Risk Tolerance, Self-Interest, and Social Preferences

We use an experimental method to investigate whether systematic relationships exist across distinct aspects of individual preferences: risk aversion in monetary outcomes, altruism in a twoperson context, and social preferences in a larger group context. Individual preferences across these three contexts are measured, and there is no possibility for risk sharing, wealth effects, or updating expectations of the population choices. We find that social preferences are related to demographic variables, including years of education, gender, and age. Perhaps most importantly, self allocation in a two-person dictator game is related to social preferences in a group context. Participants who are more generous in a dictator game are more likely to vote against their selfinterest in a group decision-making task which we interpret to be expressions of social preferences

When you need it or when I die? Timing of monetary transfers from parents to children

This paper investigates the timing of wealth transfers between generations. We develop an overlapping generations model in which each generation can borrow against its future income but not against expected bequest. As a result, generations relatively poorer than their parents may end up not smoothing consumption. We prove that if wealth transfers can take place earlier in life, then each generation smooths consumption despite the constraint on borrowing and the first best solution is restored. The model implies that parents transfer resources when the children are credit constrained. This implication is tested using Dutch survey data on households' intentions to make intervivos transfers matched with administrative data that allow to construct a measure of the probability of being in need of a transfer. All in all, the paper highlights the importance of intervivos transfers as a device that households can resort to in order to mitigate inter--generational wealth inequalities