Microgravity Particle Research on the Space Station

Science questions that could be addressed by a Space Station Microgravity Particle Research Facility for studying small suspended particles were discussed. Characteristics of such a facility were determined. Disciplines covered include astrophysics and the solar nebula, planetary science, atmospheric science, exobiology and life science, and physics and chemistry

Rebutting the Fraud on the Market Presumption in Securities Fraud Class Actions: \u3cem\u3eHalliburton II\u3c/em\u3e Opens the Door

In Halliburton Co. v. Erica P. John Fund, Inc. (Halliburton II), the United States Supreme Court reaffirmed the validity of the “fraud on the market” presumption underlying securities fraud class action litigation. This presumption is vital to bringing suits as class actions because it excuses plaintiffs from proving individual reliance on an alleged corporate misstatement on the theory that any public statements made by the company are incorporated into its stock price and consequently relied upon by all investors. Thus, the Court’s decision to uphold the validity of the presumption has been hailed as a significant victory for those who bring securities fraud class actions. Overlooked by many commentators is the fact that in addition to upholding the fraud on the market presumption, the Court established a new avenue for defendants to rebut the presumption at the class certification stage of a case. Defendants can now rebut the presumption before a class is certified by presenting evidence that an alleged corporate misstatement had no impact on the price of the stock. This ruling is significant because securities fraud class actions, as a practical matter, often settle after a class has been certified. This article examines what that ruling could mean for modern securities fraud class action litigation

Effective Communication of Warnings in the Workplace: Avoiding Injuries in Working with Industrial Materials

This Article provides a guide for participants in the supply chain to communicate product risks in the most effective manner to prevent injury where prevention is possible. It suggests how liability rules should be congruent with this same public policy goal. Part II of the Article details the special challenges inherent to effectively warning users of the potential dangers posed by industrial products, while Part III sets forth criteria for meeting these challenges in the workplace. Part IV considers the development of the law in industrial product warnings. Part V then analyzes workplace safety under the current liability structure, and recognizes that warnings are not the end-all, be-all for worker safety. Finally, Part VI examines the responsibilities of the relevant parties to maintain effective communication and prevent workplace injury. The Article concludes that placing a duty to warn on raw material manufacturers and industrial suppliers regarding the potential dangers associated with the varied conceivable end uses of their products is both inefficient and impractical. Of equal importance, such an obligation subverts the goal of effectively educating the end-user of the product so that he or she avoids inury. Injury prevention through effective warnings may also not be attainable in certain applications where proper training and safety equipment are essential. Existing legal principles, such as the sophisticated user, bulk supplier, learned intermediary and substantial change doctrines, recognize the importance of placing the responsibility of developing and communicating warnings with the party that is in the best position to do so. In the context of workplace hazards, that party is most often the employer. Thus, where the workers\u27 compensation system, and its incident-based premiums, place responsibility on employers to protect their employees from hazards related to industrial materials, the product liability system should, in tum, avoid placing manufacturers and sellers of the materials in a position where they are compelled to provide redundant, incomplete, speculative, conflicting, or otherwise ineffective warnings

Common-Sense Construction of Unfair Claims Settlement Statutes: Restoring the Good Faith in Bad Faith

This Article proposes to balance the scale by providing principles for the reasonable construction of bad-faith and unfair claims settlement practices in statutes applicable to insurance. Part I examines the history and development of bad-faith law, and discusses the common structure of statutes giving rise to badfaith settlement claims. Part II presents general principles courts may apply to resolve an action alleging bad faith, and specific principles courts may apply to address common issues with many states’ statutes. Part III then evaluates the public policy involved in applying such principles to first-party claims where the insured suffers an injury and seeks compensation directly from the insurance company, or, where they are permitted, third-party claims where the insured harms a person not party to the insurance contract and the harmed person makes a claim against the insured who is then defended by the insurer. This Article concludes that the public interest is most effectively and efficiently served by applying more responsible construction of bad-faith laws and by returning to the foundational precepts behind these laws. It further reasons that while there is, no doubt, a substantial public interest in ensuring that insurers “play nicely” and act in good faith, this interest should not always be enforced through litigation and should never supersede basic fairness and justice

Common-Sense Construction of Unfair Claims Settlement Statutes: Restoring the Good Faith in Bad Faith

This Article proposes to balance the scale by providing principles for the reasonable construction of bad-faith and unfair claims settlement practices in statutes applicable to insurance. Part I examines the history and development of bad-faith law, and discusses the common structure of statutes giving rise to badfaith settlement claims. Part II presents general principles courts may apply to resolve an action alleging bad faith, and specific principles courts may apply to address common issues with many states’ statutes. Part III then evaluates the public policy involved in applying such principles to first-party claims where the insured suffers an injury and seeks compensation directly from the insurance company, or, where they are permitted, third-party claims where the insured harms a person not party to the insurance contract and the harmed person makes a claim against the insured who is then defended by the insurer. This Article concludes that the public interest is most effectively and efficiently served by applying more responsible construction of bad-faith laws and by returning to the foundational precepts behind these laws. It further reasons that while there is, no doubt, a substantial public interest in ensuring that insurers “play nicely” and act in good faith, this interest should not always be enforced through litigation and should never supersede basic fairness and justice