Hard Instances of the Constrained Discrete Logarithm Problem

The discrete logarithm problem (DLP) generalizes to the constrained DLP, where the secret exponent $x$ belongs to a set known to the attacker. The complexity of generic algorithms for solving the constrained DLP depends on the choice of the set. Motivated by cryptographic applications, we study sets with succinct representation for which the constrained DLP is hard. We draw on earlier results due to Erd\"os et al. and Schnorr, develop geometric tools such as generalized Menelaus' theorem for proving lower bounds on the complexity of the constrained DLP, and construct sets with succinct representation with provable non-trivial lower bounds

Milagrito: a TeV air-shower array

Milagrito, a large, covered water-Cherenkov detector, was the world's first air-shower-particle detector sensitive to cosmic gamma rays below 1 TeV. It served as a prototype for the Milagro detector and operated from February 1997 to May 1998. This paper gives a description of Milagrito, a summary of the operating experience, and early results that demonstrate the capabilities of this technique.Comment: 38 pages including 24 figure

Quality management of bluegill: Factors affecting population size structure

Report issued on: issued November 1, 2001INHS Technical Report prepared for Division of Fisheries, Illinois Department of Natural Resource

Concrete security of the Blum–Blum–Shub pseudorandom generator

Abstract. The asymptotic security of the Blum-Blum-Shub (BBS) pseudorandom generator has been studied by Alexi et al. and Vazirani and Vazirani, who proved independently that O(log log N) bitscanbeextracted on each iteration, where N is the modulus (a Blum integer). The concrete security of this generator has been analyzed previously by Fischlin and Schnorr and by Knuth. In this paper we continue to analyse the concrete security the BBS generator. We show how to select both the size of the modulus and the number of bits extracted on each iteration such that a desired level of security is reached, while minimizing the computational effort per output bit. We will assume a concrete lower bound on the hardness of integer factoring, which is obtained by extrapolating the best factorization results to date. While for asymptotic security it suffices to give a polynomial time reduction a successful attack to factoring, we need for concrete security a reduction that is as efficient as possible. Our reduction algorithm relies on the techniques of Fischlin and Schnorr, as well as ideas of Vazirani and Vazirani, but combining these in a novel way for the case that more than one bit is output on each iteration.

A Comparison of CEILIDH and XTR

We give a comparison of the performance of the recently proposed torus-based public key cryptosystem CEILIDH, and XTR. Underpinning both systems is the mathematics of the two dimensional algebraic torus T6(Fp). However, while they both attain the same discrete logarithm security and each achieve a compression factor of three for all data transmissions, the arithmetic performed in each is fundamentally different. In its inception, the designers of CEILIDH were reluctant to claim it offers any particular advantages over XTR other than its exact compression and decompression technique. From both an algorithmic and arithmetic perspective, we develop an e#cientversion of CEILIDH and show that while it seems bound to be inherently slower than XTR, the difference in performance is much smaller than what one might infer from the original description. Also, thanks to CEILIDH's simple group law, it provides a greater flexibility for applications, and maythus be considered a worthwhile alternative to XTR

Bioensaios para identificação de biótipos de Euphorbia heterophylla com resistência múltipla a inibidores da ALS e da PROTOX Greenhouse and laboratory bioassays for identification of Euphorbia heterophylla biotypes with multiple resistance to PROTOX and ALS-inhibiting herbicides

Quatro bioensaios, dois em casa de vegetação e dois em laboratório, foram conduzidos com o objetivo de identificar biótipos de Euphorbia heterophylla (EPHHL) com resistência múltipla a inibidores da ALS e da PROTOX. Em casa de vegetação, plantas do biótipo suscetível (S) e dos biótipos 4 e 23, suspeitos de resistência múltipla, foram aspergidas com diferentes doses de imazethapyr e fomesafen. Nos bioensaios em laboratório, sementes dos biótipos S e 4 foram depositadas em placas de Petri contendo diferentes concentrações dos mesmos herbicidas. Curvas de dose-resposta foram ajustadas, utilizando os modelos logístico e polinomial, respectivamente, para os dados obtidos em casa de vegetação e em laboratório. Em casa de vegetação, o fator de resistência (FR) a imazethapyr para o biótipo 4 foi superior a 24, enquanto para o biótipo 23 ele foi de 15. Os FRs a fomesafen foram, respectivamente, de 62 e 39, para os mesmos biótipos. Em um período de 144 horas, concentrações de imazethapyr e fomesafen no bioensaio em laboratório foram capazes de discriminar os crescimentos da parte aérea e radicular dos biótipos de EPHHL com resistência múltipla e S. Os resultados confirmam ser tanto os testes em casa de vegetação quanto os laboratoriais, utilizando placas de Petri, metodologias apropriadas para discriminar biótipos de EPHHL S daqueles com resistência múltipla.<br>Four bioassays were developed under greenhouse and laboratory conditions to identify Euphorbia heterophylla (EPHHL) biotypes with multiple resistance to PROTOX and ALS-inhibiting herbicides. In the greenhouse bioassays, plants of a susceptible (S) biotype and of two biotypes suspected of multiple resistance (#4 and #23) were sprayed using different levels of the herbicides imazethapyr and fomesafen. The laboratory bioassays consisted of a comparative test between biotypes S and #4, exposed to germination in imazethapyr and fomesafen solutions. Dose-response relationships were adjusted using logistic and polynomial models, respectively, for data obtained from greenhouse and laboratory bioassays. For biotype #4, the resistance factor (RF) to imazethapyr was above 24, while for biotype #23 it was 15. FR to fomesafen were, respectively, 62 and 39, for the same biotypes. In the laboratory bioassay, a period of 144 hours was sufficient to discriminate differencial growth response to imazethapyr and fomesafen levels between R and S biotypes. The results confirm that both greenhouse and laboratory tests with Petri dishes are appropriate methodologies to discriminate S and multiple R EPHHL biotypes