Centralized vs. Decentralized Institutions for Expert Testimony

The legal community has been debating the question of who should select and provide expert witnesses at trial: the litigant or the judge? Using a persuasion-game framework, I show that there is a trade-off. On the one hand, the litigant is willing to consult an expert even when the judge is reluctant to appoint her own experts due to high costs. On the other hand, given the same amount of expert advice, the judge can make a more accurate decision when using a court-appointed expert's advice at trial. I show that the cost of expert advice is an important factor in this trade-off and, therefore, in the argument for the reform toward a centralized system for expert witnesses

Centralized vs. Decentralized Institutions for Expert Testimony

The legal community has been debating the question of who should select and provide expert witnesses at trial: the litigant or the judge? Using a persuasion-game framework, I show that there is a trade-off. On the one hand, the litigant is willing to consult an expert even when the judge is reluctant to appoint her own experts due to high costs. On the other hand, given the same amount of expert advice, the judge can make a more accurate decision when using a court-appointed expert's advice at trial. I show that the cost of expert advice is an important factor in this trade-off and, therefore, in the argument for the reform toward a centralized system for expert witnesses

An Economic Rationale for Dismissing Low-Quality Experts in Trial

The history of the admissibility standard for expert testimony in American courtrooms reveals that the standard has gradually increased to a high level since a series of important decisions by the Supreme Court. Whether such a stringent standard for expert testimony is beneficial or detrimental to the American justice system is still under fierce debate, but there has been scant economic analysis of this issue. This paper attempts to fill the gap by presenting a game-theoretic argument showing that a stringent admissibility standard operates to increase the judicial decision's accuracy under certain situations. More precisely, when the judge faces uncertainty regarding an expert's quality, the admissibility standard may provide the judge with information about the quality of expert testimony, thereby increasing the accuracy of the judicial decision by mitigating the judge's inference problem. I show the ways in which this effect dominates at trial and discuss related issues

Adversarial Bias, Litigation, and the Daubert Test: An Economic Approach

The last few decades have seen a dramatic shift in the admissibility of expert testimony in American courtrooms from a laissez-faire approach to a strict standard for admissibility, often called the Daubert test. The implicit rationale behind such a stringent standard for admissibility is the trier of fact's vulnerability to adversarial bias, which many legal scholars and practitioners assume to be rampant. Employing a standard litigation model in the literature, I demonstrate that client-expert relationships may not always exhibit adversarial bias and that a litigant may voluntarily present neutral expert testimony under certain situations. I also show that a litigant is more likely to deploy hired guns if the litigation environment is more favorable to his cause. In particular, the burden of proof assignment and the court's prior belief are shown to influence adversarial bias

Judge's Gate-Keeping Power and Deterrence of Negligent Acts: An Economic Analysis of Twombly and Iqbal

Following its landmark decisions in Bell Atlantic v. Twombly and Ashcroft v. Iqbal, the Supreme Court allows federal judges to dismiss cases when the plaintiff's allegations are conclusory or implausible, thereby increasing the judges' discretionary power in pleading stages of litigation. Using a stylized litigation model, I find the conditions under which the ruling improves upon litigation outcomes by simultaneously raising deterrence and reducing litigation costs and error costs. In particular, I demonstrate the ways in which the ruling's effect depends on the correlation between the potential injurers' primary behavior and the strength of cases filed at trial courts

Adversarial Bias, Litigation, and the Daubert Test: An Economic Approach

The last few decades have seen a dramatic shift in the admissibility of expert testimony in American courtrooms from a laissez-faire approach to a strict standard for admissibility, often called the Daubert test. The implicit rationale behind such a stringent standard for admissibility is the trier of fact's vulnerability to adversarial bias, which many legal scholars and practitioners assume to be rampant. Employing a standard litigation model in the literature, I demonstrate that client-expert relationships may not always exhibit adversarial bias and that a litigant may voluntarily present neutral expert testimony under certain situations. I also show that a litigant is more likely to deploy hired guns if the litigation environment is more favorable to his cause. In particular, the burden of proof assignment and the court's prior belief are shown to influence adversarial bias

Strategic alliances in a veto game:An experimental study

In a veto game, we investigate the effects of “buyout” which allows non-veto players strategically form an intermediate coalition. First, our experimental findings show that the proportion of intermediate coalition formation is much lower than predicted by theory, regardless of the relative negotiation power between veto and non-veto players. Second, allowing coalition formation among non-veto players does not affect the surplus distribution between veto and non- veto players, which diverges from core allocations. These findings contrast to the literature, which views the ability to form an intermediate coalition as a valuable asset for non-veto players in increasing their bargaining power

Gender differences in repeated dishonest behavior: experimental evidence

We investigate gender differences in lying behavior when the opportunity to tell lies is repeated. In specific, we distinguish the situations in which such an opportunity can be planned versus when it comes as a surprise. We utilize data from Chowdhury et al. (2021) and show that when the opportunity to tell a lie comes as a surprise, then on the first occasion, males lie more than females. However, when telling lies can be planned, then there is no gender difference in telling a lie. When planning is possible, females tell more lies in the first occasion compared to when it is not possible to plan; males do not show such behavior. On the second and final occasion, males tell more lies than females when they either could not plan but had the opportunity to a lie before, or could plan but did not have to tell a lie before. These observations can be interpreted in terms of the gender differences in consistent versus compensatory moral behavior