Speaking in Name of the Constituent Power: the Spanish Constitutional Court and the New Catalan Estatut

In June 2010 the Spanish Constitutional Court rendered a very important judgment on the constitutional legitimacy of the new fundamental charter (Estatut) of the Autonomous Community of Catalonia. Coping with a very long and ambitious legal document, the Court succeeded in ‘rescuing’ most of its controversial provisions by means of consistent interpretation. Thus, those provisions aiming at ‘constitutionalizing’ Catalan identity have been widely neutralized. By doing so, however, the Court has undergone widespread criticism, possibly paving the way for further conflicts

Perfect and Imperfect Bicameralism: A Misleading Distinction?

Abstract The aim of this contribution is to make some points on the distinction between 'perfect' (or equal) and 'imperfect' (or unequal) bicameralism and its relevance to contemporary discussions about second chambers and their constitutional position. The analysis starts with an assumption that this distinction is somehow under-theorised. The distinction between perfect and imperfect bicameralism, finally resulting in a clear prevalence of the latter, mainly focuses on two aspects: the exercise of legislative function and, in parliamentary regimes, the confidence vote. In spite of the unquestionable relevance of these two components to the activity of parliaments, these analyses are incomplete. The functions and competences of a given second chamber depend on the way it represents pluralism: the weight that each legal system attaches to the representative role of its own second chamber decisively shapes the perimeter of their functions. Important evidence for validating this claim comes from the procedures for passing constitutional amendments, in which second chambers, even in a number of 'unequal' bicameral systems, are put on equal footing with first chambers

Diritto costituzionale e secessione: il caso del Liechtenstein in prospettiva comparata

This essay develops an analysis of the secession clause in Article 4(2) of the Constitution of Liechtenstein, as amended in 2003. Article 4(2) has been described as a unique provision in that it grants each and every municipality within the Principality of Liechtenstein with a right to initiate a withdrawal procedure. This contribution assesses the significance of Article 4(2) in the light of the emerging comparative constitutional law of secession. The results are a mixed picture, with Liechtenstein standing out as an anomaly but also echoing some widespread concerns

Il Consiglio superiore dei giudici e dei procuratori nell’ordinamento turco, fra alleanza repubblicana e derive illiberali

This article analyses the role of the High Council of Judges and Prosecutors (HSYK) in the Turkish constitutional order. The HSYK was established as early as 1961, and its evolution over the six following decades has largely reflected the complex constitutional history of the country. In 1961, the establishment of the HSYK was part of an attempt to strengthen the position of the judiciary as part of the so-called Republican Alliance. In the Erdoğan years, a moderately reformist attitude, which had been positively welcomed by the Venice Commission, was later replaced by a strong illiberal turn that has dramatically affected the position of the HSYK. The suspension of the HSYK from its membership of the European Network of Judicial Councils in 2016 testifies to the magnitude of these transformations

Il federalismo asimmetrico del Belgio di fronte alla crisi pandemica

Belgium’s asymmetric federalism faced with the pandemic crisis – This essay analyses the impact of the Covid-19 pandemic on Belgian federalism. In many respects, the pandemic crisis has highlighted the inherent paradox of Belgium’s dual federalism. In spite of the principle of the exclusivity of competences, the federal government and the regional and community governments have been somewhat forced to cooperate to face such an unprecedented challenge. Besides, the Covid-19 pandemic has raised questions on what a seventh round of institutional reforms should entail, possibly including a change of direction in Belgium’s federalizing process

La forma di governo presidenziale dell’Indonesia, fra lasciti autoritari del passato e inquietudini recenti

This article analyses the presidential form of government of the Republic of Indonesia. In so doing, it focuses both on the constitutional and legislative provisions currently in force and on the cultural factors that have contributed to shaping constitutional law in Indonesia since independence. The dominant authoritarian culture of the founding years, embodied first and foremost by Soepomo’s integralism, led to the relatively ambiguous Constitution of 1945, based on a strong President and limited checks and balances. The authoritarian traits of the system were further accentuated by Sukarno’s and Suharto’s authoritarian styles of government. After Suharto’s resignation in 1998, the Constitution was significantly amended so as to redefine and limit presidential powers and the relations between the President and the legislative branch. Recent developments seem to suggest that the transition to constitutional democracy known as Reformasi has not been entirely successful so far