When Immediate Responses Fail

Tit-for-tat is a strategy of immediate and proportional responses. Game theorists showed that this strategy often leads to fruitful cooperation. Indeed, many legal regimes resemble a tit-for-tat strategy and benefit from its ability to avoid unnecessary conflicts. But in situations of uncertainty--when actors cannot be sure about the actions of their adversaries--a tit-for-tat strategy would destroy cooperation and lead to continuous clashes. Because tit-for-tat responds immediately, a single mistake about the intentions of the adversary can lead to retaliation and start an endless string of counterstrikes. When uncertainty prevails, a strategy of many-tits-for-many-tats is optimal. Actors applying this strategy study the actions of their adversaries over multiple rounds without issuing an immediate response. Only when the actor is convinced that the adversary intentionally defects, will the actor issue a disproportionately forceful response. The laws of war, criminal law, and international sales law all face some situations of uncertainty. This Article argues that each of these legal fields adopts a strategy of many-tits-for-many-tats to address conditions of acute uncertainty

International Courts Improve Public Deliberation

The paper starts with the effects of international courts on the broader public and narrows down to their influence on a small elite of lawyers. Part I suggests that international courts captivate the public imagination, allowing citizens to articulate their rights. Part II demonstrates how governments, parliaments, and national courts around the world interact with international courts in ways that improve public deliberation. Part III studies the global elite of lawyers that work in conjunction with international courts to shape policy. Part IV concludes by arguing that the dialogue fostered between international courts and democratic bodies does, in fact, lead to more vibrant democratic deliberation

Democracy, Populism, and Concentrated Interests

Concentrated interest groups have a significant advantage over diffuse interest groups: they can effectively stop free riding among their members. Because of this advantage, concentrated interest groups work in unison and manage to capture the government in many democracies. Democratic mechanisms of separation of powers, an independent judiciary, and the rule of law are designed to prevent the capture of government by concentrated interests. Under certain conditions, these mechanisms make it possible for diffuse interests to have a fair share of the influence over the government. Populist ideologists doubt that claim, however. They are convinced that democracies are captured by a small elite that controls most of the political power. The declared aim of populists is to give political power back to the majority of society. Despite that declared aim, this Article argues that the actions taken by populists have exactly the opposite outcome. By downgrading democratic mechanisms that constrain the government, populists end up making it easier for concentrated interests to capture the government and take advantage of diffuse groups

Judicial Deference Allows European Consensus to Emerge

The European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) searches for human rights policies that are adopted by the majority of the countries in Europe. Using a doctrine known as “emerging consensus,” the court then imposes these policies as an international legal obligation on all the countries under its jurisdiction. But the ECHR sometimes defers to countries, even if their policies fall short of the standard accepted by most of the countries in Europe. This deference is accomplished by using the so-called “margin of appreciation” doctrine. Naturally, emerging consensus and margin of appreciation are often conceived as competing doctrines: the more there is of one, the less there is of another. This article suggests a novel rationale for the emerging consensus doctrine: the doctrine can allow the ECHR to make good policies by drawing on the independent decision-making of many similar countries. In light of that, the article demonstrates that a correct application of the margin of appreciation doctrine actually helps emerging consensus reach optimal results by giving countries an incentive to make their policies independently

La deferencia judicial permite que emerja el consenso europeo

The European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) searches for human rights policies that are adopted by the majority of the countries in Europe. Using a doctrine known as “emerging consensus,” the court then imposes these policies as an international legal obligation on all the countries under its jurisdiction. But the ECHR sometimes defers to countries, even if their policies fall short of the standard accepted by most of the countries in Europe. This deference is accomplished by using the so-called “margin of appreciation” doctrine. Naturally, emerging consensus and margin of appreciation are often conceived as competing doctrines: the more there is of one, the less there is of another. This article suggests a novel rationale for the emerging consensus doctrine: the doctrine can allow the ECHR to make good policies by drawing on the independent decision-making of many similar countries. In light of that, the article demonstrates that a correct application of the margin of appreciation doctrine actually helps emerging consensus reach optimal results by giving countries an incentive to make their policies independently.El Tribunal Europeo de Derechos Humanos (TEDH) indaga en políticas de derechos humanos adoptadas por la mayoría de los países de Europa. Utilizando una doctrina conocida como el “consenso emergente”, el Tribunal impone tales políticas como una obligación jurídica internacional a todos los países bajo su jurisdicción. Sin embargo, en ocasiones, el TEDH cede ante los Estados, incluso si sus políticas no están a la altura del estándar aceptado por la mayoría de los países de Europa. Esta deferencia se logra utilizando la doctrina llamada “margen de apreciación”. Naturalmente, el consenso emergente y el margen de apreciación se conciben, a menudo, como doctrinas en competencia: cuanto más hay de una, menos hay de otra. En el presente artículo se sugiere una nueva justificación de la doctrina del consenso emergente: la doctrina puede permitir que el TEDH formule buenas políticas recurriendo a la toma de decisiones independiente de muchos países similares. A la luz de ello, el documento demuestra que una aplicación correcta de la doctrina del margen de apreciación ayuda, realmente, a que el consenso emergente alcance resultados óptimos, al dar a los países un incentivo para elaborar sus políticas de forma independiente. El Tribunal Europeo de Derechos Humanos (TEDH) indaga en políticas de derechos humanos adoptadas por la mayoría de los países de Europa. Utilizando una doctrina conocida como el “consenso emergente”, el Tribunal impone tales políticas como una obligación jurídica internacional a todos los países bajo su jurisdicción. Sin embargo, en ocasiones, el TEDH cede ante los Estados, incluso si sus políticas no están a la altura del estándar aceptado por la mayoría de los países de Europa. Esta deferencia se logra utilizando la doctrina llamada “margen de apreciación”. Naturalmente, el consenso emergente y el margen de apreciación se conciben, a menudo, como doctrinas en competencia: cuanto más hay de una, menos hay de otra. En el presente artículo se sugiere una nueva justificación de la doctrina del consenso emergente: la doctrina puede permitir que el TEDH formule buenas políticas recurriendo a la toma de decisiones independiente de muchos países similares. A la luz de ello, el documento demuestra que una aplicación correcta de la doctrina del margen de apreciación ayuda, realmente, a que el consenso emergente alcance resultados óptimos, al dar a los países un incentivo para elaborar sus políticas de forma independiente