Governance of Italian pension funds: problems and solutions

In this paper we investigate the governance structure of Italian pensions funds. First, we conduct a brief but critical review of the theoretical and empirical literature, in order to identify the areas where major improvements are necessary: a) the skills and competence of the trustees; b) the definition of tasks and responsibilities; c) the handling of conflicts of interest. Secondly, we assess the governance of closed and open pension funds in Italy by analyzing their bylaws and other fund documents. Our main findings are: a) the average skill level of the trustees is still inadequate, despite the remarkable improvements made following recent reforms; b) there is no clear definition of the responsibilities of the various governing bodies; c) there is no clear policy for handling conflicts of interest. Finally, we observe that in these areas the potential role of self-regulation has not yet been fully exploited.pension funds, governance, conflicts of interest

Infrastructure and project financing in Italy: the (possible) role of the regulation

There has been a significant increase in project financing in the public sector in Europe in the past decade, benefiting the implementation of infrastructure projects. In Italy, project financing is still much more limited than in such countries as Spain and the UK: the projects funded are smaller and the sectors involved are less appropriate. Based on the economic literature, European initiatives and international comparisons, the paper examines the aspects of the regulations that could encourage the appropriate use of project financing and considers the problems with the Italian regulations, proposing some corrective measures. The main limitations involve: i) uncertainties over the allocation of administrative and regulatory risks; ii) poor procedures for selecting the private contractors; iii) relative lack of attention to the contract terms; and iv) inadequate safeguards to ensure the bankability of the projects.infrastructure financing, project financing, regulation, risk allocation

Riforma del mercato del lavoro e giudizi sui licenziamenti individuali: prime evidenze* = Labor market reform and individual layoff judgments: first evidence*. WP C.S.D.L.E. “Massimo D’Antona”.IT – 210/2014

The paper aims to provide first evaluations of the measures introduced by the Law n. 92/2012, with the aim of reducing the costs of dismissal for firms and speeding up judicial procedures. The available evidence, although limited and preliminary, seems to indicate a partial reduction of the application of reinstatement protection and a partial acceleration of the judgments on individual dismissals. However, it also highlights the existence of critical aspects that may limit the effectiveness of the measures adopted and – in some cases – increase the complexity of the system. In particular, there is an increase in the uncertainty of the regulatory framework, since the presence of conflicting interpretations of the judges on extremely significant aspects. In addition, there are frequent duplications of proceedings, resulting in more burdensome labour justice

Risk allocation and incentives for private contractors: an analysis of Italian project financing contracts

Based on the economic literature and international comparison, the paper examines the adequacy of the terms of Italian project financing contracts to build and operate public works, and identifies potential areas for improvement. We analyze the main contractual content of the public works construction and management concessions submitted to the Project Financing Technical Unit with a view to monitoring public-private contract partnerships. Overall, the analysis reveals the backwardness of the Italian system and the existence of not insignificant problem areas. The survey supports the need to foster adequate standardization of contracts in Italy aimed, in particular, at ensuring: i) the provision of more appropriate mechanisms for the employment of penalties for breach of contract by the concessionaire, especially in the management phase, and – conversely – of reward mechanisms; ii) the inclusion of clauses relative to the sharing of financing documents by the contracting authorities; iii) appropriate attention to the quantitative elements of the business plan; and iv) the strengthening of supervisory activity of the grantor during the various phases of the contract.project financing, regulation, risk allocation

The awarding of public works in Italy: an analysis of the mechanisms for the selection of contractors

Despite successive reforms, public procurement in Italy is still highly fragmented and vulnerable to collusion, corruption and ex-post renegotiation. Other defects are found in the planning stages of the works. These problems are due in part to the regulations on the awarding of public works contracts, which do not guarantee the correct functioning of the selection mechanisms. Indications from the economic literature and international comparisons suggest a series of possible improvements: i) the elimination of automatic exclusion mechanisms for anomalous tenders (which would reduce the risk of collusion between bidders); ii) the centralization of assessments of anomalous offers under the responsibility of larger adjudicating authorities, with an increase in the surety guarantees provided by the winner, to reduce the risk of subsequent renegotiations; iii) stronger anti-corruption measures; iv) more standardized planning and, for the more complex auctions, competitive dialogue.infrastructure, auctions, regulation

Stato dell’arte e prospettive della contrattazione aziendale in Italia = State of the art and prospects for corporate bargaining in Italy. WP C.S.D.L.E. “Massimo D’Antona”.IT – 242/2015

Italy is not immune from the long term process towards greater bargaining decentralization under way in Western Europe. The article surveys the main actions, either defined by social partners or by government intervention, which have attempted to encourage this process in recent years, without altering the relative importance of different levels of bargaining. Empirical evidence shows that firm-level bargaining has been associated with innovative managerial practices, but also that a significant share of firms would be willing to sign contracts that would grant higher wages or preserve occupational levels in order to obtain higher flexibility in the use of the workforce. From an institutional standpoint, the main obstacles preventing the adoption of such deals are: i) unresolved issues related to the measurement of trade unions’ weight at the national level and to the coexistence of two different workers’ representation systems, ii) limits to contract enforcement, iii) limited scope for action of second level bargaining in determining both wages and work organization. The effectiveness of tax breaks encouraging a closer link between wage and productivity at the firm level has been undermined by poor monitoring and frequent changes to the eligibility criteria

Local public procurement regulations: the case of Italy

Regional and local authorities award 54% of the public works contracts submitted to the Authority for the Supervision of Public Contracts. This paper analyses the regulations adopted in the period 2000–2010 in all Italian regions and a sample of provinces and municipalities and shows how highly pervasive they are. In some cases they had positive effects that served the specific needs of the territory; in others, an anti-competitive orientation prevailed, with extra costs for the contracting authorities and less efficient allocation of resources. The paper's policy recommendations include: (i) greater coordination of reforms between the central and the local levels; (ii) an enhanced role for the sector authorities; (iii) improvements in national regulations so that the regional and local authorities have less of an interest in modifying them; (iv) greater transparency and better information quality

Qualificazione, aggiudicazione e subappalti nei lavori pubblici: cosa insegnano le riforme locali?

Qualification, Awarding and Subcontracting in Public Procurement: What Can We Learn from Local Reforms? The presence of a pervasive and evolving local regulation in the Italian public procurement offers a way to study the effects of a vast series of reforms involv-ing firms qualifications, contracts awarding and subcontracting. This paper doc-uments the legal aspects of these local regulations and, for some of these rules, exploits their changes over time to analyze their effects on firms participation, winning bids, renegotiations and subcontracts. The paper also investigates how the type and availability of data affects the robustness of the effects of the dif-ferent reforms evaluated. Finally, it also compares the estimates obtained to those coming from the recent experimentation undertaken by the municipality of Turin regarding the auction formats