7 research outputs found
On the Price of Anarchy of Highly Congested Nonatomic Network Games
We consider nonatomic network games with one source and one destination. We
examine the asymptotic behavior of the price of anarchy as the inflow
increases. In accordance with some empirical observations, we show that, under
suitable conditions, the price of anarchy is asymptotic to one. We show with
some counterexamples that this is not always the case. The counterexamples
occur in very simple parallel graphs.Comment: 26 pages, 6 figure
Mechanisms that Govern how the Price of Anarchy varies with Travel Demand
Selfish routing, represented by the User-Equilibrium (UE) model, is known to be inefficient when compared to the System Optimum (SO) model. However, there is currently little understanding of how the magnitude of this inefficiency, which can be measured by the Price of Anarchy (PoA), varies across different structures of demand and supply. Such understanding would be useful for both transport policy and network design, as it could help to identify circumstances in which policy interventions that are designed to induce more efficient use of a traffic network, are worth their costs of implementation. This paper identifies four mechanisms that govern how the PoA varies with travel demand in traffic networks with separable and strictly increasing cost functions. For each OD movement, these are expansions and contractions in the sets of routes that are of minimum cost under UE and minimum marginal total cost under SO. The effects of these mechanisms on the PoA are established via a combination of theoretical proofs and conjectures supported by numerical evidence. In addition, for the special case of traffic networks with BPR-like cost functions having common power, it is proven that there is a systematic relationship between link flows under UE and SO, and hence between the levels of demand at which expansions and contractions occur. For this case, numerical evidence also suggests that the PoA has power law decay for large demand
O TALLER DE ENSENANZA DE FĂSICA: INOVAĂĂES E PRESSUPOSTOS DE UMA PROPOSTA UNIVERSITĂRIA DE APRENDIZAGEM COLABORATIVA
Data-Driven Models of Selfish Routing: Why Price of Anarchy Does Depend on Network Topology
The asymptotic behavior of the price of anarchy
International audienceThis paper examines the behavior of the price of anarchy as a func- tion of the traffic inflow in nonatomic congestion games with multiple origin- destination (O/D) pairs. Empirical studies in real-world networks show that the price of anarchy is close to 1 in both light and heavy traffic, thus raising the ques- tion: can these observations be justified theoretically? We first show that this is not always the case: the price of anarchy may remain bounded away from 1 for all values of the traffic inflow, even in simple three-link networks with a single O/D pair and smooth, convex costs. On the other hand, for a large class of cost functions (including all polynomials), the price of anarchy does converge to 1 in both heavy and light traffic conditions, and irrespective of the network topology and the number of O/D pairs in the network