The future of global strategy

Research Summary: Global strategy, that is, the analysis of strategy in an international context, has co-evolved with the dramatic changes in the global economy in the 21st century. Research advances have enabled a more sophisticated understanding of how firms develop strategies in an increasingly turbulent global environment in which societal expectations, technological advances, and political decisions are all in a state of continuous change. In this article, we reflect and provide suggestions for how the field may evolve on five key themes of global strategy: cooperation, coordination, governance, politics, and innovation. We also outline suggestions for future research on global issues that are gaining increasing centrality in business decisions: climate change, artificial intelligence, and geopolitics. Managerial Summary: The study of how the context affects firms' strategies has changed with the transformation of the world in the 21st century. Research has provided a better understanding of how managers create and implement strategies in response to changes in societal expectations, technological advances, and political decisions. In this article, we reflect and provide suggestions for future studies on five key themes of global strategy: cooperation, coordination, governance, politics, and innovation in multinationals. We also outline suggestions for analyzing the increasingly important grand challenges that affect business decisions: climate change, artificial intelligence, and geopolitics

Risk propensity in the foreign direct investment location decision of emerging multinationals

A distinguishing feature of emerging economy multinationals is their apparent tolerance for host country institutional risk. Employing behavioral decision theory and quasi-experimental data, we find that managers’ domestic experience satisfaction increases their relative risk propensity regarding controllable risk (legally protectable loss), but decreases their tendency to accept non-controllable risk (e.g., political instability). In contrast, firms’ potential slack reduces relative risk propensity regarding controllable risk, yet amplifies the tendency to take non-controllable risk. We suggest that these counterbalancing effects might help explain observation that risk-taking in FDI location decisions is influenced by firm experience and context. The study provides a new understanding of why firms exhibit heterogeneous responses to host country risks, and the varying effects of institutions

Corruption and its effects on FDI:Analysing the interaction between the corruption levels of the home and host countries and its effects at the decision-making level

This study furthers our understanding of how corruption affects the decision-making process of allocating foreign direct investment. Drawing on the responses of 28 managers in charge of establishing operations in a highly corrupt host country, we argue that those firms based in home countries with low levels of corruption are more proactive in preparing to face corruption abroad than those based in countries with high corruption levels. This means that firms from less corrupt home countries have strategies in place to deal with high corruption abroad. This finding is based on the fact that these firms have stronger pressures to not engage in corruption from their home stakeholders. Also, these firms might not have the experience of dealing with corruption at home, which hinders their potential to deal with corruption abroad. On the other hand, those firms based in highly corrupt home countries do not have clear strategies to deal with corruption abroad. This assertion is based on the fact that these firms might have familiarity in dealing with corruption and thus, might not see it as an obstacle to operating abroad

State owned enterprises as bribe payers: the role of institutional environment

Our paper draws attention to a neglected channel of corruption—the bribe payments by state-owned enterprises (SOEs). This is an important phenomenon as bribe payments by SOEs fruitlessly waste national resources, compromising public welfare and national prosperity. Using a large dataset of 30,249 firms from 50 countries, we show that, in general, SOEs are less likely to pay bribes for achieving organizational objectives owing to their political connectivity. However, in deteriorated institutional environments, SOEs may be subjected to potential managerial rent-seeking behaviors, which disproportionately increase SOE bribe propensity relative to privately owned enterprises. Specifically, our findings highlight the importance of fostering democracy and rule of law, reducing prevalence of corruption and shortening power distance in reducing the incidence of SOE bribery

Simple word of mouth or complex resource orchestration for overcoming liabilities of outsidership

Drawing on the resource orchestration literature, we explore the processes by which transnational entrepreneurs offset the liabilities of outsidership they face in their host country. We show how these entrepreneurs’ outsidership with respect to domestic business networks of the host country is compensated by their involvement in diaspora networks. Our second contribution lies in an extension of the resource orchestration framework, as we show that sequencing of resource orchestration processes is important for the implementation of the entrepreneurs’ strategy for using their embeddedness within the diaspora network for enhancing their competitiveness, and can lead to lead to groupings of activities that differ from the groupings found in the original version of the framework