Preventing collapse in Ukraine: The EU should finance the grass roots directly. CEPS Commentary, 10 December 2014

With the aim of averting the total collapse of the Ukrainian economy, Daniel Gros and Steven Blockmans urge the EU to ​offer a minimum of macro-financial assistance to improve governance, fight corruption and harmonise laws with the EU acquis, while beefing up financing channelled directly to the grass roots

The Geostrategic Implications of TTIP. CEPS Special Report No. 105/April 2015

This paper analyses the strategic considerations that define the perceived need for transatlantic renewal, and examines the geo-economic impact of the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) on both emerging powers and poorer countries. It argues that TTIP has the potential to be a catalyst for trade liberalisation at the global level, as long as the US and the EU are proactive about making the ‘open architecture’ of TTIP a reality

The Case for EU Police Mission Ukraine. CEPS Commentary, 14 May 2014

The EU appears to be out of its depth as a geopolitical actor trying to deal with the crisis in Ukraine. In this new CEPS Commentary, Steven Blockmans and Daniel Gros argue that the EU should concentrate on what really matters now: namely, preventing any further escalation of the conflict by sending a substantial stabilisation force to the areas that have so far remained relatively calm

From a political to a politicised Commission? CEPS Policy Insights No 2019-12/ September 2019

The Commission proposed by President-elect Ursula von der Leyen has been carefully calibrated to woo major parties in the European Parliament, member state governments and citizens alike. Announcing a “geopolitical Commission”, von der Leyen expects her restructured institution to be better equipped to tackle the global forces unleashed by a protectionist ‘America First’ policy and an increasingly assertive China. It remains to be seen, however, whether some of von der Leyen’s more controversial choices will balance themselves out in the first 100 days after the new Commission takes office on November 1st, or backfire further down the line. The latter, in particular, concerns the role of the Commission as an impartial guardian of the treaties

Trump’s election foreshadows further divisions in Europe. CEPS Commentary, 9 November 2016

The victory of Donald Trump has sent shockwaves throughout Europe. Under President Trump, US domestic and foreign policies can be expected to become more volatile and less predictable. For years, Trump has fairly consistently espoused the view that the US has been taken advantage of by the free-riding of its so-called ‘strategic’ partners. With Trump, a US retreat from the world can be expected. Guarantees that have underpinned more than 70 years of post-war global order are melting into air. This will affect Europe, in particular in the fields of trade and security and call into question previously shared values

A Commission of concrete steps rather than grand strategy. Policy Priorities for 2019-2024, 19 September 2019

The von der Leyen Commission inherits a Union that has largely overcome its ‘polycrises’. The economy has stabilised and employment continues to grow, despite the slowdown in the global economy. Apart from some fluctuations in the risk premium on Italian government bonds, the financial markets are largely without tension. The flow of refugees has fallen to a fraction of the peak registered three and four years ago. At the same time, trust in the EU and its institutions has increased steadily across most member states, reaching near-record values, and participation rates in the recent elections for the European Parliament also increased considerably. Against this background, it is not surprising that the various Eurosceptic parties did not do as well as expected in these elections. In the absence of unforeseen major shocks, the EU institutions should now be less engaged in crisis management and more able to pursue a long-term strategic agenda. The President-elect of the European Commission has also set out her overall programme, which is highly ambitious in many respects, hits all the right notes in terms of policy prioritisation but, significantly, does not recognise any trade-offs between different goals. Recognising trade-offs is essential for policymaking. For example, protecting citizens from terrorist threats might necessitate limitations to their freedoms. Fostering a climate-neutral Europe has costs that might weigh on growth and be difficult to distribute fairly. Any concrete political strategy will need to address these trade-offs – which political leaders typically fail to do

The EU’s Response to the Refugee Crisis: Taking Stock and Setting Policy Priorities. CEPS Essay No. 20, 16 December 2015

What have been the most important EU policy and legal responses to the 2015 refugee crisis? Is Europe taking effectively responsibility in compliance with its founding principles? This Essay takes stock of the main results and policy outputs from the EU’s interventions in the refugee crisis. It critically highlights the outstanding policy dilemmas confronting the adopted instruments and puts forwards a set of policy priorities to guide the next phases of the European Agenda on Migration

The European Border and Coast Guard Addressing migration and asylum challenges in the Mediterranean? CEPS Task Force Report, 1 February 2017

The humanitarian refugee crisis in Europe of 2015-2016 has revealed several unfinished elements and shortcomings in current EU policies and approaches to migration, asylum and borders, particularly those applying in southern EU maritime borders and frontier states in the Mediterranean. This book provides a critical examination of the main issues and lessons learned from this crisis and gives an up-to-date assessment of the main policy, legal and institutional responses that have been put in place at the EU level. It further examines the extent to which these responses can be expected to work under the current system of sharing responsibilities among EU member states in assessing asylum applications and ensuring a consistent implementation of EU legal standards that comply with the rule of law and fundamental rights. This report is based on original research and draws upon the existing literature, along with the discussions of a CEPS Task Force that met over six months, under the chairmanship of Enrico Letta, President of the Jacques Delors Institute, Dean of the Paris School of International Affairs (PSIA) at Sciences Po and former Prime Minister of Italy. The rapporteurs offer specific recommendations and possible scenarios for policy optimisation and assess the extent to which the establishment of a European Border and Asylum Service (EBAS) could address the current gaps and challenges in EU and member states’ migration policies

Britain’s Future in Europe: The known Plan A to remain or the unknown Plan B to leave. CEPS Paperback 2nd Ed., March 2016

Following the agreement made by Prime Minister David Cameron with the EU on 18-19 February 2016, the day for the referendum for the UK to remain in or leave the EU is set for 23 June 2016. This will be the most important decision taken by the British people in half a century, and whose consequences will live on for another half century. The first edition of this book, published in March 2015, laid the foundations for any objective assessment of the workings of the EU and the UK’s place in it. It was widely acclaimed and rated as “a myth-breaking exercise of the best kind”. This second edition adds a substantial new chapter following Cameron’s agreement with the EU and announcement of the referendum. It reviews both the ‘Plan A’, namely the status quo for the UK in the EU as amended by the new agreement, and three variants of a ‘Plan B’ for secession. The key point is that the ‘leave’ camp have not done their homework or ‘due diligence’ to specify the post-secession scenario, or how the British government would face up to the challenges that this would bring. The authors therefore do the ‘leave’ camp’s homework for them, setting out three Plan Bs more concretely and in more depth than the ‘leave’ camp have been able or wanted to do, or any other source has done. The book is therefore unique and essential reading for anyone concerned with the fateful choice that lies soon ahead

Long-term effect of tocilizumab in patients with giant cell arteritis:open-label extension phase of the Giant Cell Arteritis Actemra (GiACTA) trial

Background: The combination of tocilizumab plus a glucocorticoid taper is effective in maintaining clinical remission without requiring additional glucocorticoid therapy in patients with giant cell arteritis, as shown in part one of the Giant Cell Arteritis Actemra (GiACTA) trial. However, the duration of the tocilizumab effect after discontinuation is unknown. Here, we explored the maintenance of efficacy 1 year after discontinuation of tocilizumab treatment, the effectiveness of retreatment with tocilizumab after relapse, and the long-term glucocorticoid-sparing effect of tocilizumab. Methods: In part one of the GiACTA trial, 251 patients were randomly assigned (2:1:1:1) to receive subcutaneous tocilizumab (162 mg) once a week or every other week, combined with a 26-week prednisone taper, or placebo combined with a prednisone taper over a period of either 26 weeks or 52 weeks. Patients in clinical remission stopped masked injections at 1 year (the conclusion of part one). In part two, treatment was at the investigators' discretion and could consist of no treatment, tocilizumab, glucocorticoids, methotrexate, or combinations of these, for two years. Maintenance of efficacy as assessed by clinical remission (defined as absence of relapse determined by the investigator), cumulative glucocorticoid dose, and long-term safety were exploratory objectives in part two of the trial. This trial is registered at ClinicalTrials.gov, NCT01791153. Findings: 215 patients participated in part two of the trial; 81 patients who were randomly assigned to tocilizumab once a week in part one were in clinical remission after 1 year, of whom 59 started part two on no treatment. 25 of these 59 patients (42%) maintained tocilizumab-free and glucocorticoid-free clinical remission throughout part two. Median (95% CI) cumulative glucocorticoid doses over 3 years were 2647 mg (1987\u20133507) for tocilizumab once a week, 3948 mg (2352\u20135186) for tocilizumab-every-other-week, 5277 mg (3944\u20136685) for placebo with a 26-week prednisone taper, and 5323 mg (3900\u20136951) for placebo with a 52-week prednisone taper (van Elteren p 640\ub7001, tocilizumab once a week vs placebo groups; p<0\ub705, tocilizumab-every-other-week vs placebo groups). Tocilizumab-based regimens restored clinical remission among patients who experienced relapse in part two and were treated (median time to remission: 15 days for tocilizumab alone [n=17]; 16 days for tocilizumab plus glucocorticoids [n=36]; and 54 days for glucocorticoids alone [n=27]). No new or unexpected safety findings were reported over the full 3 years of the study. Interpretation: Giant cell arteritis remains a chronic disease that entails ongoing management and careful vigilance for disease relapse, but continuous indefinite treatment with immunosuppressive drugs is not required for all patients. A substantial proportion of patients treated with tocilizumab for one year maintain drug-free remission during the two years after tocilizumab cessation. For patients who experience relapse, tocilizumab can be used to manage relapses, but it remains prudent to include prednisone for patients who experience relapse because of the risk for vision loss. Funding: F Hoffmann-La Roche