How working memory capacity constrains the learning of relational concepts

We investigated the way in which working memory (WM) constrains the learning of relational concepts - categories defined by the way objects are assigned to roles in the structure of an underlying relation, and not by objects’ intrinsic features. By applying to a large sample a novel test of concept learning as well as the battery of WM tasks, we found that WM is a strong predictor of the scores on the test, but the WM-learning correlation decreases as the relational complexity of the to-be-learned concepts increases. Such results support those theoretical models of relational learning, which assume that learning of relational concepts (and relations in general) consumes more WM resources than just the processing of relations which have already been learned

Constraints on analogical reasoning: Working memory capacity or executive control?

Since people differ inter-individually in the effectiveness of their analogical reasoning, an important question deals with elementary cognitive parameters, which potentially constrain analogy-making. Among the candidate parameters that have been investigated, the capacity of working memory (WM) and executive control (EC) are the most widely recognized determinants of reasoning. An experiment, which utilizes a test of analogical reasoning on figural material and two versions of the n-back task, which imposes a load on both WM and EC, is presented. Results confirm that analogical reasoning is related to EC but they show that enlarging the WM load is not necessarily related to scores in the analogy test

Two facets of cognitive control in analogical mapping : the role of semantic interference resolution and goal-driven structure selection

The study used scene analogies to investigate two component processes of analogical thinking: resolution of semantic interference, which emerges when the proper mapping between analogically matching objects is incoherent with their categorical features (e.g., stereotypical functions), and goal-driven selection of the key relational structure, by directing attention to the most promising objects which constitute that structure among many other candidate objects. We manipulated interference by placing in corresponding scenes the objects from one category in different relational roles. Selection was loaded by including additional, relationally irrelevant objects in a scene. We also manipulated relational complexity and the presence of salient objects (people) in relations. Increased load on both interference resolution and selection decreased the accuracy of analogical mapping, but these factors did not interact. Moreover, the factors yielded opposite patterns of interaction with relational complexity. Finally, saliency eased selection, but tended to negatively influence interference resolution. In summary, inference resolution and selection seem to constitute two relatively independent facets of cognitive control involved in analogical thinking. Selection may act before mapping occurs, while interference influences analogy making only if an interfering object takes part in mapping