Construcción, preservación, y la presencia del yo en la memoria de observador: Una respuesta a Trakas

Observer memories involve a representation of the self in the memory image, which is presented from a detached or external point of view. That such an image is an obvious departure from how one initially experienced the event seems relatively straightforward. However, in my book on this type of imagery, I suggested that such memories can in fact, at least in some cases, accurately represent one’s past experience of an event. During these past events there is a sense in which we adopt an external perspective on ourselves. In the present paper, I respond to a critical notice of my book by Marina Trakas. Trakas argues that my account of observer memory unfolded against the background of a problematic preservationist account of episodic memory, and that I failed to adequately account for the presence of self in observer memory. I respond these worries here, and I try to clarify key points that were underdeveloped in the book.Los recuerdos de observador involucran una representación de sí mismo en la escena recordada, la cual es presentada desde una perspectiva distanciada o del exterior. Que tal imagen de la escena sea diferente a como uno la experimentó originalmente puede parecer obvio. Sin embargo, en mi libro sobre este tipo de imagen, yo sugerí que, de hecho, tales recuerdos, por lo menos en algunos casos, pueden representar precisamente como uno experimentó el evento originalmente. Durante estos eventos pasados, en cierto sentido adoptamos una perspectiva externa sobre nosotros mismos. En este artículo, yo respondo a una nota crítica de mi libro, escrita por Marina Trakas. Trakas sostiene que mi explicación de la memoria del observador se desarrolló en el contexto de una suposición preservacionista problemática de la memoria episódica y que no pude explicar adecuadamente la presencia del yo en la memoria del observador. Respondo a estas preocupaciones aquí y trato de aclarar los puntos clave que estaban poco desarrollados en el libro

Point of view in personal memory: a philosophical investigation

Theoretical thesis.Bibliography: pages 197-219.1. Remembering from-the-outside -- 2. Constructing and reconstructing observer perspectives -- 3. The Constructive framework : multiplicity and multimodality -- 4. Memory, imagination, and de se thought -- 5. Imagery, point of view, and the plurality of perspectives -- 6. Looking at the self : personal identity and the observer perspective -- 7. Conclusion.When remembering events from one's life one often sees the remembered scene as one originally experienced it, from one's original point of view (from a field perspective). Sometimes, however, one sees oneself in the memory, as if one were an observer of the remembered scene (an observer perspective). The main aim of this thesis is to investigate philosophically this puzzling aspect of memory imagery : the phenomenon of point of view in personal (or autobiographical, or episodic) memory. In the first chapter I set out some of the key issues related to a philosophical analysis of point of view in memory. Chapter 2 uses the phenomenon of observer perspectives as a departure point for developing two frameworks for thinking about reconstructive memory: the Constructive framework and the Reconstructive framework. I argue that memory can be (re)constructive, dynamic, and flexible, but also accurate and faithful to the past. I defend observer perspective memories from two related objections by drawing on the insights of the frameworks I outline. In chapter 3 I develop the more novel Constructive framework with reference to the spatial perspectival characteristics of observer perspectives. I do so by engaging with the complex literature on spatial cognition. The main focus of chapter 4 is the relation between observer perspectives and first-personal (de se) thought. This chapter looks in detail at the nature of de se thoughts, the nature of self-representation in memory, and the notion of immunity to error through misidentification. Chapter 5 considers an important claim that ‘objective’ imagination (seeing oneself from-the-outside) is just a special case of ‘subjective’ imagination (from-the-inside). In this chapter I critically examine this idea. I offer an alternative account of seeing oneself from-the-outside in memory and imagination. Chapter 6 looks at two influential but radically distinct accounts of the nature of personal identity. Both accounts recognise the importance of episodic memory to conceptions of personal identity, but they use memory in fundamentally distinct ways. In addition, both accounts neglect observer perspectives in episodic memory. In this chapter I explore the implications that the acknowledgment and inclusion of observer perspectives would have for both accounts.Mode of access: World wide web1 online resource (xiii, 219 pages

Putting the Past into Perspective. Remembering, Reappraising, and Forgiving

The process of forgiving seems to require that a person can remember a specific moment in their personal past in which they were harmed in some way. Forgiving, then, often requires episodic memory, which may be understood as memory of events or experiences in one’s personal past. What is it that grounds acts of forgiveness? One of the most prominent ideas is that, fundamentally, forgiveness involves a change in emotion; it requires that negative emotions associated with the event are abandoned, withdrawn or overcome. In this paper, we outline one way in which the emotion and meaning of past events may be modulated. In particular, we suggest that by thinking more abstractly about an event we can shift our emotional response to it. We outline one way in which this form of more abstract thinking, which can help us distance ourselves from the negative emotion associated with a past wrongdoing, can show up in memory. We propose that emotionally distant memories, or memories in which the emotional content has undergone some change, may often be recalled from an observer perspective, in which the individual recalls the event from an external or detached point of view. Recalling a past wrongdoing from an observer memory may help put it into perspective and afford the emotional distancing required to facilitate forgiveness

Immunity to error through misidentification in observer memories: A moderate separatist account

International audienceJudgments based on episodic memory are often thought to be immune to errors of misidentification (IEM). Yet there is a certain category of episodic memories, viz. observer memories, that seems to threaten IEM. In the resulting debate, some say that observer memories are a threat to the IEM enjoyed by episodic memory (Michaelian, 2021); others say that they pose no such threat (Fernández, 2021; Lin, 2020). In this paper, we argue for a middle way. First, we frame the debate, claiming that the existing literature lacks a satisfying definition both of observer memories and of the precise issue of errors of identification in such memories. Then, we contribute to the debate by challenging an anti-separatist view about the relation between phenomenal and intentional features of observer memories that looms behind this debate. On this view, if the rememberer's self is a phenomenal feature of the memory, by implication it is also built into the intentional content. We reject this view and offer a moderate separatist account. Distinguishing between empirically-grounded species of observer memories, we say that the phenomenal self sometimes is, and sometimes is not built into the intentional content of the memory, and this results in different implications for IEM

Putting the Past into Perspective. Remembering, Reappraising, and Forgiving

The process of forgiving seems to require that a person can remember a specific moment in their personal past in which they were harmed in some way. Forgiving, then, often requires episodic memory, which may be understood as memory of events or experiences in one’s personal past. What is it that grounds acts of forgiveness? One of the most prominent ideas is that, fundamentally, forgiveness involves a change in emotion; it requires that negative emotions associated with the event are abandoned, withdrawn or overcome. In this paper, we outline one way in which the emotion and meaning of past events may be modulated. In particular, we suggest that by thinking more abstractly about an event we can shift our emotional response to it. We outline one way in which this form of more abstract thinking, which can help us distance ourselves from the negative emotion associated with a past wrongdoing, can show up in memory. We propose that emotionally distant memories, or memories in which the emotional content has undergone some change, may often be recalled from an observer perspective, in which the individual recalls the event from an external or detached point of view. Recalling a past wrongdoing from an observer memory may help put it into perspective and afford the emotional distancing required to facilitate forgiveness.El proceso de perdonar aparentemente requiere que la persona pueda recordar un momento específico de su pasado durante el cual fue lastimada. Perdonar, entonces, precisa de una memoria episódica, entendida como el recuerdo de eventos o experiencias en el pasado personal de alguien. ¿Qué es lo que fundamenta los actos de perdón? Al respecto, una de las ideas que más se destaca es que, en esencia, el perdón implica un cambio en las emociones; esto es, abandonar, apartar o superar las emociones negativas relacionadas con el evento. En este artículo esbozamos una forma en la que la emoción y el significado de los eventos pasados lograrían regularse. En específico, proponemos que, al pensar de manera más abstracta sobre un evento, es posible modificar nuestra respuesta emocional hacia este. Así, explicamos la manera como una forma más abstracta de pensar, que nos ayude a establecer una distancia con la emoción negativa asociada a un daño en el pasado, puede manifestarse en la memoria. Planteamos que los recuerdos emocionalmente lejanos, o aquellos en los que el contenido emocional ha experimentado algún cambio, a menudo son rememorados desde el ángulo del observador, de modo que el individuo recuerda el evento desde un punto de vista externo e imparcial. Recordar un perjuicio del pasado a partir de la memoria del observador contribuiría a poner el evento en perspectiva y propiciar el distanciamiento emocional necesario para permitir el perdón.O processo de perdão aparentemente exige que a pessoa seja capaz de se lembrar de um momento específico em seu passado durante o qual foi magoada. O perdão, portanto, requer memória episódica, entendida como a lembrança de eventos ou experiências do passado pessoal de alguém. O que fundamenta os atos de perdão? A esse respeito, uma das ideias mais proeminentes é que, em essência, o perdão envolve uma mudança nas emoções, ou seja, abandonar, deixar de lado ou superar as emoções negativas relacionadas ao evento. Neste artigo, esboçamos uma maneira pela qual a emoção e o significado de eventos passados poderiam ser regulados. Especificamente, propomos que, ao pensar de forma mais abstrata sobre um evento, é possível modificar nossa resposta emocional a ele. Assim, explicamos como uma forma mais abstrata de pensar, que nos ajuda a estabelecer distância da emoção negativa associada a um dano passado, pode se manifestar na memória. Argumentamos que as lembranças emocionalmente distantes ou aquelas em que o conteúdo emocional sofreu alguma mudança geralmente são lembradas do ângulo do observador, do qual o indivíduo se lembra de um ponto de vista externo e imparcial. A lembrança de uma mágoa do passado a partir da memória do observador ajudaria a colocar o evento em perspectiva e proporcionaria o distanciamento emocional necessário para permitir o perdão

Current Controversies in Philosophy of Memory

International audienceLe regain d'intérêt philosophique pour la mémoire épisodique a mis en lumière un certain nombre de questions controversées sur cette forme de mémoire qui n'ont commencé que récemment à être abordées en détail. Ce livre organise la discussion autour de six de ces questions, offrant deux nouveaux chapitres par question, d'experts dans le domaine. Les questions sont :I. Quelle est la relation entre la mémoire et l'imagination ?II. Les traces mnésiques ont-elles un contenu ?III. Quelle est la nature de la confabulation mnémonique ?IV. Quelle est la fonction de la mémoire épisodique ?V. Les animaux non humains ont-ils une mémoire épisodique ?VI. La mémoire épisodique nous donne-t-elle une connaissance du passé ?Le livre constitue une ressource précieuse pour les chercheurs, les enseignants et les étudiants. Pour les chercheurs, il fournit une discussion actualisée de certaines des principales théories, arguments et problèmes dans le domaine. Pour les enseignants, le livre peut fournir les lectures d'un cours entier, ou des sections particulières peuvent fournir les lectures d'unités spécifiques dans le cadre d'un cours de philosophie plus large de la mémoire. Pour les étudiants, le livre propose des discussions accessibles sur certains des sujets les plus récents de la philosophie de la mémoire, qui, pris ensemble, constituent une introduction complète au domaine

Are observer memories (accurate) memories? : insights from experimental philosophy

International audienceA striking feature of our memories of the personal past is that they involve different visual perspectives: one sometimes recalls past events from one’s original point of view (a field perspective), but one sometimes recalls them from an external point of view (an observer perspective). In philosophy, observer memories are often seen as being less than fully genuine and as being necessarily false or distorted. This paper looks at whether laypeople share the standard philosophical view by applying the methods of experimental philosophy. We report the results of five studies suggesting that, while participants clearly categorize both field and observer memories as memories, they tend to judge that observer memories are slightly less accurate than field memories. Our results suggest, however, that in lay thought, the difference between field and observer memories is not nearly as clear-cut as philosophers have generally taken it to be

Résister à la tentation et surmonter la procrastination : les rôles du voyage mental dans le temps et de la métacognition

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Current controversies in philosophy of memory: Editors’ introduction

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