That\u27s Not Fair! Children\u27s Judgments of Maternal Fairness and Good/Bad Intentions

Do children use their own moral judgments as a template against which to judge a parent’s fairness, and does that depend on the child’s age? Piaget’s concept of objective-to-subjective responsibility (a focus on outcome to a focus on intentions) was the template for the current study. The research question was how do children of different ages evaluate the fairness of mothers’ praise/blame for acts featuring different combinations of good/bad intentions and outcome. Forty-eight children (ages 3–11 years) heard two stories in which the outcome did not match the intentions. There were two versions of each story type: In one, the mother praised the child in the story; in the other, she blamed the child. Findings were that (a) children under 7 judged mothers who praised as fair and mothers who blamed as unfair regardless of the intentionality of the act, whereas (b) children 7 and older judged fairness based on consistency of mother’s reaction with the child protagonist’s intentions, thus using moral intentionality as a template to evaluate fairness

Decisional Bias as Implicit Moral Judgment

Decisional bias (false alarm rate) when judging the guilt/innocence of a suspect is offered as an implicit measure of moral judgment. Combining two data sets, 215 participants, ages 10-12, 13-15, and 16-18 watched the visually identical film involving a person setting a fire, framed either as (a) intentional but not resulting in a fire (BI-NF), (b) unintentional but resulting in a major fire (NI-F), or (c) intentional and resulting in a major fire (BI-F). After watching the film, participants identified seriatim who of six individuals was the perpetrator and how certain they were. The data were subjected to a signal detection analysis. Participants also explicitly judged how bad the perpetrator and act were. The implicit measure fit Piaget’s claim of moral realism, shifting from judging wrongness according to the outcome to judging according to the actor’s intentions, better than the explicit traditional measures

A Moral Developmental Perspective on Children\u27s Eyewitness Identification: Does Intent Matter?

Plain English Abstract These studies are based on the assumption that when adults, adolescents or children identify someone as the guilty one, i.e., the person who committed the act, they are not only making an identification based on memory and thinking, but also a moral decision. This is because, by the act of identifying or not identifying someone, the eyewitness runs the risk of either convicting an innocent person , i.e., making false positive error or letting a guilty person go free, i.e., a false negative error. Our interest is less in the overall accuracy of their identifications and more in the balance of false positive and false negative errors. We have found in these and past studies that the balance of these two kinds of errors changes with age, and that this pattern may also depend on (a) the child’s general understanding of the purpose of the task, which appears to be lost on 7-9 year olds, the youngest group studied, and (b) for older children and adolescents, how the act is described, e.g., intended or not. In this way, we can understand that the act of identifying the perpetrator as a moral decision and not simply an act of perception and memory. Scientific Abstract In study 1 eyewitness identification of the perpetrator of a crime (fire), framed as either intended or unintended, was studied in 138 children, ages 7 to 18. Analysis using Signal Detection reveals an interaction of age and condition on decisional bias. Like in past studies, the framing of the act had no effect on the 7-9 year olds, but did have an effect on decisional bias for the other age groups. Decisional bias was more lax (indicting more false alarms) in the intended condition for 10-12 and 14-15 year olds but was more stringent (fewer false alarms) for the 16-18 year olds. This pattern of age and condition differs from the pattern of explicit judgments (how bad the act was, how much punishment it deserved, and how bad it is to commit a false alarm or a miss). Study 2 was conducted to confirm the unexpected findings for the 10-12 year olds. Forty-two children, ages 10-12 viewed the same film, which was framed as unintended, but, resulting either in (a) major or (b) minor damage (fire), approximately half randomly assigned to condition (a) and half to (b). Parallel results were obtained with an earlier study, with lower bias scores (more false alarms) in the major than minor damage conditions. Thus, from both studies, we may conclude that decisional bias is more lenient (resulting in more false alarms) for 10-12 year olds when either intent or damage is bad

Gender Differences in Moral Influences on Adolescents’ Eyewitness Identification

In this study, 232 (89 11- to-12-year-olds, 71 13- to-14-year-olds; 72 15- to-16-year-olds) students recruited from grades 6th–11th in an urban public high school participated in a study of eyewitness identification. The focus of this study was on the effects of age, gender and moral orientation on decisional bias and, as a secondary outcome, on accuracy (using signal detection analysis). The primary purpose of this and previous studies in this series is to uncover implicit moral decision-making in decisional bias. In this study the perpetrator, the bystanders and the foil were all females. Prior to completing the eyewitness identification task, participants were given instructions that emphasized either (a) fairness and crime prevention, or (b) neither. These instructions had no discernible effect on accuracy but, as in past studies, younger participants (below the age of 13) had lower decisional criteria, resulting in a higher rate of false alarms/positives. Further, those who judged the transgression as worse had a lower decisional criterion, indicating more false alarms. Females were more accurate than the males in identifying the female perpetrator and scored significantly higher on how bad they would feel if they were the victim than did the males

First description of feline inflammatory mammary carcinoma: clinicopathological and immunohistochemical characteristics of three cases

INTRODUCTION: Inflammatory breast cancer is a special type of locally advanced mammary cancer that is associated with particularly aggressive behaviour and poor prognosis. The dog was considered the only natural model in which to study the disease because, until now, it was the only species known to present with inflammatory mammary carcinoma (IMC) spontaneously. In the present study we describe clinicopathological and immunohistochemical findings of three cats with IMC, in order to evaluate its possible value as an animal model. METHODS: We prospectively studied three female cats with clinical symptoms of IMC, identified over a period of 3 years. Clinicopathological and immunohistochemical evaluations of Ki-67, and oestrogen, progesterone and androgen receptors were performed. RESULTS: All three animals presented with secondary IMC (postsurgical) characterized by a rapid onset of erythema, severe oedema, extreme local pain and firmness, absence of subjacent mammary nodules, and involvement of extremities. Rejection of the surgical suture was observed in two of the cats. Histologically, highly malignant papillary mammary carcinomas, dermal tumour embolization of superficial lymphatic vessels, and severe secondary inflammation were observed. The animals were put to sleep at 10, 15 and 45 days after diagnosis. Metastases were detected in regional lymph nodes and lungs in the two animals that were necropsied. All tumours had a high Ki-67 proliferation index and were positive for oestrogen, progesterone and androgen receptors. CONCLUSION: Our findings in feline IMC (very low prevalence, only secondary IMC, frequent association of inflammatory reaction with surgical suture rejection, steroid receptor positivity) indicate that feline IMC could be useful as an animal model of human inflammatory breast cancer, although the data should be considered with caution

How Does Reasoning (Fail to) Contribute to Moral Judgment? Dumbfounding and Disengagement

Recent experiments in moral psychology have been taken to imply that moral reasoning only serves to reaffirm prior moral intuitions. More specifically, Jonathan Haidt concludes from his moral dumbfounding experiments, in which people condemn other people’s behavior, that moral reasoning is biased and ineffective, as it rarely makes people change their mind. I present complementary evidence pertaining to self-directed reasoning about what to do. More specifically, Albert Bandura’s experiments concerning moral disengagement reveal that moral reasoning often does contribute effectively to the formation of moral judgments. And such reasoning need not be biased. Once this evidence is taken into account, it becomes clear that both cognition and affect can play a destructive as well as a constructive role in the formation of moral judgments

Methods and timing of biliary drainage for acute cholangitis: Tokyo Guidelines

Biliary drainage is a radical method to relieve cholestasis, a cause of acute cholangitis, and takes a central part in the treatment of acute cholangitis. Emergent drainage is essential for severe cases, whereas patients with moderate and mild disease should also receive drainage as soon as possible if they do not respond to conservative treatment, and their condition has not improved. Biliary drainage can be achieved via three different routes/procedures: endoscopic, percutaneous transhepatic, and open methods. The clinical value of both endoscopic and percutaneous transhepatic drainage is well known. Endoscopic drainage is associated with a low morbidity rate and shorter duration of hospitalization; therefore, this approach is advocated whenever it is applicable. In endoscopic drainage, either endoscopic nasobiliary drainage (ENBD) or tube stent placement can be used. There is no significant difference in the success rate, effectiveness, and morbidity between the two procedures. The decision to perform endoscopic sphincterotomy (EST) is made based on the patient’s condition and the number and diameter of common bile duct stones. Open drainage, on the other hand, should be applied only in patients for whom endoscopic or percutaneous transhepatic drainage is contraindicated or has not been successfully performed. Cholecystectomy is recommended in patients with gallbladder stones, following the resolution of acute cholangitis with medical treatment, unless the patient has poor operative risk factors or declines surgery