ethical reasons and political commitment

Political commitments to resist oppression play a central role in the moral lives of many people. Such commitments are also a source of ethical reasons. They influence and organize ethical beliefs, emotions and reasons in an ongoing way. Political commitments to address oppression often contain a concern for the dignity and well-being of others and the objects of political commitments often have value, according to ideal moral theories, such as Kantian and utilitarian theory. However, ideal moral theories do not fully explain the ethical reasons political commitments engender. First, ideal moral theories do not explain the normative priority that agents give to politically committed ethical reasons. Their profound effect on a politically committed agent’s ethical deliberation and choice and the precedence they are given over other ends cannot be wholly understood through the moral obligations within ideal theories. Second, although politically committed reasons are valuable in ideal theory for the benefits they bring to others, they are not fungible with other reasons ideal theory would regard as having equal ethical value. A person might substitute another beneficial humanitarian aim for that to which she is politically committed and nevertheless regard herself as having done a morally wrong thing for failing or betraying her commitment. Politically committed ethical reasons are also motivated and informed by the social location of agents and their relationship to structures of oppression. Although there are universal ethical reasons to oppose oppression, this means that some of a person’s actual ethical reasons will be irreducibly particular

An argument for the use of Aristotelian method in bioethics

The main claim of this paper is that the method outlined and used in Aristotle's Ethics is an appropriate and credible one to use in bioethics. Here “appropriate” means that the method is capable of establishing claims and developing concepts in bioethics and “credible” that the method has some plausibility, it is not open to obvious and immediate objection. It begins by suggesting why this claim matters and then gives a brief outline of Aristotle's method. The main argument is made in three stages. First, it is argued that Aristotelian method is credible because it compares favourably with alternatives. In this section it is shown that Aristotelian method is not vulnerable to criticisms that are made both of methods that give a primary place to moral theory (such as utilitarianism) and those that eschew moral theory (such as casuistry and social science approaches). As such, it compares favourably with these other approaches that are vulnerable to at least some of these criticisms. Second, the appropriateness of Aristotelian method is indicated through outlining how it would deal with a particular case. Finally, it is argued that the success of Aristotle's philosophy is suggestive of both the credibility and appropriateness of his method.</p

Targeting Wetland Preservation Areas for Compensatory Mitigation Utilizing a GIS Protocol

Virginia Institute of Marine ScienceMaster of Science (M.Sc.

Reminiscences of the Civil War

Life reminiscences of James M. Dancy, who first saw the light of day at Buena Vista on the east bank of the St. Johns River, on the 15 day of January, 1845; son of Francis L. and Florida F. Dancy; now at this date [June 30, 1933] eighty-eight and one-half years of age, writing this without glasses

Predication and Immanence: Anaxagoras, Plato, Eudoxus, and Aristotle

A theory of predication invokes immanence if it explains why snow is white by introducing something that is in snow that accounts for its being white. Aristotle\u27s theory of predication in the Categories is partly immanentist, see Cat. 2, 1a24-25. My object here is to shed some indirect light on this passage. I suggest that the comment is a disclaimer responding to an immanentist theory of predication under discussion in the Academy, according to which the something that is immanent in snow that makes it white is a physical ingredient. This theory was an idea of Eudoxus\u27. Aristotle was sympathetic to the position, and his own sounded a lot like it, but his was not that position, and so it was important to distance himself from it

Psychopathy: what apology making tells us about moral agency

Psychopathy is often used to settle disputes about the nature of moral judgment. The “trolley problem” is a familiar scenario in which psychopathy is used as a test case. Where a convergence in response to the trolley problem is registered between psychopathic subjects and non-psychopathic (normal) subjects, it is assumed that this convergence indicates that the capacity for making moral judgments is unimpaired in psychopathy. This, in turn, is taken to have implications for the dispute between motivation internalists and motivation externalists, for instance. In what follows, we want to do two things: firstly, we set out to question the assumption that convergence is informative of the capacity for moral judgment in psychopathy. Next, we consider a distinct feature of psychopathy which we think provides strong grounds for holding that the capacity for moral judgment is seriously impaired in psychopathic subjects. The feature in question is the psychopathic subject’s inability to make sincere apologies. Our central claim will be this: convergence in response to trolley problems does not tell us very much about the psychopathic subject’s capacity to make moral judgments, but his inability to make sincere apologies does provide us with strong grounds for holding that this capacity is seriously impaired in psychopathy

Rationality as the Rule of Reason

The demands of rationality are linked both to our subjective normative perspective (given that rationality is a person-level concept) and to objective reasons or favoring relations (given that rationality is non-contingently authoritative for us). In this paper, I propose a new way of reconciling the tension between these two aspects: roughly, what rationality requires of us is having the attitudes that correspond to our take on reasons in the light of our evidence, but only if it is competent. I show how this view can account for structural rationality on the assumption that intentions and beliefs as such involve competent perceptions of downstream reasons, and explore various implications of the account

Towards a physio-cognitive model of the exploration exploitation trade-off.

Managing the exploration vs exploitation trade-off is an important part of our everyday lives. It occurs in minor decisions such as choosing what music to listen to as well as major decisions, such as picking a research direction to pursue. The dilemma is the same despite the context: does one exploit the environment, using current knowledge to acquire a satisfactory solution, or explore other options and potentially find a better answer. An accurate cognitive model must be able to handle this trade-off because of the importance it plays in our lives. We are developing physio-cognitive models to better understand how physiological and cognitive processes interact to mediate decisions to explore or exploit. To accomplish this, we utilize the ACT-R/Φ hybrid architecture (Dancy, 2013; Dancy et al., 2015) and the Project Malmo AI platform (Johnson et al., 2016)

Simulating Human-AI Collaboration with ACT-R and Project Malmo

We use the ACT-R cognitive architecture (Anderson, 2007) to explore human-AI collaboration. Computational models of human and AI behavior, and their interaction, allow for more effective development of collaborative artificial intelligent agents. With these computational models and simulations, one may be better equipped to predict the situations in which certain classes of intelligent agents may be more suited to collaborate with people. One can more tractably understand and predict how different AI agents affect task behavior in these situations. To simulate human-AI collaboration, we are developing ACT-R models that work with more traditional AI agents to solve a task in Project Malmo (Johnson et al., 2016). We use existing AI agents that were originally developed as the AI portion of the Human-AI collaboration. In addition, creating a model in ACT-R to simulate human behavior gives us the opportunity to play out these interactions much faster than would be possible in real time

Using a disciplinary discourse lens to explore how representations afford meaning making in a typical wave physics course

We carried out a case study in a wave physics course at a Swedish university in order to investigate the relations between the representations used in the lessons and the experience of meaning making in interview–discussions. The grounding of these interview–discussions also included obtaining a rich description of the lesson environment in terms of the communicative approaches used and the students’ preferences for modes of representations that best enable meaning making. The background for this grounding was the first two lessons of a 5-week course on wave physics (70 students). The data collection for both the grounding and the principal research questions consisted of video recordings from the first two lessons: a student questionnaire of student preferences for representations (given before and after the course) and video-recorded interview–discussions with students (seven pairs and one on their own). The results characterize the use of communicative approaches, what modes of representation were used in the lectures, and the trend in what representations students’ preferred for meaning making, all in order to illustrate how students engage with these representations with respect to their experienced meaning making. Interesting aspects that emerged from the study are discussed in terms of how representations do not, in themselves, necessarily enable a range of meaning making; that meaning making from representations is critically related to how the representations get situated in the learning environment; and how constellations of modes of disciplinary discourse may be necessary but not always sufficient. Finally, pedagogical comments and further research possibilities are presented.Web of Scienc