François Dagognet, Una nueva moral: familia, trabajo, nación.

Le Plessis-Robinson: Institut Synthélabo pour la connaissance, 1998Traducido por Luis Alfonso Paláu C.Medellín, abril de 2006-marzo de 2009.“Las ideas generales son demasiado nebulosascomo para que se encuentre siempre el medio de verificarlas.Las ideas generales son razones de inmovilidad.Por esto pasan por fundamentales”.(Gaston Bachelard.La actividad racionalista de la física contemporánea.[París: Presses universitaires de France, 1951, p.12]Buenos Aires: Siglo XX, 1975. p. 20).IntroducciónA causa de nuestra entrada en un nuevo campo de la filosofía –por lo demás nuevo solo en apariencia– vamos a desagradar.Por dos razones al menos: según la primera se nos reprochará correr así detrás de muchas liebres, de emprender un examen en un territorio diferente del que hasta entonces habíamos frecuentado, por no decir cultivado; un filósofo debe siempre ahondar en lo que él piensa haber obtenido, meditarlo aun, en lugar de circular, de moverse en todos los sentidos y probablemente de errar. O, además, el filósofo debe seguir un camino y no marchar a través de la planicie

François Dagognet, ¿Cómo salvarse de la servidumbre?

Justicia, escuela, religión. París: Sanofi-Synthélabo, 2000Traducido por Luis Alfonso Paláu C.Medellín, abril de 2009.Introducción¿Qué es la filosofía? Nosotros creemos que esta disciplina audaz se propone conocer nuestro mundo, bajo todos sus aspectos, y lo analiza y lo acosa hasta en sus provincias más remotas, las más ignoradas y las más antinómicas. Una tal ambición explica –por adelantado– los posibles fracasos; rara vez logra aclarar, en tanto que quiere englobar, además del presente, al pasado que marcó, así como al porvenir que se viene. En suma: la filosofía podría definirse por una sistematicidad ilimitada, organizada, para no decir, imposible

François Dagognet, Cuestiones prohibidas

París: Les Empêcheurs de penser en rond/Seuil, 2002Traducido por Luis Alfonso Paláu C.Medellín, julio de 2008-mayo de 2009.PrefacioA la búsqueda de un fundamento moralNadie puede dudar de la importancia de las decisiones políticasactuales como la semana laboral de 35 horas, la creación de empleo con miras a reabsorber el desempleo, la desconcentración administrativa, la ayuda a los más débiles, la igualdad hombre/mujer en la representación. Pero, subyacente a estas medidas que caracterizan nuestra época y la modernizan, se levanta otro mundo mucho más fundamental

Narrative and epistemology: Georges Canguilhem’s concept of scientific ideology

In the late 1960s, Georges Canguilhem introduced the concept of ‘scientific ideology’. This concept had not played any role in his previous work, so why introduce it at all? This is the central question of my paper. Although it may seem a rather modest question, its answer in fact uncovers hidden tensions in the tradition of historical epistemology, in particular between its normative and descriptive aspects. The term ideology suggests the influence of Althusser’s and Foucault’s philosophies. However, I show the differences between Canguilhem’s concept of scientific ideology and Althusser’s and Foucault’s respective concepts of ideology. I argue that Canguilhem was in fact attempting to solve long-standing problems in the tradition of historical epistemology, rather than following the lead of his younger colleagues. I argue that Canguilhem’s ‘refurbishment without rejection’ of Bachelard’s epistemology, which the concept of scientific ideology was aimed to implement, was necessary to justify the historical narratives that Canguilhem had constructed in his own work as a historian of concepts. A strict acceptance of Bachelard’s epistemology would have made it impossible to justify them. Canguilhem’s concept of scientific ideology therefore served as a theoretical justification of his practice as a historian. I maintain that the concept of scientific ideology was needed to reconcile Bachelard’s normative epistemology with Canguilhem’s view of the history of science and its aims, which differed from Bachelard’s more than it is generally acknowledged

The tribunal of philosophy and its norms: History and philosophy in Georges Canguilhem's historical epistemology

In this article I assess Georges Canguilhem's historical epistemology with both theoretical and historical questions in mind. From a theoretical point of view, I am concerned with the role that history can play in the understanding and evaluation of philosophical concepts. From a historical point of view, I regard historical epistemology, as developed by Gaston Bachelard and Georges Canguilhem, as a conception and practice which came out of the project, elaborated in France from the 1920s to the 1940s, of combining history of science and philosophy. I analyse in particular Canguilhem's epistemology in his theory and practive of history of science. What he called 'normative history' is the focus of my analysis. I evaluate the question of the nature and provenience of the norm employed in normative history, and I compare it with the norm as discussed by Canguilhem in _Le normal et le pathologique_. While I am critical of Canguilhem's treatment of history, I conclude that his philosophical suggestion to analyse the formation of scientific concepts 'from below' represents a useful model for history and philosophy of science, and that it can be very profitably extended to philosophical concepts

A conformação dos ecomuseus: elementos para compreensão e análise

Apresenta uma história dos ecomuseus enraizado nos movimentos de folclore e etnografia regional, do final do século XIX até os dias de hoje, examinando o caso francês. Explora aspectos em geral menos enfatizados neste campo, tal como a natureza e o papel atribuído aos acervos e ao patrimônio cultural e padrões museográticos