Wittgenstein and Communication Technology : A conversation between Richard Harper and Constantine Sandis

Special Issue: PROCEEDINGS OF THE BRITISH WITTGENSTEIN SOCIETY 10TH ANNIVERSARY CONFERENCE: WITTGENSTEIN IN THE 21ST CENTURY © 2018 John Wiley & Sons LtdThis paper documents a conversation between a philosopher and a human computer interaction researcher whose research has been enormously influenced by Wittgenstein. In particular, the in vivo use of categories in the design of communications and AI technologies are discussed, and how this meaning needs to evolve to allow creative design to flourish. The paper will be of interest to anyone concerned with philosophical tools in everyday action.Non peer reviewe

'If Some People Looked Like Elephants and Others Like Cats': : Wittgenstein on Understanding Others and Forms of Life

This manuscript version is made available under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution licence (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted re-use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited. The version of record, © 2015, de Gruyer, Sandis, Constantine; ‘If some people looked like Elephants and Others Like Cats’, Wittgenstein on Understanding Others and Forms of Life, Nordic Wittgenstein Review, Special Issue, pp. 131-153, October 2015, ISSN 2242-248X. Available online at: http://www.nordicwittgensteinreview.com/article/view/3372This essay introduces a tension between the public Wittgenstein’s optimism about knowledge of other minds and the private Wittgenstein’s pessimism about understanding others. There are three related reasons which render the tension unproblematic. First, the barriers he sought to destroy were metaphysical ones, whereas those he struggled to overcome were psychological. Second, Wittgenstein’s official view is chiefly about knowledge while the unofficial one is about understanding. Last, Wittgenstein’s official remarks on understanding themselves fall into two distinct categories that don’t match the focus of his unofficial ones. One is comprised of those remarks in the Investigations that challenge the thought that understanding is an inner mental process. The other consists primarily of those passages in PPF and On Certainty concerned with the difficulty of understanding others without immersing oneself into their form of life. In its unofficial counterpart, Wittgenstein focuses on individuals, rather than collectives. The official and the unofficial sets of remarks are united in assuming a distinction between understanding a person and understanding the meaning of their words. If to understand a language is to understand a form of life, then to understand a person is to understand a whole life.Non peer reviewe

Against principles

Constantine Sandis argues for a holistic approach to museum

Kant and Hegel on Purposive Action

This essay discusses Kant and Hegel’s philosophies of action and the place of action within the general structure of their practical philosophy. We begin by briefly noting a few things that both unite and distinguish the two philosophers. In the sections that follow, we consider these and their corollaries in more detail. In so doing, we map their differences against those suggested by more standard readings that treat their accounts of action as less central to their practical philosophy. Section 2 discusses some central Kantian concepts (Freedom, Willkür, Wille, and Moral Law). In Section 3, we take a closer look at the distinction between internal and external action, as found in Kant’s philosophy of morality and legality. In Section 4, we turn to Hegel and his distinctions between abstract right (legality), morality, and ethical life, as well as the location of his account of action within his overall theory of morality. We discuss the distinction between Handlung and Tat, and non-imputable consequences. The overall aims of our essay are to shed light on some puzzles in Kant and Hegel’s conceptions and to examine where their exact disputes lie without taking a stand on which philosophy is ultimately the most satisfactory.Peer reviewe

Modern Moral Philosophy Before and After Anscombe

Prologue This paper argues for the following three theses: i) There was considerably more philosophy of action in moral theory before 1958 (when Anscombe complained of its lack under the banner 'philosophy of psychology') than there has been since. This is in part because ii) Anscombe influenced the formation of ‘virtue theory’ as yet another position within normative ethics, and iii) Anscombe’s work contributed to the fashioning of ‘moral psychology’as an altogether distinct (and now increasingly empirical) branch of moral philosophy. None of (i-iii) were foreseen – let alone intended – by Anscombe, who would have been displeased by this state of affairs, already evident at the time of her death in early 2001. The tragic irony of ‘Modern Moral Philosophy’ (MMP), then, is that in many ways the past century of ethical theory make more sense read backwards. My somewhat programmatic investigation into this predicament begins somewhere in the middle, with MMP, then proceeds to present what happened before and after in its light.Peer reviewe

What is it to do nothing?

© The Author. This is the accepted manuscript version of a book chapter which has been published in final form at https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108628228.014We should reject any moral theory that rests on the metaphysical assumption that actions—or even their characterisations—can be neatly divided into positive acts of doing and so-called ‘negative’ acts of omitting, refraining, neglecting, and so on. This essay is an attempt to cut loose from the tenacious grip of such a picture and journey towards the elusive Bhagavadian view that all action contains inaction, and vice versa. Should it succeed, the repercussions for the doctrine of doing and allowing and related puzzles concerning moral responsibility are radical