High time for an efficient and effective internationally-supported Zoonosis Surveillance System?

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Coping flexibly: role reorientation and the UK’s military cooperation with European allies after Brexit

The UK faced a potential loss of influence after the 2016 Brexit referendum. Without a seat in EU institutions and absent from the Common Security and Defence Policy, London lost the opportunity to influence the trajectory of the EU as a security actor. However, the UK remains a heavyweight in European security and has focussed on ways to exercise military and security leadership unencumbered by the constraints of EU membership. It has done so by leveraging its high standing in NATO, by emphasising regional initiatives such as the Joint Expeditionary Force and by reinforcing (and, in some cases, extending) bilateral cooperation with individual European countries. Brexit-induced concerns about the trajectory of UK power and influence opened up space to cooperate with the UK’s European partners in several ways. These trends have been amplified by the UK’s response to the Russian invasion of Ukraine

Persevering with bandwagoning, not hedging: why European security cooperation still conforms to realism

Over the past few years, European security cooperation has been revived. The EU has launched several defence initiatives and some member states, such as France have launched their own collaborative initiatives. The renewed activism in European security cooperation followed several years of inactivity and warrants theoretical investigation. Hedging is a concept that has been employed to make sense of renewed activism in European security cooperation. By pursuing hedging, Europeans are preparing for a future in which the US might be unwilling or unable to get involved, and to assist with, European security affairs. Advancing a neorealist analysis, this article argues that European states’ efforts to increase cooperation remain consistent with the broader trajectory of European security cooperation since the end of the Cold War. European states remain dependent on the US for their security and are still far from autonomously projecting their influence internationally. This article illustrates the argument with reference to the recent withdrawal of the US from Afghanistan and the French promise to wind down its commitment in the Sahel. The implications of this argument are discussed in detail

THE ME TOO SYNDROME RELOADED: CHANGE AND CONTINUITY IN ITALIAN RELATIONS WITH FRANCE AND GERMANY AFTER BREXIT

The 2016 United Kingdom European Union membership referendum altered the European balance of power, leaving France and Germany as the only major powers in the EU. As a would-be peer within EU institutions, Italy was particularly exposed by this situation and adapted its foreign policy accordingly. Noting that Italy has displayed a mix of cooperation and conflict with France and Germany, our article seeks to answer why this has been the case. Focusing on the impact of party politics on foreign policy, we argue that Italian foreign policy resulted from the political synthesis developed by each of the Ital-ian cabinets ruling since 2016. The political synthesis depended, in turn, on the interplay between party ideology (pro- or anti-EU) and coalition dynamics. A cooperative foreign policy is then related to ideologically divided coalitions and those sharing a pro-EU ideology. On the contrary, an oppositional foreign policy depended on homogeneous, anti-EU coalitions

Undergraduate teaching on biological weapons and bioterrorism at medical schools in the UK and the Republic of Ireland: results of a cross-sectional study

Objective To determine if individual undergraduate schools of medicine in the UK and the Republic of Ireland provide any teaching to medical students about biological weapons, bioterrorism, chemical weapons and weaponised radiation, if they perceive them to be relevant issues and if they figure them in their future plans. Design A cross-sectional study utilising an internet-based questionnaire sent to key figures responsible for leading on the planning and delivery of undergraduate medical teaching at all schools of medicine in the UK and Ireland. Setting All identified undergraduate schools of medicine in the UK and Ireland between August 2012 and December 2012. Outcome measures Numerical data and free text feedback about relevant aspects of undergraduate teaching. Results Of the 38 medical schools approached, 34 (28 in UK, 6 in Ireland) completed the questionnaire (89.47%). 4 (all in UK) chose not to complete it. 6/34 (17.65%) included some specific teaching on biological weapons and bioterrorism. 7/34 (20.59%) had staff with bioterrorism expertise (mainly in microbiological and syndromic aspects). 4/34 (11.76%) had plans to introduce some specific teaching on bioterrorism. Free text responses revealed that some felt that because key bodies (eg, UK's General Medical Council) did not request teaching on bioterrorism, then it should not be included, while others regarded this field of study as a postgraduate subject and not appropriate for undergraduates, or argued that the curriculum was too congested already. 4/34 (11.76%) included some specific teaching on chemical weapons, and 3/34 (8.82%) on weaponised radiation. Conclusions This study provides evidence that at the present time there is little teaching at the undergraduate level in the UK and Ireland on the subjects of biological weapons and bioterrorism, chemical weapons and weaponised radiation and signals that this situation is unlikely to change unless there were to be high-level policy guidance

Why did Italy contribute to UNIFIL II? An analytical eclectic analysis

No embargo required.After the 2006 war between Israel and Hezbollah, the UN launched the peacekeeping operation UNIFIL II. Italy embarked on the demanding task of taking responsibility for leading the mission. We present a model of military intervention in multilateral operations that aims at highlighting the mechanisms at stake. In so doing, we argue that an analytical eclectic approach offers a novel explanation of Italy’s behaviour. We explain the drivers of Italy’s intervention in Lebanon in two ways. First, we analyse Italy’s actions at the outset of the crisis. Second, we provide an account of the parliamentary debate that took place in both chambers of the Italian Parliament between July and October 2006