Punishment, Inequality and Emotions

Cooperation among people who are not related to each other is sustained by the availability of punishment devices which help enforce social norms (Fehr and Gächter, 2002). However, the rationale for costly punishment remains unclear. This paper reports the results of an experiment investigating inequality aversion and negative emotions as possible determinants of punishment. We compare two treatments of a public good game, one in which costly punishment reduces the immediate payoff inequality between the punisher and the target, and one in which it does not affect inequality. We show that while inequality-aversion prevents some subjects from punishing in the equal cost treatment, negative emotions are the primary motive for punishment. Results also indicate that the intensity of punishment increases with the level of inequality, and reduces earnings inequality over time.inequality aversion; negative emotions; free-riding; cooperation; experiment

Does Monitoring Decrease Work Effort ? The Complementarity Between Agency and Crowding-Out Theorie

Agency theory assumes that tighter monitoring by the principal should motivate the agent to raise his effort level whereas the “crowding-out” literature suggests that it may reduce the overall work effort. These two assertions are not necessarily contradictory provided that the nature of the employment relationship is taken into account (Frey, 1993). Based upon a real-task laboratory experiment, our results show that principals are not trustful enough to refrain from monitoring the agents, and most of the agents react to the disciplining effect of monitoring. However we find also some evidence that intrinsic motivation is crowded out when monitoring is above a certain threshold. We identify that both interpersonal principal/agent links and concerns for the distribution of output payoff are important for the emergence of this crowding out effect.crowding-out; monitoring; motivation; principal-agent theory; real effort experiments

Punishment, Inequality and Emotions

Cooperation among people who are not related to each other is sustained by the availability of punishment devices which help enforce social norms (Fehr and Gächter, 2002). However, the rationale for costly punishment remains unclear. This paper reports the results of an experiment investigating inequality aversion and negative emotions as possible determinants of punishment. We compare two treatments of a public good game, one in which costly punishment reduces the immediate payoff inequality between the punisher and the target, and one in which it does not affect inequality. We show that while inequality-aversion prevents some subjects from punishing in the equal cost treatment, negative emotions are the primary motive for punishment. Results also indicate that the intensity of punishment increases with the level of inequality, and reduces earnings inequality over time.cooperation ; experiment ; Free-Riding ; inequity aversion ; negative emotions

Does Monitoring Decrease Work Effort? The Complementarity Between Agency and Crowding-Out Theories

Agency theory assumes that tighter monitoring by the principal should motivate the agent to raise his effort level. In contrast, the “crowding-out” literature suggests that tighter monitoring may reduce the overall work effort. These two assertions are not necessarily contradictory provided that the nature of the employment relationship is taken into account (Frey 1993). This paper reports on the results of a real-effort laboratory experiment designed to test the relative importance of the disciplining effect and the crowding-out effect of monitoring. We find no strong support for the crowding-out hypothesis and we show that the disciplining effect of monitoring dominates in abstract one-shot relationships as well as in somewhat more interpersonal multi-shot relationships. Principals are not trustful enough to refrain from using the monitoring opportunity and most agents react to a decrease in the monitoring intensity by decreasing their effort.

Punishment, inequality, and welfare : a public good experiment

This paper reports the results of an experiment that investigates the relationships between inequality and punishment. In particular, we analyze how inter-personal comparisons affect altruistic punishment behavior. In addition, we examine how punishment affects inequality over time. We compare two treatments of a two-stage public good game, one in which costly punishment reduces the immediate payoff inequality between the punisher and the target, and one in which it does not affect the current level of inequality. Our results indicate that subjects punish even when they cannot alter the current distribution of payoffs. We find however that in both treatments, the intensity of punishment increases in the level of inequality. Finally, despite its cost, we show that punishment improves welfare in association with a decrease in the level of inequality over time.public good experiment ; punishment ; inequality aversion ; free-riding ; welfare

MASH1 activates expression of the paired homeodomain transcription factor Phox2a, and couples pan-neuronal and subtype-specific components of autonomic neuronal identity

We have investigated the genetic circuitry underlying the determination of neuronal identity, using mammalian peripheral autonomic neurons as a model system. Previously, we showed that treatment of neural crest stem cells (NCSCs) with bone morphogenetic protein-2 (BMP-2) leads to an induction of MASH1 expression and consequent autonomic neuronal differentiation. We now show that BMP2 also induces expression of the paired homeodomain transcription factor Phox2a, and the GDNF/NTN signalling receptor tyrosine kinase c-RET. Constitutive expression of MASH1 in NCSCs from a retroviral vector, in the absence of exogenous BMP2, induces expression of both Phox2a and c-RET in a large fraction of infected colonies, and also promotes morphological neuronal differentiation and expression of pan-neuronal markers. In vivo, expression of Phox2a in autonomic ganglia is strongly reduced in Mash1 -/- embryos. These loss- and gain-of-function data suggest that MASH1 positively regulates expression of Phox2a, either directly or indirectly. Constitutive expression of Phox2a, by contrast to MASH1, fails to induce expression of neuronal markers or a neuronal morphology, but does induce expression of c-RET. These data suggest that MASH1 couples expression of pan-neuronal and subtype-specific components of autonomic neuronal identity, and support the general idea that identity is established by combining subprograms involving cascades of transcription factors, which specify distinct components of neuronal phenotype

Lightweight Multilingual Software Analysis

Developer preferences, language capabilities and the persistence of older languages contribute to the trend that large software codebases are often multilingual, that is, written in more than one computer language. While developers can leverage monolingual software development tools to build software components, companies are faced with the problem of managing the resultant large, multilingual codebases to address issues with security, efficiency, and quality metrics. The key challenge is to address the opaque nature of the language interoperability interface: one language calling procedures in a second (which may call a third, or even back to the first), resulting in a potentially tangled, inefficient and insecure codebase. An architecture is proposed for lightweight static analysis of large multilingual codebases: the MLSA architecture. Its modular and table-oriented structure addresses the open-ended nature of multiple languages and language interoperability APIs. We focus here as an application on the construction of call-graphs that capture both inter-language and intra-language calls. The algorithms for extracting multilingual call-graphs from codebases are presented, and several examples of multilingual software engineering analysis are discussed. The state of the implementation and testing of MLSA is presented, and the implications for future work are discussed.Comment: 15 page