Re-Prioritising Referrals under Article 22 EUMR: Consequences for Third Parties and Mutual Trust between Competition Authorities

This article assesses the distribution of enforcement powers across national authorities and the European Commission, in light of the Commission’s Guidance on the referral mechanisms under Article 22 in 2021 and the General Court’s judgment in Illumina/GRAIL1 and the Commission’s prohibition decision in 2022.The Article shows how the issue of delegation of enforcement powers between the Member States and the EU institutions has always been at the heart of the negotiation processes of the Merger Regulation, and though implemented through compromises, such as Article 22, this question may not have been entirely resolved.The article critically analyses two specific consequences of the way the Commission re-prioritised cases eligible for Article 22 referrals: the consequences of the Commission’s new policy for third parties and the principles of effective competition law enforcement including the principle of loyal cooperation and mutual trust

Abolishing Formal Complaints? Balancing Technical Expertise and Efficiency with Democratic Accountability in the European Commission’s Decision-Making

The progression of EU law: Accommodating change and upholding value

Hungary: Topical issues in competition law enforcement

This article examines recent developments and topical matters in Hungarian competition law and policy, and its enforcement practice. Against a short historical and legal background the article discusses the current state of competition law enforcement, which has developed on the basis of a particular institutional model integrating certain consumer protection and the competition law enforcement powers. The current enforcement reveals a mixed picture of dominant reliance on consumer protection enforcement powers in, for example, digital markets and a restrained competition law enforcement due to various legislative developments in Hungary. The article argues that the Hungarian competition law and policy grew over the past two decades into a modern and solid competition law regime featuring a special institutional design housing both competition law and certain consumer law enforcement powers. Even though such an institutional setting has provided a fertile ground for the GVH to analyse market problems in a broader perspective and to explore and implement a broad range of enforcement tools and innovative enforcement mechanisms, over the years state intervention in markets grew to be unproportionate compared to the market failures. The article suggests a rebalancing of enforcement efforts and practices in order to better facilitate how future market structures could develop in Hungary and outside