1,246 research outputs found
On the relation between modality and tense
ABSTRACT We critically review two extant paradigms for understanding the systematic interaction between modality and tense, as well as their respective modifications designed to do justice to the contingency of time’s structure and composition. We show that on either type of theory, as well as their respective modifications, some principles prove logically valid whose truth might sensibly be questioned on metaphysical grounds. These considerations lead us to devise a more general logical framework that allows accommodation of those metaphysical views that its predecessors rule out by fiat
The formalities of temporaryism without presentness
Temporaryism the view that not always everything always exists comes in two main versions: presentism and expansionism (aka the growing block theory of time). Both versions of the view are commonly formulated using the notion of being present, which we, among others, find problematic. Expan- sionism is also sometimes accused of requiring extraordinary conceptual tools for its formulation. In this paper, we put forward systematic characterisations of presentism and expansionism which involve neither the notion of being present nor unfamiliar conceptual tools. These characterisations are full blown logics, each logic comprising an axiomatic proof system and an intuitive semantics with respect to which the system is both sound and complete
Essence, Modality, and Identity
In a recent article forthcoming in *Mind*, Leech (2020) presents a challenge for essentialist accounts of metaphysical modality: why should it be that essences imply corresponding necessities? Leech’s main focus is to argue that one cannot overcome the challenge by utilizing an account of essence in terms of generalized identity due to Correia and Skiles (2019), on pain of circularity. In this reply, we will show how to use identity-based essentialism to bridge ‘epistemic’ and ‘explanatory’ understandings of this alleged essence-to-necessity gap without circularity, Leech’s arguments notwithstanding. We do so by first presenting a novel proof that generalized identities imply corresponding necessities. We then propose several substantive identity-based explanations of how it is, exactly, that essences imply necessities
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