The Experience of Reading Philosophy

Reading is not a peripheral philosophical pastime; it constitutes most of what we do when we do philosophy. And the experience of reading philosophy is much more than just a series of interpretative acts: the philosopher-reader is subject to, among other things, sensations, passions, emendations, and transformations. In this essay, I argue that a full account of philosophical reading should outline some of the sociological structures that determine how different communities of philosophers (within and outside the academy) construct such experiences, as well as describe in detail the ways in which philosophers encounter (or fail to encounter) truths while reading. It should, that is, describe ways in which philosophy acts upon readers and the various effects that result

Anachronism in recent moral philosophy

In this article, I analyze the debate between Raimond Gaita and Christopher Hamilton on the rhetorical practices appropriate to achieving lucidity (full attention to moral reality). I concentrate on the deployment of untimely terms (taking “soul” as my central example) as a means by which both Gaita and Hamilton attempt to provoke lucidity in the reader. In the final sections of the article, I use this case study of the moral term “soul” to set out a theoretical model for the process of becoming lucid in order to (partially) defend Gaita's philosophical style against Hamilton's criticisms. At stake is the possibility of other forms of rigor, other forms of clarity, and other forms of cogency than analytic philosophizing typically presumes.</jats:p

Religious discrimination and symbolism: a philosophical perspective

This report is the product of the Arts-and-Humanities Research Council’s Connected Communities programme. The specific project being undertaken at the University of Liverpool is entitled Philosophy of Religion and Religious Communities: Defining Beliefs and Symbols. The aim of the Liverpool project as a whole is to consider the contribution philosophy of religion can make to recent debates surrounding legal cases alleging religious discrimination. Its orienting question runs, ‘when, if ever, is it acceptable to prohibit the use of religious symbols?’. The present report scrutinises in detail the way in which Article 9 of the European Convention of Human Rights has been utilised in recent judgments concerning the uses of religious symbolism. It argues that since 1995, Strasbourg jurisprudence, followed, to some extent, by domestic jurisprudence, has displayed what we call ‘the practical turn’. This we analyse as the turn away from seeing actions solely in the light of the antecedent beliefs that they manifest to seeing actions and the practices that they compose in their own right alongside beliefs. The practical turn can, we consider, be given several slightly different detailed readings. One such is that it is the turn from consideration of high-level theoretical systems of belief (such as religions), to which actions and practices are considered subservient, to consideration of individual low-level practical beliefs on an equal footing with the actions that naturally flow from them

O Projeto Crítico em Schelling, Tillich e Goodchild

O artigo procura estabelecer as condições e os elementos de uma teoria genuinamente crítica no estudo da religião: a partir de onde se crítica? Isso é, qual é o discurso ideal a partir do qual se pode embarcar no projeto crítico? Qual é o gênero da crítica? Se a crítica é inerentemente teológica, mas estruturada filosoficamente, são aqueles que criticam filósofos, teólogos ou críticos propriamente ditos (κριτικόι)? a crítica das religiões e a reorientação da preocupação última é um ethos, uma ética do pensamento. O autor delinea esse ethos através de três manifestações de uma tradição distinta, ainda que subexplorada, de teologia radical, que atravessa Schelling, Tillich e Goodchild. O que os três têm em comum é o compromisso de atender àquilo que mais importa (piedade ou preocupação última) e a um projeto de crítica que radicalize a definição kantiana de transcendental a fim de chegar àquilo que escapa ao pensamento de Kant - os valores incondicionais ou "teológicos mais profundos" que orientam a existência pessoal.[1] A obra de Lacoue-Labarthe e Jean-Luc Nancy a partir do final dos anos 70 também é impulsionada por essa pergunta (p. ex., LACOUE-LABARTHE e NANCY, The Literary Absolute: The Theory of Literature in German Romanticism, trans. Philip Bernard and Cheryl Lester. Albany: SUNY Press, 1988

Thought Crime and the Treason Act 1351

AbstractHas there ever been a law criminalizing mental states in themselves? We show that there has been, and still is: the Treason Act 1351. We argue for what we call ‘the Mental Interpretation’ of the Act, over against the interpretation that it criminalizes a complex of a mental state and an ‘overt act’. We also provide authority for the stronger thesis that the overt act functions purely as evidence for the mental state. We discuss other laws in various jurisdictions that have historically criminalized mental states in themselves. We conclude by considering the objection that the European Convention on Human Rights rules out our interpretation.</jats:p