling a dyadic interaction scenario in which two agents with independent controllers move an object together with fully redundant control. Results show that increasing dyad's collaboration decreases the information intake and vice versa, antagonistic behavior puts a strain on the information bandwidth capacity. The key role of the particular embodiment of the environment in this trade-off is demonstrated in a series of simulations with informationally parsimonious optimal controllers.Peer reviewedFinal Published versio

Information-theoretic Sensorimotor Foundations of Fitts' Law

© 2019 ACM. This is the author's version of the work. It is posted here by permission of ACM for your personal use. Not for redistribution. The definitive version was published is accessible via https://doi.org/10.1145/3290607.3313053We propose a novel, biologically plausible cost/fitness function for sensorimotor control, formalized with the information-theoretic principle of empowerment, a task-independent universal utility. Empowerment captures uncertainty in the perception-action loop of different nature (e.g. noise, delays, etc.) in a single quantity. We present the formalism in a Fitts' law type goal-directed arm movement task and suggest that empowerment is one potential underlying determinant of movement trajectory planning in the presence of signal-dependent sensorimotor noise. Simulation results demonstrate the temporal relation of empowerment and various plausible control strategies for this specific task

Limiting Limited Liability

Limited liability may result in inefficient accident prevention, because a relevant portion of the expected harm is externalized on victims. This paper shows that under some restrictive conditions further limiting liability by means of a liability cap can improve caretaking.

THE ECONOMICS OF PURE ECONOMIC LOSS AND THE INTERNALISATION OF MULTIPLE EXTERNALITIES

This study emphasises the divergence between the legal approach to pure economic loss and the economic one, and focuses on the latter. Traditional economic theory is grounded on the divide between social and private loss and is employed in formulating policy recommendations for an efficient outcome. However, it fails to explain why pure economic loss cases are treated differently in different legal systems. This study suggests that pure economic loss should be regarded as the internalisation of positive externalities through a mechanism (tort law) primarily designed for negative externalities. The pure economic loss problem is a problem of choosing between secondbest solutions, because tort law generally fails to provide first-best internalisation of both types of externalities. Within this framework, some new hypotheses on the comparative law and economics of pure economic loss will be discussed.economic loss, financial loss, tort, damage, compensation,

Carrots, sticks, and the multiplication effect

Although a punishment can be applied only once, the threat to punish (also referred to as stick) can be reiterated several times, because when parties obey, the punishment is not applied and thus the threat can be repeated. The same is not possible with promises to reward (also known as carrots), since they need to be carried on every time a party complies, and hence at each round a new reward is needed. We show that the multipliability of sticks has pervasive consequences in economics and law and provides a unified explanation for seemingly unrelated phenomena such as the dynamics of riots and revolutions, the divide-and-conquer strategy, comparative negligence, the anticommons problem, the use of property rules in markets, the most-favored nation clause, legal restrictions on penalties in employment contracts, and legal aid

Model of Coordination Flow in Remote Collaborative Interaction

© 2015 IEEEWe present an information-theoretic approach for modelling coordination in human-human interaction and measuring coordination flows in a remote collaborative tracking task. Building on Shannon's mutual information, coordination flow measures, for stochastic collaborative systems, how much influence, the environment has on the joint control of collaborating parties. We demonstrate the application of the approach on interactive human data recorded in a user study and reveal the amount of effort required for creating rigorous models. Our initial results suggest the potential coordination flow has - as an objective, task-independent measure - in supporting designers of human collaborative systems and in providing better theoretical foundations for the science of Human-Computer Interaction

Empowerment as a metric for Optimization in HCI

We propose a novel metric for optimizing human-computer interfaces, based on the information-theoretic capacity of empowerment, a task-independent universal utility measure. Empowerment measures, for agent-environment systems with stochastic transitions, how much influence, which can be sensed by the agent sensors, an agent has on its environment. It captures the uncertainty in human-machine systems arising from different sources (i.e. noise, delays, errors, etc.) as a single quantity. We suggest the potential empowerment has as an objective optimality criterion in user interface design optimization, contributing to the more solid theoretical foundations of HCI.Peer reviewedFinal Accepted Versio

Uncertainty of Law and the Legal Process.

There is extensive literature on whether courts or legislators produce efficient rules, but which of them produces rules efficiently? Is there an optimal mix of litigation and legislation? The law is inevitably subject to a certain degree of uncertainty ex ante; uncertainty makes the outcomes of trials difficult to predict and, hence, prevents parties from settling disputes out of court. Conversely, the law is necessarily certain ex post: litigation fosters the creation of precedents that reduce uncertainty. We postulate that there is a natural balance between the degree of uncertainty of a legal system (kept under control by litigation) and its litigation rate (sustained by uncertainty). We describe such equilibrium rates of litigation and uncertainty in a formal model, study how they are affected by two different policies -litigation fees/subsidies and legislation - and compare the costs and benefits of the legislative and the judicial process of lawmaking. We then extend the analysis to explore the implications of this approach.incompleteness of law, complexity of law, litigation, judge-made law, legislation.