Robust Inference with Clustered Data

In this paper we survey methods to control for regression model error that is correlated within groups or clusters, but is uncorrelated across groups or clusters. Then failure to control for the clustering can lead to understatement of standard errors and overstatement of statistical significance, as emphasized most notably in empirical studies by Moulton (1990) and Bertrand, Duflo and Mullainathan (2004). We emphasize OLS estimation with statistical inference based on minimal assumptions regarding the error correlation process. Complications we consider include cluster-specific fixed effects, few clusters, multi-way clustering, more efficient feasible GLS estimation, and adaptation to nonlinear and instrumental variables estimators.Cluster robust, random eects, xed eects, dierences in dierences, cluster bootstrap, few clusters, multi-way clusters.

Robust Inference with Clustered Data

In this paper we survey methods to control for regression model error that is correlated within groups or clusters, but is uncorrelated across groups or clusters. Then failure to control for the clustering can lead to understatement of standard errors and overstatement of statistical significance, as emphasized most notably in empirical studies by Moulton (1990) and Bertrand, Duflo and Mullainathan (2004). We emphasize OLS estimation with statistical inference based on minimal assumptions regarding the error correlation process. Complications we consider include cluster-specific fixed effects, few clusters, multi-way clustering, more efficient feasible GLS estimation, and adaptation to nonlinear and instrumental variables estimators.Cluster robust, random effects, fixed effects, differences in differences, cluster bootstrap, few clusters, multi-way clusters.

Anchors Away: Why the Anchoring Effect Suggests that Judges should be able to Participate in Plea Discussions

The “anchoring effect” is a cognitive bias by which people evaluate numbers by focusing on a reference point—an anchor—and adjusting up or down. Unfortunately, people usually do not sufficiently adjust away from their anchors, so the initial choice of anchors has an inordinate effect on their final estimates. More than ninety percent of all criminal cases are resolved by plea bargains. In the vast majority of those cases, the prosecutor makes the initial plea offer, and prosecutors often make high initial offers. Assuming that the prosecutor’s opening offer operates as an anchor, nearly all criminal case in this country produce unjust results based upon an unconscious cognitive bias. This Article proposes a solution that most jurisdictions have rejected: Judges should be able to participate in the plea discussions. Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11(c)(1) and most state counterparts strictly preclude judges from participating in plea discussions, but a few jurisdictions permit judicial participation. In these jurisdictions, plea discussions commence with the prosecution and defense laying out their cases and asking for particular dispositions and the judge responding with the expected post-plea sentence. This Article contends that this type of judicial participation would reduce the anchoring effect

Escape from New York: Analyzing the State\u27s Relative Interests in Proscribing the Withdrawal of Life Support and Physician-Assisted Suicide

This Note argues that states cannot consistently prohibit physician assisted suicide for terminally ill patients while they continue to allow the withdrawal of life support for even non-terminal patients. All of the state interests identified by the Supreme Court in rejecting a right to assisted suicide are implicated to a higher degree by withdrawal of life support. The primary reason for this difference is that withdrawal of life support often involves incompetent patients and surrogate decision making while assisted suicide by definition requires a competent patient choosing to hasten her deat

Beware of the Diamond Dogs: Why a \u27Credentials Alone\u27 Conception of Probable Cause Violates the Compulsory Process Clause

In Florida v. Harris, the State has asked the Supreme Court to find that a positive alert by a certified narcotics-detection dog is per se sufficient, in and of itself, to establish probable cause for the search of a vehicle. This essay, to be published in conjunction with Leslie Shoebotham\u27s amici brief in Harris, argues that this credentials alone conception of probable cause violates the Compulsory Process Clause

Death by Any Other Name: The Federal Government\u27s Inconsistent Treatment of Drugs Used in Lethal Injections and Physician-Assisted Suicide

While the FDA is under no legal obligation to regulate the drugs used in executions, these recent developments certainly create a moral imperative requiring review. This paper will argue that the federal government cannot consistently refrain from regulating lethal injection drugs while arguing for prosecution of those prescribing drugs to be used by patients in assisted suicide. Part II will look at the opinions in Chaney and the factors behind the FDA\u27s decision not to regulate the drugs used in executions. Part III will look at Oregon\u27s Death with Dignity Act and its authorization by the Supreme Court. Parts IV-VI will analyze how the justifications given by the FDA in the early 1980s, for not regulating the drugs used in executions, are no longer valid in 2003. Part IV will discuss how lethal injection now constitutes a serious public health issue. In the early 1980s, only two hundred prisoners were subject to lethal injections, and scant evidence existed of its dangerousness. Now, after two decades of botched executions and the ascendance of lethal injection as the near exclusive method of execution, it is evident that the process has caused serious damage. Part V will look at the inconsistency in the federal government\u27s classification of lethal injection as a legitimate medical practice that the FDA will not regulate and in its claim that physician assisted suicide (PAS) is an illegal state practice subject to federal nullification. It will argue that lethal injection is 1) more disfavored by medical groups, 2) less consistent with the Hippocratic Oath, 3) a more active form of killing for the physician, and 4) less consistent with the standard medical treatment model than PAS. Finally, Part VI will discuss how capital punishment is less of a duly authorized state practice than PAS