A New World Order: Explaining the Emergence of the Classical Gold Standard

The classical gold standard only gradually became an international monetary regime after 1870. This paper provides a cross-country analysis of why countries adopted when they did. I use duration analysis to show that network externalities operating through trade channels help explain the pattern of diffusion of the gold standard. Countries adopted the gold standard sooner when they had a large share of trade with other gold countries relative to GDP. The quality of the financial system also played a role. Support is found for the idea that a weak gold backing for paper currency emissions, possibly because of an unsustainable fiscal position or an un-sound banking system, delayed adoption. A large public debt burden also led to a later transition. Data are also consistent with the idea that nations adopted the gold standard earlier to lower the costs of borrowing on international capital markets. I find no evidence that the level of exchange rate volatility or agricultural interests mattered for the timing of adoption.

Why Do Countries Peg the Way They Peg? The Determinants of Anchor Currency Choice

Conditional on choosing a pegged exchange rate regime, what determines the currency to which countries peg or “anchor” their exchange rate? This paper aims to answer this question using a panel multinomial logit framework, covering more than 100 countries for the period 1980-1998. We find that trade network externalities are a key determinant of anchor currency choice, implying that there are multiple steady states for the distribution of anchor currencies in the international monetary system. Other factors found to be related to anchor currency choice include the symmetry of output co-movement, the currency denomination of debt, and legal or colonial origins

Losing our Marbles in the New Century? The Great Rebalancing in Historical Perspective

Great attention is now being paid to global imbalances, the growing U.S. current account deficit financed by growing surpluses in the rest of the world. How can the issue be understood in a more historical perspective? We seek a meaningful comparison between the two eras of globalization: "then" (the period 1870 to 1913) and "now" (the period since the 1970s). We look at the two hegemons in each era: Britain then, and the United States now. And adducing historical data to match what we know from the contemporary record, we proceed in the tradition of New Comparative Economic History to see what lessons the past might have for the present. We consider two of the most controversial and pressing questions in the current debate. First, are current imbalances being sustained, at least in part, by return differentials? And if so, is this reassuring? Second, how will adjustment take place? Will it be a hard or soft landing? Pessimistically, we find no historical evidence that return differentials last forever, even for hegemons. Optimistically, we find that adjustments to imbalances in the past have generally been smooth, even under a regime as hard as the gold standard.

Foreign Capital and Economic Growth in the First Era of Globalization

We explore the association between income and international capital flows between 1880 and 1913. Capital inflows are associated with higher incomes per capita in the long-run, but capital flows also brought income volatility via financial crises. Crises also decreased growth rates of income per capita significantly below trend for at least two years leading to important short term output losses. Countries just barely made up for these losses over time, so that there is no conditional long-run income loss or gain for countries that experienced crises. This is in contrast to the recent wave of globalization when capital importing countries that experienced a crisis seemed to grow relatively faster over fixed periods of time. We discuss some possibilities that can explain this finding.

The Role of Foreign Currency Debt in Financial Crises: 1880-1913 vs. 1972-1997

What is the role of foreign currency debt in precipitating financial crises? In this paper we compare the 1880 to 1913 period to recent experience. We examine debt crises, currency crises, banking crises and the interrelation between these varieties of crises. We pay special attention to the role of hard currency debt, currency mismatches and debt intolerance. We find fairly robust evidence that high exposure to foreign currency debt does not necessarily lead to a high chance of having a debt crisis, currency crisis, or a banking crisis. A key finding is some countries do not suffer from great financial fragility despite high exposure to original sin. In the nineteenth century, the British offshoots and Scandinavia generally avoided severe financial meltdowns while today many advanced countries have high original sin but have had few financial crises. The common denominator in both periods is that currency mismatches matter. A strong reserve position or high exports relative to hard currency liabilities helps decrease the likelihood of a debt crisis, currency crisis or a banking crisis. This strengthens the evidence for the hypothesis that foreign currency debt is dangerous when mis-managed. We discuss the robustness of these results and make some general comparisons based on this evidence from over 60 years of intense international capital market integration.

Financial Crises, 1880-1913: The Role of Foreign Currency Debt

What is the role of foreign currency debt in precipitating financial crises? In this paper we assemble data for nearly 30 countries between 1880 and 1913 and examine debt crises, currency crises, banking crises and twin crises. We pay special attention to the role of foreign currency and gold clause debt, currency mismatches and debt intolerance. We find fairly robust evidence that more foreign currency debt leads to a higher chance of having a debt crisis or a banking crisis. However, a key finding is that countries with noticeably different backgrounds, and strong institutions such as Australia, Canada, New Zealand, Norway, and the US deftly managed their exposure to hard currency debt, generally avoided having too many crises and never had severe financial meltdowns. Moreover, a strong reserve position matched up to hard currency liabilities seems to be correlated with a lower likelihood of a debt crisis, currency crisis or a banking crisis. This strengthens the evidence for the hypothesis that foreign currency debt is dangerous when mis-managed. We also see that countries with previous default histories seem prone to debt crises even at seemingly low debt to revenue ratios. Finally we discuss the robustness of these results to local idiosyncrasies and the implications from this representative historical sample.

Does Inequality Lead to a Financial Crisis?

The recent global crisis has sparked interest in the relationship between income inequality, credit booms, and financial crises. Rajan (2010) and Kumhof and Rancière (2011) propose that rising inequality led to a credit boom and eventually to a financial crisis in the US in the first decade of the 21st century as it did in the 1920s. Data from 14 advanced countries between 1920 and 2000 suggest these are not general relationships. Credit booms heighten the probability of a banking crisis, but we find no evidence that a rise in top income shares leads to credit booms. Instead, low interest rates and economic expansions are the only two robust determinants of credit booms in our data set. Anecdotal evidence from US experience in the 1920s and in the years up to 2007 and from other countries does not support the inequality, credit, crisis nexus. Rather, it points back to a familiar boom-bust pattern of declines in interest rates, strong growth, rising credit, asset price booms and crises.

International Aspects of the Great Depression and the Crisis of 2007: Similarities, Differences, and Lessons

We focus on two international aspects of the Great Depression--financial crises and international trade—and try to discern lessons for the current economic crisis. Both downturns featured global banking crises which were generated by boom-slump macroeconomic cycles. During both crises, world trade collapsed faster than world incomes and the trade decline was highly synchronized across countries. In the Depression, income losses and rises in trade barriers explain trade’s collapse. Due to vertical specialization and more intense trade in durables today’s trade collapse is due to uncertainty and small shocks to trade costs hitting international supply chains. So far, the global economy has avoided the global trade wars and banking collapses of the Depression perhaps due to improved policy. Even so, the global economy remains susceptible to large shocks due to financial innovation and technological change as recent events illustrate.Great Depression, Crisis of 2007

Prayer or Prison: The Unconstitutionality of Mandatory Faith-Based Substance Abuse Treatment

Whether faith-based substance abuse treatments are effective is certainly a valid question in its rightful place, but it is not the inquiry pursued here. Rather, this Note argues that a drug court\u27s act of assigning unwilling offenders to twelve-step or otherwise religiously-based residential treatment centers violates the Establishment Clause guarantee. Specifically, such centers regulate the offenders\u27 beliefs and compel them to affirm whatever tenets are professed at the individual treatment center. Moreover, a court\u27s subsequent act of threatening or actually imposing criminal sanctions upon offenders for refusing to complete such treatment programs constitutes punishment for refusing to be religiously indoctrinated by a program mandated by the state. Regulations currently imposed upon federally funded faithbased treatment centers adequately safeguard offenders\u27 First Amendment rights in these respects, but those regulations must be made applicable to all treatment centers that accept offenders from any court across the country