The politics of IMF–EU cooperation : institutional change from the Maastricht Treaty to the launch of the Euro

How do regional changes affect the process of global governance? This article addresses this question by examining how the International Monetary Fund (IMF) responded to the challenges presented by Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) between the signing of the Maastricht Treaty in 1992 and the launch of the euro in 1999. Based on primary research from the IMF archives, the article illustrates how the IMF's efforts to reconfigure its relationship with European institutions evolved gradually through a logic of incremental change, despite initial opposition from member states. The article concludes that bureaucratic actors within international organizations will take advantage of informal avenues for promoting a new agenda when this fits with shared conceptions of an organization's mandate. The exercise of informal influence by advocates for change within an international organization can limit the options available to states in formal decision-making processes, even when these options cut across state preferences

International Coercion, Emulation and Policy Diffusion: Market-Oriented Infrastructure Reforms, 1977-1999

Why do some countries adopt market-oriented reforms such as deregulation, privatization and liberalization of competition in their infrastructure industries while others do not? Why did the pace of adoption accelerate in the 1990s? Building on neo-institutional theory in sociology, we argue that the domestic adoption of market-oriented reforms is strongly influenced by international pressures of coercion and emulation. We find robust support for these arguments with an event-history analysis of the determinants of reform in the telecommunications and electricity sectors of as many as 205 countries and territories between 1977 and 1999. Our results also suggest that the coercive effect of multilateral lending from the IMF, the World Bank or Regional Development Banks is increasing over time, a finding that is consistent with anecdotal evidence that multilateral organizations have broadened the scope of the “conditionality” terms specifying market-oriented reforms imposed on borrowing countries. We discuss the possibility that, by pressuring countries into policy reform, cross-national coercion and emulation may not produce ideal outcomes.http://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/2027.42/40099/3/wp713.pd

Cohesion, consensus, and conflict:Technocratic elites and financial crisis in Mexico and Argentina

Observers of economic policy-making in developing countries often suggest that consensus and cohesion within technocratic policy elites facilitate the implementation and consolidation of reforms, but have not clearly defined these terms or the relationship between them. Likewise, political sociologists argue that social networks account for elite cohesion, but have not adequately specified the relevant structural properties of these networks. This article argues that structural network cohesion facilitates elite consensus formation by enabling cooperation, while fragmented networks promote competition between factions and hence conflict. I support this hypothesis empirically by examining two cases in which elite consensus was severely challenged by financial crises: Mexico and Argentina. Mexican policy elites sustained consensus throughout the crisis, whereas conflict plagued the Argentine elite. Likewise, while the Mexican technocratic elite is highly cohesive, the Argentine elite is fragmented and factionalized. I document this hypothesis using a mixed-methods approach that embeds an analysis of elite networks within a comparative analysis of policy-making patterns drawing on extensive fieldwork in both countries

Does the IMF Help or Hurt? The Effect of IMF Programs on the Likelihood and Outcome of Currency Crises

Using panel data for 68 countries over the period 1975-2002 this paper examines how IMF programs, disbursed loans, and compliance with conditionality affect the risk of currency crises and the outcome of such crises. Specifically, we investigate whether countries with previous IMF intervention are more likely to experience currency crises. In a second step, we analyze the IMF's impact on a country's decision to adjust the exchange rate, once a crisis occurred. We find that IMF involvement reduces the probability of a crisis. Once in a crisis, IMF programs significantly increase the probability that the authorities devalue the exchange rate. The amount of loans and compliance with conditionality have no impact. Our results suggest that the IMF - contrary to the Fund's critics - does indeed fulfill its functions of promoting exchange rate stability and helping its members to correct macroeconomic imbalances

The diffusion of financial supervisory governance ideas

Who is watching the financial services industry? Since 1980, there have been multiple waves of thought about whether the ministry of finance, the central bank, a specialized regulator or some combination of these should have supervisory authority. These waves have been associated with the convergence of actual practices. How much and through what channels did internationally promoted ideas about supervisory 'best practice' influence institutional design choices? I use a new dataset of 83 countries and jurisdictions between the 1980s and 2007 to examine the diffusion of supervisory ideas. With this data, I employ Cox Proportional Hazard and Competing Risks Event History Analyses to evaluate the possible causal roles best practice policy ideas might have played. I find that banking crises and certain peer groups can encourage policy convergence on heavily promoted ideas

Rethinking European integration history in light of capitalism: the case of the long 1970s

This introduction outlines the possibilities and perspectives of an intertwining between European integration history and the history of capitalism. Although debates on capitalism have been making a comeback since the 2008 crisis, to date the concept of capitalism remains almost completely avoided by historians of European integration. This introduction thus conceptualizes ‘capitalism’ as a useful analytical tool that should be used by historians of European integration and proposes three major approaches for them to do so: first, by bringing the question of social conflict, integral to the concept of capitalism, into European integration history; second, by better conceptualizing the link between European governance, Europeanization and the globalization of capitalism; and thirdly by investigating the economic, political and ideological models or doctrines that underlie European cooperation, integration, policies and institutions. Finally, the introduction addresses the question of the analytical benefits of an encounter between capitalism and European integration history, focusing on the case of the 1970s. This allows us to qualify the idea of a clear-cut rupture, and better highlight how the shift of these years resulted from a complex bargaining that took place in part at the European level