No. 77: Living with Xenophobia: Zimbabwean Informal Enterprise in South Africa

South Africa’s crisis of xenophobia is defined by the discrimination and intolerance to which migrants are exposed on a daily basis. A major target of the country’s extreme xenophobia – defined as a heightened form of xenophobia in which hostility and opposition to those perceived as outsiders and foreigners is expressed through violent acts – is the businesses run by migrants and refugees in the informal sector. Attitudinal surveys clearly show that South Africans differentiate migrants by national origin and that Zimbabweans are amongst the most disliked. Zimbabweans are certainly not the only small-business owners to have become victims of extreme xenophobia. However, few studies to date have specifically examined the impact of xenophobic violence on Zimbabweans who are trying to make a living in the South African informal sector. This report is based on two sources of data: (a) in 2015, SAMP’s Growing Informal Cities (GIC) Project surveyed over 1,000 randomly selected migrant-owned informal sector enterprises in Cape Town and Johannesburg. The data on 304 Zimbabwean-owned enterprises included in the survey sample has been extracted for analysis; and (b) in 2016, 50 in-depth interviews were conducted with Zimbabwean informal business owners in Cape Town, Johannesburg and Polokwane who had been affected by xenophobic violence. The demographic profile of the Zimbabwean migrant entrepreneurs in the GIC survey included the following: As many as 60% of Zimbabwean entrepreneurs in Cape Town and 65% in Johannesburg are male. This was a marked contrast to informal cross-border trade between Zimbabwe and South Africa, which is dominated by female Zimbabweans. The number of migrant entrepreneurs who arrived in South Africa peaked between 2005 and 2010 at the height of the economic crisis in Zimbabwe and has since fallen. As many as 88% of the migrants in Cape Town arrived in the city after 2005 (compared to 52% of those in Johannesburg). Only 5% of the survey respondents had experience working in the Zimbabwean informal economy before migrating to South Africa. Those with prior experience had generally been involved in informal cross-border trading and were therefore familiar with South Africa. Relatively few of the Zimbabwean entrepreneurs did not have documents permitting them to be in the country and/or to work legally. Just over one-third of the migrants in the survey had asylum-seeker (Section 22) permits but only 5% had refugee status (Section 24 permits). Around one-quarter had work permits and 10% had visitor’s permits. Only 15% did not have permits to reside and/or work in South Africa. The majority of the surveyed Zimbabwean enterprises were in the retail, trade and wholesale sector, followed by services and manufacturing. Most migrants did not start an informal business immediately on arrival in South Africa but first raised start-up capital through regular and casual employment. Against this backdrop, the report focuses on the findings from the in-depth interviews with Zimbabwean entrepreneurs. First, we review their experience of xenophobia and xenophobic violence. Most of the respondents recounted incidents of violence that had personally affected them. These accounts revealed a number of common features: To migrants, much of the violence occurs without warning and appears spontaneous. However, this is rarely the case as many attacks are preceded by community meetings from which migrants are excluded. They, therefore, have little ability or time to take evasive action. The perpetrators of xenophobic violence are often from the same community and are even personally known to their victims. The fact that migrant entrepreneurs provide goods, including food, at competitive prices and offer credit to consumers is clearly insufficient to protect them when violence erupts. In many areas, community leaders are ineffective in dealing with the violence and, in some cases, they actively foment hostility and instigate attacks. The looting of stock on the premises is a constant feature of the attacks. However, robbery per se is not the prime motive for the attacks. Virtually all agreed that the purpose of the attacks was not simply to steal certain desirable goods but to destroy their business premises and operations so that they could not continue to operate and would go back to Zimbabwe. South African business owners in the same vicinity are left alone during crowd violence. Attacks often involved vicious physical assaults against the person, accompanied by insulting xenophobic language. Many accounts describe how anti-government service delivery protests quickly disintegrate into mob violence and looting of shops owned by migrants. The looting is never indiscriminate and targets only migrants. Migrants feel that they are scapegoats for government failure to deliver services. There was some evidence of “violent entrepreneurship” involving attacks orchestrated by South African competitors. Xenophobic violence is gender-indiscrimate with male and female migrants recounting equally harrowing stories. The respondents differed on whether Zimbabweans were particular targets. Most said that all foreign-owned businesses were targeted. A number commented that the type of business made a difference, with food and grocery shops being especially vulnerable. The pervasive view amongst South African politicians is that xenophobia does not exist in the country. However, the term “xenophobia:” was used by all the rewspondents to describe the harassment and physical abuse that they experience and some even referred to the widespread violence in 2008 and 2015 as “the xenophobia.” The language and practices of xenophobia cow the victims into silence and a sense of helplessness. The interviews provide important insights into how migrant entrepreneurs respond to the threat and reality of xenophobic violence. Trying to “fit in “ and integrate by learning local languages, dress codes and cultural practices is one way to try to pre-empt attacks. However, these strategies are no guarantee of protection when mob violence breaks out. Some suggested that there was safety in numbers and that conducting business in areas where there were many other migrant businesses reduced the risks of being attacked. The downside of operating in safer spaces is that business competition is extremely fierce. Most are aware that a great deal of the xenophobic violence is confined to low-income areas, particularly informal settlements. While it is possible for some to avoid doing business in these areas, and to operate in areas of the city where attacks are less frequent, this is not feasible for all. Many Zimbabwean migrants to South Africa do not have the financial means to afford accommodation outside informal settlements and do not have the resources to run a business elsewhere. Several respondents noted that the unpredictability of the attacks made it difficult to plan in advance. Some said that they made sure that they did not keep all of their stock at the place of business, storing some at home or in rented containers. All tried to minimize the amount of cash they kept on the premises. Various reactive strategies were mentioned, including temporarily ceasing business operations, staying indoors at home, and moving in with friends or relatives in other parts of the city. None of the respondents said that xenophobic attacks would put them permanently out of business. On the contrary, most said that they would simply raise the capital and start again. The logical implication of this is that xenophobic violence fails in its two main aims: to drive migrant entrepreneurs out of business and to drive them out of the country. Many respondents made reference to the fact that the crisis in Zimbabwe meant that there was nothing for them to return to, even if they wanted to return

A comparison of methods to estimate anaerobic capacity: Accumulated oxygen deficit and W' during constant and all-out work-rate profiles.

This document is the Pre-Print version of an article first published by Taylor & Francis Group in Journal of Sports Sciences, on December 2016, available online at:http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/02640414.2016.1267386. The Accepted Manuscript version is under embargo. Embargo end date: 26 June 2018.This study investigated (i) whether the accumulated oxygen deficit (AOD) and curvature constant of the power-duration relationship (W') are different during constant work-rate to exhaustion (CWR) and 3-min all-out (3MT) tests and (ii) the relationship between AOD and W' during CWR and 3MT. Twenty-one male cyclists (age: 40 ± 6 years; maximal oxygen uptake [V̇O2max]: 58 ± 7 ml · kg-1 · min-1) completed preliminary tests to determine the V̇O2-power output relationship and V̇O2max. Subsequently, AOD and W' were determined as the difference between oxygen demand and oxygen uptake and work completed above critical power, respectively, in CWR and 3MT. There were no differences between tests for duration, work, or average power output (P ≥ 0.05). AOD was greater in the CWR test (4.18 ± 0.95 vs. 3.68 ± 0.98 L; P = 0.004), whereas W' was greater in 3MT (9.55 ± 4.00 vs. 11.37 ± 3.84 kJ; P = 0.010). AOD and W' were significantly correlated in both CWR (P < 0.001, r = 0.654) and 3MT (P < 0.001, r = 0.654). In conclusion, despite positive correlations between AOD and W' in CWR and 3MT, between-test differences in the magnitude of AOD and W', suggest that both measures have different underpinning mechanisms.Peer reviewe

South Africa Case Study: The Double Crisis – Mass Migration From Zimbabwe And Xenophobic Violence in South Africa

The protracted economic and political crisis in Zimbabwe led directly to a major increase in mixed migration flows to South Africa. Migrants were drawn from every sector of society, all education and skill levels, equal numbers of both sexes, and all ages (including unaccompanied child migration). Many migrants claimed asylum in South Africa which gave them the right to work while they waited for a refugee hearing. Many others were arrested and deported back to Zimbabwe. Migrants who were unable to find employment in the formal economy turned to employment and self-employment in the informal economy. These migrant entrepreneurs used personal savings to establish small and micro enterprises in many urban areas. The businesses focused on retail trading, manufacturing and services and contributed to the South African economy in various ways, including providing employment for South Africans. Nationwide xenophobic violence in 2008 targeted all migrants, irrespective of origin and legal status. From 2008 onwards, violent attacks on migrant-owned informal businesses began to escalate. This culminated in a second round of nationwide xenophobic violence in early 2015 when migrant-owned businesses were targeted by mobs. Migrants send essential remittances to family in Zimbabwe and return migration is not a viable or long-term response until Zimbabwe’s economic crisis is resolved. As a result, informal migrant entrepreneurs have adapted to hostile business conditions by adopting a range of strategies to avoid and protect themselves and their businesses from xenophobia. Against this backdrop, this report first discusses the nature of the crisis in Zimbabwe and its connections with large-scale out-migration, particularly to South Africa. The South African response to crisis-driven migration is reviewed showing how the government shifted from a predominantly coercive and control-oriented policy towards a more realistic assessment of the need to accommodate migrants through an immigration amnesty and the right to work in the formal and informal sector. One of the major challenges facing migrants and all stakeholders in South Africa is xenophobic violence. Nationwide attacks on migrants and refugees in 2008 and 2015 have been interspersed with ongoing lower-level episodes of violence. These attacks have increasingly targeted migrants and refugees, including many Zimbabweans, seeking to make a living in the country’s urban informal economy. The research for this report focused on the business activities and responses to xenophobic violence of Zimbabweans in the informal economy. Amongst the key findings were the following: • Between 20-30% of Zimbabwean migrants in South African cities are involved in the informal economy and the importance of informal sector employment to Zimbabweans has increased over time. • Zimbabweans operating enterprises in the informal economy are predominantly young (50- 75% under the age of 35) and male (60-70%). • Nearly two-thirds of the migrant entrepreneurs arrived in South Africa in the peak years of the Zimbabwean crisis between 2000 and 2010 (42%). Another 32% migrated after 2010. Less than 2% migrated to South Africa before the end of apartheid. • Economic hardship, unemployment and political persecution are the main push drivers of migration to South Africa. Pull drivers include the assistance of relatives already in South Africa and the prospect of employment. • The majority of the Zimbabwean migrant enterprises are in the retail, trade and wholesale sector, followed by services and manufacturing. Around three-quarters of the migrants relied on their personal savings to start their businesses and many worked in the formal economy first. • Business expansion has occurred despite the prime obligation of the entrepreneurs to support family still in Zimbabwe. Instead of reinvesting all of the business profits into further expansion, a portion is therefore diverted into remittance channels. Over one-third remit funds at least once per month and only 12% never send remittances. • A significant number of the entrepreneurs had been victims of or knew other who had been victims of crime such as looting and robbery, xenophobic abuse and police misconduct abuse. The report then presents the results of in-depth interviews with Zimbabwean business-owners who had experienced xenophobic violence in 2008 and 2015 or at other times. The narratives of the migrants provide insights into the unpredictable nature of the violence, their vulnerability to attack, the loss of business goods and property during mob violence and the need to restart from scratch, and the various strategies that they adopt to reduce risk. These strategies include operating in safer areas (not feasible for all), avoiding areas where corrupt police tend to operate, paying for protection and flight when xenophobic violence erupts. Return to Zimbabwe is not considered a viable option because of the economic conditions there. The interviews also provide insights into the migrants’ perceptions of government and stakeholder responses to the xenophobic violence. Almost without exception, the migrants felt that neither government (the Zimbabwean or South African) had done anything to protect or assist them during and after the violence. This perception of inaction also extended to international and non-governmental organisations. The migrants were particularly harsh in their comments about the police who were widely seen as either conniving in the violence or uninterested in protecting migrants. The perceptions of the migrants that nothing is done may simply be a function of who was interviewed and does not necessarily reflect the actual reality. The report therefore evaluates the response of the South African government to the ongoing crisis of xenophobia and concludes that some actions – such as sending in the army – are taken during episodes of nationwide violence but that ongoing daily and weekly attacks are generally ignored. There is a strong official line that these attacks are not motivated by xenophobia and. Indeed, that xenophobia does not even exist. This is clearly contradicted by the migrants who view the attacks as motivated by xenophobia. A second element of the official response is that the migrants are partially to blame for what happens to them as their business success builds resentment amongst South Africans. Government has yet to acknowledge that migrant-owned informal enterprises make a valuable contribution to the economy of the country, including through job creation for South Africans. The primary response to the violence of 2015 was the launching of a military-style Operation Fiela which was justified as a crime-fighting initiative but appears to have targeted migrant enterprises. The final sections of the report examine the responses and programmes of various non-governmental and international organisations to the crisis of xenophobia. During large-scale xenophobic violence there is considerable mobilisation of anti-xenophobia civil society organisations to offer protection and protest. Their effectiveness and impact tends to dissipate when the violence is more scattered and random. The South African Human Rights Commission (SAHRC) has played a major role in the past in holding government to account and articulating extensive recommendations for remedial action, most of which have not been taken up and many of which are still highly relevant. International organisations have tended to target integration and education programming at the community level but there has only been one systematic evaluation (of the UNHCR’s response) which was highly critical of the organisation. These organisations and other governments are considerably hamstrung by xenophobia denialism at the highest level because it means that government will avoid the kinds of partnership that are urgently needed to address this endemic crisis

Glycosylated haemoglobin (HbA1c) and cortisol levels on admission to intensive care as predictors of outcome

Objective: To evaluate the predictive value of glycosylated haemoglobin and cortisol on admission, in critical care patients. Design: Prospective, observational, single centre study. Setting: 14 bedded Intensive care unit of a tertiary-level university hospital. Patients: 124 consecutive emergency medical and surgical patients. Methods: Data collected on admission included patient demographics, medical history, medication, diagnosis, type of nutrition, TISS28 score, serum blood glucose, Glycosylated haemoglobin (HbA1c), cortisol, mean arterial blood pressure, and the use of inotropes in the first 24hrs. Daily baseline tests included complete blood count, urea and electrolytes, creatinine, twice weekly liver function tests. The primary outcome measure was intensive care unit mortality. Secondary outcome measures were ITU stay, days of ventilation, peak urea, peak creatinine, lowest platelet count, peak bilirubin, lowest Pa/FiO2, and the number of transfusions. Measurements and results: 124 patients (mean age 56.2 years SD 23.2) were included. Regression analysis was used to identify any potential predictors of outcome: HbA1c levels on admission were not found to be significantly associated with mortality (p=0.51), or any other secondary endpoints listed above. However, subgroup analysis revealed a predictive role of HbA1c with regards to length of ITU stay (p= 0.01) and number of days of ventilation (p=0.007) in those patients with a history of diabetes. Glucose level on admission emerged as an independent marker of mortality (p=0.009). Conclusions: This study suggests that HbA1c may not be a predictor of outcome in the general ITU population but may be of predictive value in diabetic ITU patients. On the other hand, blood glucose levels on admission emerged as a predictor of mortality, whilst no association was found between HbA1c and cortisol levels on admission.peer-reviewe

A Method for Psychosocial Stress-Induced Reinstatement of Cocaine Seeking in Rats

We describe a novel preclinical model of stress-induced relapse to cocaine use in rats using social defeat stress, an ethologically valid psychosocial stressor in rodents that closely resembles stressors that promote craving and relapse in humans. Rats self-administered cocaine for 20 days. On days 11, 14, 17, and 20, animals were subjected to social defeat stress or a nonstressful control condition following the session, with discrete environmental stimuli signaling the impending event. After extinction training, reinstatement was assessed following re-exposure to these discrete cues. Animals re-exposed to psychosocial stress-predictive cues exhibited increased serum corticosterone and significantly greater reinstatement of cocaine seeking than the control group, and active coping behaviors during social defeat episodes were associated with subsequent reinstatement magnitude. These studies are the first to describe an operant model of psychosocial stress-induced relapse in rodents and lay the foundation for future work investigating its neurobiological underpinnings

Chewing the fat on natural killer T cell development

Natural killer T cells (NKT cells) are selected in the thymus by self-glycolipid antigens presented by CD1d molecules. It is currently thought that one specific component of the lysosomal processing pathway, which leads to the production of isoglobotrihexosylceramide (iGb3), is essential for normal NKT cell development. New evidence now shows that NKT cell development can be disrupted by a diverse range of mutations that interfere with different elements of the lysosomal processing and degradation of glycolipids. This suggests that lysosomal storage diseases (LSDs) in general, rather than one specific defect, can disrupt CD1d antigen presentation, leading to impaired development of NKT cells

No. 69: Calibrating Informal Cross-Border Trade in Southern Africa

Informal cross-border trade (ICBT) is a significant feature of regional trade and international mobility in Southern Africa. The exact number of participants and economic importance of this trade is unknown because no official statistics are collected. Despite its obvious presence at every border post throughout the SADC region, ICBT remains largely invisible to policy-makers. Indeed, in government circles it is more often associated with smuggling, tax evasion and illegality than with innovation, enterprise and job creation. On the research side, there is a growing body of case study evidence that ICBT plays a critical role in poverty alleviation, food security and household livelihoods in Southern Africa. But its overall character and significance is unknown. With this in mind, SAMP initiated a project to examine cross-border regional trade at a selection of important border posts throughout the region. This research led to a number of country reports that provided rich insights into ICBT in particular countries. This report combines the data collected by each of the country teams and analyses the data set as a whole. The first issue addressed in the report is whether ICBT traders are a homogenous group. The research shows that this is far from being the case and that more attention needs to be paid to different types of traders and trading activity. Second, the report examines the activities of cross-border traders including the types of goods traded, the sources of those goods and where they are sold. While the majority of traders purchase goods from formal outlets in their countries of destination, most of these goods enter the informal economy on their return home. Third, the report examines financial transactions at the borders showing that most traders pay extremely small amounts of duty, which hardly justifies the effort of collecting it. On the other hand, only a small minority collect the VAT they are owed when they leave the country of purchase. Finally, the report itemizes the problems and challenges faced by informal traders when crossing borders. In total, the SAMP survey covered 20 land border posts connecting 11 Southern African countries using a threefold methodology. First, all people crossing through the selected border posts were monitored over a 10-day period and the number of ICBT traders counted. Second, the interactions of traders with customs officials were observed and the types, value and volumes of goods declared and duties paid were recorded. Third, a sample of traders was interviewed using an origin and destination (O&D) survey. During the course of the exercise, more than 205,000 people, including 85,000 traders, were counted passing through these border posts. The transactions of over 5,500 traders with customs officials were monitored and over 4,500 traders were interviewed. The study demonstrates that informal cross-border is a complex phenomenon and not uniform across the region, or even through border posts of the same country. However, the overall volume of trade, duties paid and VAT foregone, as well as the types of goods and where they are produced, indicate that this sector of regional trade should be given much greater attention and support by governments of the region as well as regional organizations such as the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA), SADC and the Southern African Customs Union (SACU). The major findings at the regional level were as follows: Demographically, women comprise a significant proportion of traders and constitute the majority of traders crossing through nearly half of the border posts surveyed, including one of the busiest at Beit Bridge between South Africa and Zimbabwe. At the same time, an unexpectedly large number of men were also involved in ICBT. Malawi and Zambia had significantly more male than female traders, for example. Most ICBT is bilateral in character; that is, traders tend to operate between their home country and one other country. Trading into a third country is comparatively rare. At the same time, the vast majority of traders crossing into a country with goods to sell are citizens of that country. ICBT by traders of other nationalities is uncommon. Although South Africa is a major source of goods purchased by traders, the absence of South African informal traders was very noticeable. The reasons why South Africans do not participate in ICBT requires further exploration but it stands in marked contrast to formal sector regional trade where South African companies predominate. ICBT is a neglected market opportunity for small-scale South African entrepreneurs and the obstacles to their participation need to be better understood. The majority of traders travelled frequently to other countries for short visits (sometimes for less than a day) to buy goods to sell in their home country, or to sell goods that they had bought for that purpose in their home country. Only 13% of respondents bought and sold goods while travelling (two-way trading). Frequency of tracel also varied both within and between countries, with traders in the Namibian (42%) and Zambian (25%) surveys being most likely to travel every day. Others travel at least once a week (Mozambique, 67%; Zambia, 34%). Some travel less frequently, but at least once a month. Very few stay more than a month in another country. The types of goods carried by informal cross-border traders vary widely, but at most borders the trade was dominated by food, especially groceries and fresh produce. Again, there was considerable variability at different borders. New clothes, household and electrical goods comprised a significant proportion of the stock of some cross-border traders. Other goods identified in the survey included second-hand clothing, petrol, alcohol, car parts and construction materials. Traders mostly source their goods from the formal sector of destination countries. A small proportion obtain their goods from informal markets in other countries. Many traders acted as wholesale importers of goods, selling the goods they carried across borders to vendors in informal markets. Others sold from their own stalls in informal markets, door to door, or to networks of family, friends and other individuals. A small proportion sold to retailers and restaurants in the formal sector. The value of goods carried by traders indicates the complexity and diversity of this sector. A significant cohort of traders appeared to be survivalists as many said they carried less than ZAR500 worth of goods. However, at least some of these traders travel frequently with low-value loads, rather than infrequently with high-value loads. Most traders travelled with loads in the range of ZAR1,001-5,000. A small cohort of traders travelled with loads worth more than ZAR15,000. Informal traders make a relatively significant contribution to duties collected at border posts. During the 10-day survey period at the 20 border posts, ZAR3,750,000 was collected from 1,780 traders. Duties collected varied between and within border posts. In some surveys the value of duties paid per trader was less than ZAR50. Interestingly, duties were being incorrectly collected at some borders between Southern African Customs Union countries (for example, between Botswana and Swaziland and South Africa). Traders said they were willing to pay duties, but wanted amounts reduced and the process to be more transparent. Although most traders buy their goods in the formal sector, few claim VAT when leaving the country of purchase. Many did not know they could do this while others said that the systems are too complex and time consuming. Traders who do not claim VAT back make an unintended contribution to the fiscus of the country where they buy their goods. Responses to questions about treatment from officials at the borders were generally positive but varied between and within border posts. Larger and busier posts generally received less favourable reviews. The scope and scale of informal cross-border trade across the SADC suggests that it makes a significant contribution to regional trade and the retail economies of the region and is consistent with the stated aims of both the SADC and COMESA to promote intra-regional trade. Small-scale cross-border trade could, if promoted and supported, provide a route to the development of pro-poor trade policies that could have a direct impact at the household level. If trade policies for the region are to be successful, the activities of these entrepreneurs need to be included in planning processes. ICBT comprises a significant component of regional economic activity for most countries in Southern Africa. It is highly visible at border posts throughout the region. Only amongst policy-makers and governments does it remain largely invisible

The Relationship between Grassland Composition on Stemborer Abundance on Grasses Surrounding Maize Farms

Grasslands are known to host crop pests and may act as the reservoir of pests affecting maize production. This research aimed at determining the effect of grassland composition on abundance of stemborers on grasses sorrouding maize farms in western Kenya. The experimental set up followed a complete random block design (CRBD); with four elevations at Lambwe, Homabay, Luanda and Mt. Elgon assigned as blocks based on different altitudes. Sampling was done in two seasons, during the short rain season of 2019 and the long rain season of 2020. Grasslands surrounding four pairs of push-pull and non-push-pull maize farms were assessed. Data on grass species diversity and the corresponding number of stemborers were collected from five quadrates per transect of 500m, for 4 transects per farm. The four transects originated from the midpoint of push-pull and non-push pull maize farm. A mixed design analysis of variance was used to test for variance within the elevation’s variability. The most common types of grasses surrounding most of the maize farms were mainly Cynadon dactylon and Immensis spp. These results point at the role of grasslands surrounding maize farms as reservoirs for the stem borers which need to be managed to reduce stem borer and fall armyworm infestations in the surrounding maize farms