Mechanism Choice

This chapter reviews the literature on the selection of regulatory policy instruments, from both normative and positive perspectives. It first reviews the mechanism design literature to identify normative objectives in selecting among the menu or toolbox of policy instruments. The chapter then discusses the public choice and positive political theory literatures and the variety of models developed to attempt to predict the actual selection of alternative policy instruments. It begins with simpler early models focusing on interest group politics and proceeds to more complicated models that incorporate both supply and demand for policy, the role of policy entrepreneurs, behavioral and cognitive choice, and public perceptions and mass politics. It compares these theories to empirical experience. The chapter examines literature in law, economics, political science, and related fields, and it draws examples from US, European, and international regulation. It concludes with suggestions for future research. Document is the author\u27s manuscrip

Mechanism Choice

Mechanism choice can generally be described as the selection of some way to structure rules for social behavior. Nobel Laureate Eric Maskin recently described a mechanism as “an institution, procedure, or game for determining outcomes” (Maskin 2008: 568). In the realm of public law, mechanism choice is synonymous with “instrument choice” or policy design. The selection of the policy instrument can be as important to success or failure as the intended policy outcome. Good intentions or objectives are not enough: the choice of tools matters. A large and growing literature in instrument choice and mechanism design examines both the normative criteria for correcting market failures, matching optimal instruments to different types of problems, minimizing costs, and overcoming incomplete information; and also the positive political factors that may influence the actual selection of instruments, and the pattern of such choices across issue areas, governance systems, and time. Public policy instruments are selected and designed by public bodies –legislatures, executive agencies, and courts – that are comprised of individuals with their own policy preferences, and that are subject to pressures from private interests through lobbying, campaign contributions, and elections. Thus, it is no surprise to the student of public law that the mechanisms actually selected to implement public policy are not necessarily the ones that best pursue the public interest. This chapter begins with a brief summary of normative mechanism choice, including the legal literature on instrument choice and the economics literature on mechanism design. It then moves to a more detailed discussion of positive mechanism choice, also called public choice, political economy, or positive politics. This positive literature explores how political institutions and pressures shape the selection of mechanisms to implement policy, notably when the selected instrument departs from the normative ideal. The positive study of mechanism choice not only informs how political processes shape policy outcomes, but also sheds useful insights into those processes themselves.

Implications of Public Opinion for Space Program Planning, 1980 - 2000

The effect of public opinion on future space programs is discussed in terms of direct support, apathy, or opposition, and concern about the tax burden, budgetary pressures, and national priorities. Factors considered include: the salience and visibility of NASA as compared with other issues, the sources of general pressure on the federal budget which could affect NASA, the public's opinions regarding the size and priority of NASA'S budget, the degree to which the executive can exercise leverage over NASA's budget through influencing or disregarding public opinion, the effects of linkages to other issues on space programs, and the public's general attitudes toward the progress of science

Drought, Climate Change, and Colorado\u27s Policy Discussion: Participation or Procrastination?

Water, drought and even climate change policy problems are attracting increasing attention, but actual response is not as clear. This presentation describes unease over the pace of discussion about rules of the game while play proceeds

Water banking in Colorado: an experiment in trouble?

Presented during the USCID water management conference held on October 13-16, 2004 in Salt Lake City, Utah. The theme of the conference was "Water rights and related water supply issues."Includes bibliographical references.This presentation reports on the progress and problems of the Arkansas River Basin Water Bank Pilot Program in Colorado. The term "water banking" has been used to describe a variety of ways of trading use of water; the legislature's choice in Colorado was a non-profit brokerage mechanism trading only stored surface water. This experiment in modifying traditional prior appropriation law reduces transactions costs and delays in transfers of water. to increase flexibility for the benefit of the holders of agricultural water. Such flexibility is expected to become increasingly desirable in conditions of scarcity and shifts from structural to non-structural approaches to supply. The Colorado experiment is described. to try to explain how a great theory with substantial appeal in principle has been so far socially unacceptable (as of the time of paper submission). The goal is to alert irrigation people to another case of social management being critical to success. regardless of technical charms.Proceedings sponsored by the U.S. Department of the Interior, Central Utah Project Completion Act Office and the U.S. Committee on Irrigation and Drainage

Changing allocation of irrigation water

Presented at Ground water and surface water under stress: competition, interaction, solutions: a USCID water management conference on October 25-28, 2006 in Boise, Idaho.Includes bibliographical references.Integrated water management in the Bear New forms of water transfer are beginning to appear, after decades of calls for increased flexibility in allocation as well as reduction of impacts from the traditional Western practice of "buy-and-dry" - moving water from farming to cities by ending irrigation forever on subject lands. Colorado's interest in improved water transfers increased with recent severe drought, continuing high growth rates of urban and ex-urban populations, and examination of needs for future water supply by the Statewide Water Supply Initiative (SWSI). Colorado does not want a state water plan, but has invested in improving water information and assessment of supply and demand. This study exposed potential shortfalls and may have accelerated competition for agricultural water. Colorado is experimenting with a water bank, but the first effort was severely limited in application and design, and normal agricultural innovation practices were not employed. Now, new forms are being developed in and out of the SWSI. The Statewide Water Supply Initiative "phase 2" technical roundtables narrowed several issues, including alternatives to "buy-and-dry". Three basic additional kinds of water transfers appear to meet demands, and a small set of principles for water transfers are recommended. This paper reviews the three forms and the principles, and the presentation will report preliminary results from further inquiry into potential problems from use of the more flexible transfer forms. Anticipation of problems is desirable to maximize the certainty and predictability of new transfer forms, in order to help make them attractive compared to "buy-and-dry", and to more accurately compare costs and benefits and their distribution