Screening Contracts in the Presence of Positive Network Effects

Based on the critical assumption of strategic complementarity, this paper builds a general model to describe and solve the screening problem faced by the monopolist seller of a network good. By applying monotone comparative static tools, we demonstrate that the joint presence of asymmetric information and positive network effects leads to a strict downward distortion for all consumers in the quantities provided. We also show that the equilibrium allocation is an increasing function of the intensity of network effects, and that a discriminating monopoly may supply large quantities for all consumers than a competitive industry.network effects, strategic complementarities, contracting with externalities, second-degree discrimination, monotone comparative statics

Estimating the Lock-in Effects of Switching Costs from Firm-Level Data

This paper proposes a simple method for estimating the lock-in effects of switching costs from firm-level data. We compare the behavior of already contracted consumers to the behavior of new consumers as the latter can serve as contrafactual to the former. In panel regressions on firms' incoming and quitting consumers, we look at the differential response to price changes and identify the lock-in effect of switching costs from the difference between the two. We illustrate our method by analyzing the Hungarian personal loan market and find strong lock-in effects.switching costs, lock-in, panel data

Screening Contracts in the Presence of Positive Network Effects

Based on the critical assumption of strategic complementarity, this paper builds a general model to describe and solve the screening problem faced by the monopolist seller of a network good. By applying monotone comparative static tools, we demonstrate that the joint presence of asymmetric information and positive network effects leads to a strict downward distortion for all consumers in the quantities provided. We also show that the equilibrium allocation is an increasing function of the intensity of network effects, and that a discriminating monopoly may supply large quantities for all consumers than a competitive industry

Magyarországi empirikus piacszerkezet-elemzések kutatási eredményeinek és gyakorlati alkalmazásainak áttekintése

A tanulmány a magyarországi empirikus piacszerkezet-elemzéseket rendszerezi. Az elemzési módszerek és cikkek csoportosítása elsősorban azon szempont szerint történik, hogy azok milyen típusú adatokra építenek, az egyszerűbbtől a bonyolultabb felé haladva. Emellett ez az írás azt is bemutatja, hogy az eredmények milyen módon alkalmazhatók a versenypolitika és a szabályozás főbb területein, a piacdefiníció, a piaci erő értékelése és a piaci magatartás hatásainak elemzése kapcsán