concept study for a 80% scaled Derivative LCA

The LCA. i s expected to incorporate advanced aerodynamic and flight control features, with high AoA capabilities and high agility . Due to our limited design data bank and lack of experience in FBW technology, several uncertainties may not be resolved even at the prototype first flight stage . Hence a study was conducted to explore the feasibility of fabricating and flight-testing a 80;6 scaled derivative aircraft to provide flight mechanics and flight control data for the LCA. This aircraft would be made from rigid-foam-FRP composite materials, using techniques developed at MAL . It would have an gross weight of 2500 kg and the Viper 22/8 engine is suggested as the powerplant because of availability. Preliminary design has been started and basic parameters are mentioned. It is felt that this experimental program will be crucial for the success of the LCA . The time element is the most challenging aspect in this situation. A 21z year time frame seems to be possible if financial and manpower support are available It is expected that this study will initiate a dialogue between is HAL and MBB to formulate a joint program for the fabrication and flight-testing of the experimental LCA.

A Value Added Tax in an Oligopolistic Economy

This paper identifies a new mechanism through which value added taxes may influence the degree of competition in oligapolistic markets. The analysis is based on an oligopoly in which firms interact over an indefinite period of time and hence tacitly collude.taxes; competition; enterprises; oligopoly

The Scope for Exchange Rate Pass-through in an Oligopoly

This paper represents one of the first analyses of exchange rate pass-through in a dynamic context. It explores the impact of exchange rate fluctuations in a duopoly where firms interact over an indifinite period of time.exchange rate; oligopoly

Protectionist Lobbying and Strategic Investment

Why are some uncompetitive industry sectors so effective in lobbying for greater protection and support? This paper attempts to explain the lobbying success of these industries in terms of the strategic role of investment in technology as a credible commitment device. By eschewing potentially profitable investment opportunities firms credibly signal to the government that the cost of a tariff reduction will be substantial. This enables the firms to lobby more effectively for policy concessions Political considerations may therefore provide a significant incentive for firms to reject investment in newer technologies, even when these lower production costs.Tariffs, Investment, Lobbying

Why the Weak Win: The Strategic Role of Investment in Lobbying

Recent empirical work suggests that old er and less efficient industries are typically more successful at securing trade protection and income support. Similarly, environmentally damaging industries often lobby effectively for less stringent environmental regulations. This paper explains the lobbying success of these industries in terms of strategic role of investment as a credible commitment device.trade policy; interst groups; investments; industry

Regulation and Monitoring with Corrupt Bureaucrats

Most regulatory government agencies to monitor the degree of compliance. These tasks are usually delegated to bureaucrats who, as self interested agents, may engage in corrupt behaviour. Opportunities for bribe taking are most likely to arise when the government (principle) is imperfectly informed about the degree of compliance, but the bureaucrats (agents) are fully informed. This paper outlines a strategy which may be employed to prevent corrupt behaviour.regulatory policy, corruption, environmental and resource economics

Resources for Sale: Corruption, Democracy and the Natural Resource Curse

A puzzling piece of empirical evidence suggests that resource-abundant countries tend to grow slower than their resource-poor counterparts. We attempt to explain this phenomenon by developing a lobbying game in which rent seeking firms interact with corrupt governments. The presence or absence of political competition, as well as the potential costs of political transitions, turn out to be key elements in generating the `resource curse.¿ These variables define the degree of freedom that incumbent governments have in pursuing development policies that maximize surplus in the lobbying game, but put the economy off its optimal path. We test our predictions by adding measures of democracy and authoritarianism to existing regression models of the resource curse, and obtain support for our hypothese

Political Competition, Welfare Outcomes and Expenditures on Human Development: The Experience of a Democracy

There is a growing literature on the effect of electoral competition and democratic participation on issues such as corruption and government policy. The theoretical and empirical literature suggests that electoral competition has a beneficial impact on policies. This paper studies the effects of political competition and democratic participation on welfare outcomes. We develop a model to assess the effects of electoral competition on human developmental outcomes and empirically test the key predictions using data on infant mortality rates (IMR) in India. The empirical results provide strong support for the theoretical conjectures, which suggest that high electoral competition and high citizen participation in elections can explain much of the variation in IMR across different states in a democratic country like India.human development, electoral competition

Protecting Eden: Markets or Government?

The majority of species classified as “threatened”, “endangered” or “extinct” by the IUCN are to be found in government controlled parks and legally protected areas in developing countries. Dissatisfaction with the public sector’s record in protecting endangered species has prompted calls for the use of market based instruments and other economic incentives to promote more efficient environmental outcomes. In this paper we examine whether greater reliance on market based incentives would result in improved environmental outcomes in national parks. We address this issue by extending the incomplete contracts framework to the case of a renewable resource. We identify conditions under which private ownership or control of a national park induces more (less) efficient management of protected areas. The paper concludes with a discussion of the limitations of the analysis and the implications of these results for the conservation of biodiversity.