Scientific evidence in civil courtrooms: a comparative perspective

When science comes in contact with the law, a variety of complex issues arise. Owing to the increasing number of legal questions which can (or even have to) be resolved by resort to scientific knowledge, in recent years the challenges posed by the use of scientific evidence within civil proceedings have become a hot-point in legal debates across both common law and civil law jurisdictions alike. Judges, academics, and legislators have dealt with the issue of scientific evidence in multifarious ways on both sides of the Atlantic Ocean. For this reason, the aim of the paper is to analyze how the US and continental European legal cultures have shaped their approach to scientific evidence, as well as how scientific evidence has influenced the dynamics of civil proceedings in the US and continental Europe. The comparative overview of these developments will allow us to test whether the approaches to scientific evidence in the two legal traditions are really as far apart as one might think at a first glance, or whether on the contrary they have much in common, both in terms of perspectives and outcomes

Neuroscientists in Court

Neuroscientific evidence is increasingly being offered in court cases. Consequently, the legal system needs neuroscientists to act as expert witnesses who can explain the limitations and interpretations of neuroscientific findings so that judges and jurors can make informed and appropriate inferences. The growing role of neuroscientists in court means that neuroscientists should be aware of important differences between the scientific and legal fields, and, especially, how scientific facts can be easily misunderstood by non-scientists,including judges and jurors. This article describes similarities, as well as key differences, of legal and scientific cultures. And it explains six key principles about neuroscience that those in law need to know

‘A new and more rigorous approach’ to expert evidence in England and Wales?

An amendment to the Criminal Practice Direction issued by the Lord Chief Justice of England and Wales lays down guidance for judges to follow in determining whether expert evidence is ‘sufficiently reliable to be admitted’. Although the guidelines are based on those proposed by the Law Commission in 2011, they do not include a definition of ‘sufficiently reliable’, such as would have been provided by the Law Commission’s Draft Bill, which the government declined to introduce. A criterion of ‘sufficient reliability’ must therefore be found within the common law. This article argues that ‘sufficient reliability’ is an aspect of ‘helpfulness’ and reflects the principle that experts should provide the jury with criteria with which to assess the weight of their evidence. Reliable evidence, in short, is evidence that provides the jury with sound reasons for relying on it. This criterion could be as rigorous as that proposed by the Law Commission, and possibly more so