God’s Knowledge of Other Minds

This paper explores one aspect of God’s omniscience, that is, his knowledge of human minds. In §1 I spell out a traditional notion of divine knowledge, and in §2 I argue that our understanding of the thoughts of others is a distinct kind of knowledge from that involved in knowledge of the physical world; it involves empathizing with thinkers. In §3 I show how this is relevant to the question of how, and whether, God understands the thoughts of man. There is, we shall see, some tension between the alleged direct nature of God’s intuition-based knowledge and the empathetic nature of understanding other

Art, empathy and the divine

Religious art can reconfigure our conception of God’s omniscience. This should be seen in terms of divine understanding, with empathy and love required for understanding of human beings. §I surveys reasons to think that God can empathize with us. §II and §III consider different ways that religious art has attempted to represent such empathetic relations. There are images of Christ’s suffering that elicit empathy in the viewer, and there are depictions of God’s empathetic understanding of humanity. §IV and §V consider the epistemic roles of art and how religious art can reconfigure how we think of God’s omniscience

Living with limited water: sunflowers and cotton as alternative crops

Presented at the 15th annual Central Plains irrigation conference and exposition proceedings on February 4-5, 2003 at the City Limits Convention Center in Colby, Kansas.Includes bibliographical references

Cubism and Kant

Daniel-Henry Kahnweiler (1920), Picasso’s dealer and early authority on cubism, interpreted Picasso, Braque and Gris as Kantian in their approach. In §1 I provide an introduction to cubism and to Kahnweiler’s use of Kantian terminology to distinguish analytic and synthetic cubism. §2 concerns the ‘idealist’ interpretation of cubism in which the works are seen as attempting to depict Kantian things-in-themselves. I argue that this interpretation betrays a misunderstanding of Kant and it is at odds with Picasso’s pluralism. In §3 I suggest an alternative Kantian interpretation of cubism, one that draws on Kant’s empirical realism and the cognitive input that is necessary for experience. In §4 this is contrasted with the two-aspect reading of transcendental idealism. Lastly, in §5, I acknowledge that the major cubists had limited or no knowledge of Kant, but nevertheless argue that it is illuminating to see their works in terms of Kantian realism

Cubism: Art and Philosophy

In this paper I argue that the development of cubism by Picasso and Braque at the beginning of the twentieth century can be illuminated by consideration of long-running philosophical debates concerning perceptual realism, in particular by Locke’s (1689) distinction between primary and secondary properties, and Kant’s (1781) empirical realism. Daniel-Henry Kahnweiler (1920), Picasso’s dealer and early authority on cubism, interpreted Picasso and Braque as Kantian in their approach. I reject his influential interpretation, but propose a more plausible, Kantian reading of cubism

Quantum dot-labelled polymer beads by suspension polymerisation

CdSe quantum dots with polymerisable ligands have been incorporated into polystyrene beads, via a suspension polymerisation reaction, as a first step towards the optical encoding of solid supports for application in solid phase organic chemistry

Hume, Teleology, and the 'Science of Man'

There are various forms of teleological thinking central to debates in the early modern and modern periods, debates in which David Hume (1711–1776) is a key figure. In the first section, we shall introduce three levels at which teleological considerations have been incorporated into philosophical accounts of man and nature, and sketch Hume’s criticisms of these approaches. In the second section, we turn to Hume’s non-teleological ‘science of man’. In the third section, we show how Hume has an account of human flourishing that is not dependent on teleology. In the fourth section, we shall speculate as to the relation between Hume’s account of human nature and contemporary evolutionary accounts of morality and reasoning

Addiction Treatment Providers’ Engagements With The Brain Disease Model of Addiction

Debates about the etiology of addiction have a long history and continue to the present day. In contemporary societies, the brain disease model of addiction (BDMA) continues to receive strong support, in particular, from US agencies such as the National Institute on Drug Abuse (NIDA) and the American Society of Addiction Medicine. Today, there continues to be a significant investment in addiction neuroscience research globally. However, the views of addiction treatment providers about the BDMA, and its clinical impact, are often ignored when debates led by public health researchers and neuroscientists dominate discourse about the neurobiology of addiction. In this chapter, we start by providing a brief history of the biomedicalization of addiction. Moving beyond the question of ‘Is addiction a brain disease, or not?’, we summarize providers’ views about the BDMA and its impact on clinical practice. Drawing on recent critical drug studies scholarship, we critique how a simplistic, linear ‘bench to bedside’ model of addiction neuroscience translation elides the role treatment providers play in translating neuroscience. Finally, we consider the effects of how the enactment of addiction as a brain disease within policy impacts treatment, and how addiction might be enacted in other ways in future policy frameworks