CRIMINAL LAW-EVIDENCE-SILENCE TO ACCUSATION WHILE UNDER ARREST AS ADMISSION OF GUILT

Defendant was convicted of murder. Before the victim died, defendant, handcuffed and in custody of police, had been taken to the hospital room where the victim lay. Eight witnesses were present at the time, and each testified that the victim pointed out the defendant as her assailant. At the trial the witnesses were permitted to testify that when accused of the crime, defendant stood by silently, saying and doing nothing, although it also appeared that he had been told by the police chief to \u27\u27keep your mouth shut. The prosecution capitalized upon defendant\u27s silence as an admission of guilt. On appeal, held, reversed. Defendant, while under arrest, had no duty to speak or to deny the accusation, and his silence could not be construed as an admission. People v. Mleczko, 298 N.Y. 153, 81 N.E. (2d) 65 (1948)

WORKMEN\u27S COMPENSATION ACTS-DENIAL OF COMMON LAW REMEDY FOR ASSOCIATED INJURIES NOT COVERED BY ACT

While employed by defendant, plaintiff suffered severe bums and received compensation for a permanent partial disability under the applicable workmen\u27s compensation act. He then brought an action for damages for disfigurement, not compensable under the act, on the theory that acceptance of statutory compensation did not deprive him of his common law remedy for injuries not within the scope of the act. Held, the statutory remedy is exclusive; plaintiff cannot recover for associated injuries outside the act. Morgan v. Ray L. Smith & Son, Inc., (D.C. Kan. 1948) 79 F. Supp. 971

CREDITORS\u27 RIGHTS-REMEDIES AVAILABLE TO TORT CREDITOR WITHOUT JUDGMENT IN MICHIGAN AND UNDER THE UNIFORM FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCES ACT

During negotiations for settlement of a tort claim between plaintiff and X, X transferred some realty to his son, defendant. Plaintiff commenced suit against X on the claim and, alleging that defendant and X were jointly liable on the claim, sued defendant in equity to enjoin a prospective transfer of the property by defendant to third parties. Held, for defendant; equity has no jurisdiction to enjoin the transfer of assets for a claim that is not secured by a lien or reduced to a judgment. Irwin v. Meese, 325 Mich. 349, 38 N.W. (2d) 869 (1949)

WILLS-CONSTRUCTION-GIFT TO EXECUTOR TO BE DISPOSED OF IN HIS DISCRETION AS A GENERAL POWER OF APPOINTMENT

Testator, after bequeathing specific legacies, gave the residue of his estate to his executor to dispose of any balance after the aforementioned gifts have been paid according to his wise discretion.\u27\u27 The executor was the husband of testator\u27s niece, one of the legatees, and he was well acquainted with testator. He declared his intention of disposing of the residue to testator\u27s nieces, for whom testator had expressed concern. The trial court held the testator had attempted to create a trust by the residuary clause, which failed for indefiniteness. On appeal, held, reversed. The testator created a general power of appointment in the executor. In re Lindston\u27s Estate, (Wash. 1949) 202 P. (2d) 259

DISCOVERY-ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE-STATEMENTS BY CLIENT TO INSURER BEFORE ATTORNEY EMPLOYED

Plaintiff, suing for personal injuries suffered in an automobile collision, sought discovery of statements made by defendant to his insurer, both before and after an attorney had been employed by the insurer pursuant to its contract with defendant. Defendant contended that such statements were within the attorney-client privilege. On appeal from an order denying discovery, held, affirmed. The statements were intended as a communication by defendant to the attorney ultimately to be retained for him by his insurer, and the insurer was the agent of defendant to transmit the statements to the attorney when selected. Hollien v. Kaye, 194 Misc. 821, 87 N.Y.S. (2d) 782 (1949)

CORPORATIONS-ELECTIONS-JUDICIAL ACTIONS OF INSPECTORS OF ELECTIONS

If the modern cases are to be judged in light of what the courts say, it is probable that Judge Tilghman\u27s views are the weight of authority. While a few courts frankly admit that inspectors do act judicially at times, most of the courts continue to define the actions of the inspectors in ministerial terms. However, there are two areas within which the inspectors may exercise such unusual powers that they may be called judicial, namely, those relating to the ascertainment of (1) the validity of proxies and (2) title to stock. The scope of this comment is confined to these two areas with attention directed to the scope of the inspectors\u27 powers and the effect of their findings on the courts

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-DUE PROCESS-USE OF EXTRANEOUS EVIDENCE IN DETERMINING CRIMINAL SENTENCE

Petitioner was convicted of murder in the first degree with a recommendation for life imprisonment. In reliance on police and probation reports showing petitioner\u27s background which included over thirty burglaries for which he had never been arraigned and a morbid sexuality, the trial judge disregarded the jury\u27s recommendation and imposed the death sentence. Although petitioner did not have an opportunity to examine the reports prior to the sentence hearing, he was represented by counsel at the hearing and did not challenge them at that time. Petitioner contended that he had been denied due process of law because his sentence had not been based on information supplied by witnesses with whom he could be confronted. Held, due process was not violated because extraneous evidence was used to assist the judge in imposing sentence. Justices Murphy and Rutledge dissented. Williams v. People of State of New York, (U.S. 1949) 69 S.Ct. 1079