Private vs. Public Sector : Discrimination against Second-Generation Immigrants in France

The assimilation of immigrants and their children is a burning issue in France. Governments build a large part of their policies on the labor market. The public sector is reputed to integrate minorities better because of its entrance exams and pay-scales. In this paper, a comparison of the public and private sectors shows that second-generation immigrants are not treated equally. Those of African descent are discriminated against in both sectors even though selection issues are controlled for, whereas the wages of those of South European origin are similar to those of the French.Discrimination, wage gap, public and private sectors, France.

Competition and Discrimination : a not so Obvious Relationship

Discrimination models have diffivulties to study discrimination without assuming that prejudiced firms are more productive and results lead to workers' segregation. In this article, the model uses oligopsony and heterogeneity of workers' preferences to obtain a persistent discrimination. Firms hire both thpes of workers and pay a lower wage to the workers discriminated against whatever their taste for discrimination. A single prejudiced firm leads to a substancial wage gap in all firms. Consequently, the existence of discrimination allows a non-zero profit for unprejudiced firms and they have also no incentives to push out prejudiced firms. Moreover, the wage gap is affected by firms' spread out as well as by the number of prejudiced firms in the market. Government policies decrease the impact of taste for discrimination on wages but governments are not interested in.Discrimination, oligopsony, wage gap.

Concurrence imparfaite et discrimination sur le marché du travail

International audienceDiscrimination models have difficulties to reproduce a persistent discrimination without assuming that prejudiced firms are more productive and results lead to workers' segregation. The model uses oligopsony and heterogeneity of workers' preferences to obtain a persistent discrimination. Firms hire both types of workers and pay a lower wage to the workers discriminated against. Consequently, the existence of discrimination allows a nonzero profit for unprejudiced firms and they have also no incentives to push out prejudiced firms.Les modèles de discrimination sur le marché du travail reproduisent difficilement sa persistance sans faire d'hypothèses fortes. Cela conduit de surcroît à une ségrégation des travailleurs selon leurs caractéristiques non productives. Dans cet article, le modèle se sert de l'oligopsonie et de l'hétérogénéité des préférences des travailleurs pour obtenir une persistance de la discrimination. Les entreprises embauchent les deux types de travailleurs et offrent un salaire plus faible aux travailleurs discriminés. Par conséquent, l'existence de discrimination sur le marché permet aux entreprises n'ayant pas de goût pour la discrimination de faire des profits non nuls. Elles n'ont donc pas d'incitation à faire sortir les entreprises discriminantes du marché

Does Competition Induce Hiring Equity ?

URL des Documents de travail : http://centredeconomiesorbonne.univ-paris1.fr/bandeau-haut/documents-de-travail/Documents de travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne 2012.19 - ISSN : 1955-611XThis paper tests the impact of competition on the hiring process in the French retail sector. Following the Becker's theory, higher the competition, lower is discrimination. Using local Herfindhal-Hirschman indexes, a correspondence study ensures to observe how competition affects discrimination. A strong employment gap is observable between French natives and second generation immigrants. Concerning gender, women are favored as cashiers. The impact of competition depends on the target population : competition reinforces preference for women, whereas discrimination due to origin is follows the Becker's theory. However, increasing competition to fight against discrimination is not a solution, as it will enhance bad condition of women in the labor market and an increase of awareness of human resources department to equality of treatment is more efficient.Une large littérature s'accorde sur un effet de la concurrence sur le marché des biens sur la discrimination. Mais l'ensemble de ces études se focalisent sur les salaires et les postes, sans s'intéresser à l'embauche. Cet article teste l'impact de la concurrence sur le processus d'embauche et ses conséquences sur les écarts d'emploi. Deux types de discrimination sont étudiés : le genre et l'origine. Le secteur choisi est celui de la grande distribution. En utilisant des niveaux locaux de concurrence, un testing permet d'observer comment la concurrence affecte la discrimination. Les résultats montrent que la concurrence peut accentuer la discrimination statique dans le cas du genre. De plus, elle n'est pas forcément un bon outil pour lutter contre la discrimination, le cas de l'origine montrant un impact plus fort de la centralisation du recrutement et de la sensibilisation des recruteurs

Non-base wage components as a source of wage adaptability to shocks : evidence from european firms, 2010-2013

This paper provides evidence on the role of non-base wage components as a channel for firms to adjust labour costs in the event of adverse shocks. It uses data from a firm-level survey for 25 European countries that covers the period 2010–2013. We find that firms subject to nominal wage rigidities, which prevent them from adjusting base wages, are more likely to cut non-base wage components in order to adjust labour costs when needed. Firms thus use non-base wage components as a buffer to overcome base wage rigidity.We further show that while non-base wage components exhibit some degree of downward rigidity, they do so to a lesser extent than base wages.info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersio

Private vs. Public Sector: Discrimination against Second-Generation Immigrants in France

URL des Documents de travail : http://centredeconomiesorbonne.univ-paris1.fr/documents-de-travail/Documents de travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne 2009.59R - ISSN : 1955-611X - Version révisée Août 2014The integration of immigrants and their children is a burning issue in France. Governments build a large part of their assimilation policies on the labor market. The public sector is reputed to better assimilate minorities because of its entrance exams and pay-scales. In this paper, a comparison of the public and private sectors shows that second-generation immigrants are not treated equally. However, the wage gap is determined by the number and gender of immigrant parents and not by the country of origin.L'intégration des immigrés et de leurs enfants est un sujet important en France. Les différents gouvernements successifs ont principalement construit leurs politiques d'assimilation sur le marché du travail et l'éducation. Le secteur public est réputé mieux intégrer les minorités en raison des concours d'entrée et des grilles salariales. Dans cet article, une comparaison des secteurs publics et privés montre que les immigrés de seconde génération ne sont pas traités de manière égale. Cependant, le différentiel de salaire est déterminé par le nombre et le sexe des parents de l'immigrés et non par le pays d'origine

Local labor markets and taste-based discrimination

Abstract This article appeals to heterogeneity in workers’ non-wage preferences to model taste-based discrimination. Firms hire both types of workers and pay lower wages to minority workers, whatever their taste for discrimination. A single prejudiced firm in the market produces a substantial wage gap in all firms. Consequently, discrimination allows unprejudiced firms to make non-zero profits, so that they have little incentive to drive out prejudiced firms. As the market does not eliminate discrimination, state intervention is required. Indirect policies do not affect the absolute wage gap between the two groups, but may be more likely to be used than direct policies

Competition and Discrimination: a not so Obvious Relationship

URL des Documents de travail : http://ces.univ-paris1.fr/cesdp/cesdp2011.htmlDocuments de travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne 2011.05 - ISSN : 1955-611XDiscrimination models have diffivulties to study discrimination without assuming that prejudiced firms are more productive and results lead to workers' segregation. In this article, the model uses oligopsony and heterogeneity of workers' preferences to obtain a persistent discrimination. Firms hire both thpes of workers and pay a lower wage to the workers discriminated against whatever their taste for discrimination. A single prejudiced firm leads to a substancial wage gap in all firms. Consequently, the existence of discrimination allows a non-zero profit for unprejudiced firms and they have also no incentives to push out prejudiced firms. Moreover, the wage gap is affected by firms' spread out as well as by the number of prejudiced firms in the market. Government policies decrease the impact of taste for discrimination on wages but governments are not interested in.Les modèles de discrimination sur le marché du travail reproduisent difficilement sa persistance sans faire d'hypothèses fortes. Cela conduit de surcroît à une ségrégation des travailleurs selon leurs caractéristiques non-productives. Dans cet article, le modèle se sert de l'oligopsonie et de l'hétérogénéité des préférences des travailleurs pour obtenir une persistance de la discrimination. Un seul employeur discriminant induit un différentiel de salaire substantiel sur le marché. Les entreprises embauchent les deux types de travailleurs et offrent un salaire plus faible aux travailleurs discriminés. Par conséquent, l'existence de discrimination sur le marché permet aux entreprises n'ayant pas de goût pour la discrimination de faire des profits non-nuls. Elles n'ont donc pas d'incitation à faire sortir les entreprises discriminantes du marché

Competition and Discrimination: a not so Obvious Relationship.

Discrimination models have diffivulties to study discrimination without assuming that prejudiced firms are more productive and results lead to workers' segregation. In this article, the model uses oligopsony and heterogeneity of workers' preferences to obtain a persistent discrimination. Firms hire both thpes of workers and pay a lower wage to the workers discriminated against whatever their taste for discrimination. A single prejudiced firm leads to a substancial wage gap in all firms. Consequently, the existence of discrimination allows a non-zero profit for unprejudiced firms and they have also no incentives to push out prejudiced firms. Moreover, the wage gap is affected by firms' spread out as well as by the number of prejudiced firms in the market. Government policies decrease the impact of taste for discrimination on wages but governments are not interested in.Discrimination, oligopsony, wage gap.