87 research outputs found
Asymmetric evolutionary games
Evolutionary game theory is a powerful framework for studying evolution in
populations of interacting individuals. A common assumption in evolutionary
game theory is that interactions are symmetric, which means that the players
are distinguished by only their strategies. In nature, however, the microscopic
interactions between players are nearly always asymmetric due to environmental
effects, differing baseline characteristics, and other possible sources of
heterogeneity. To model these phenomena, we introduce into evolutionary game
theory two broad classes of asymmetric interactions: ecological and genotypic.
Ecological asymmetry results from variation in the environments of the players,
while genotypic asymmetry is a consequence of the players having differing
baseline genotypes. We develop a theory of these forms of asymmetry for games
in structured populations and use the classical social dilemmas, the Prisoner's
Dilemma and the Snowdrift Game, for illustrations. Interestingly, asymmetric
games reveal essential differences between models of genetic evolution based on
reproduction and models of cultural evolution based on imitation that are not
apparent in symmetric games.Comment: accepted for publication in PLOS Comp. Bio
Eco-evolutionary dynamics of social dilemmas
Social dilemmas are an integral part of social interactions. Cooperative
actions, ranging from secreting extra-cellular products in microbial
populations to donating blood in humans, are costly to the actor and hence
create an incentive to shirk and avoid the costs. Nevertheless, cooperation is
ubiquitous in nature. Both costs and benefits often depend non-linearly on the
number and types of individuals involved -- as captured by idioms such as `too
many cooks spoil the broth' where additional contributions are discounted, or
`two heads are better than one' where cooperators synergistically enhance the
group benefit. Interaction group sizes may depend on the size of the population
and hence on ecological processes. This results in feedback mechanisms between
ecological and evolutionary processes, which jointly affect and determine the
evolutionary trajectory. Only recently combined eco-evolutionary processes
became experimentally tractable in microbial social dilemmas. Here we analyse
the evolutionary dynamics of non-linear social dilemmas in settings where the
population fluctuates in size and the environment changes over time. In
particular, cooperation is often supported and maintained at high densities
through ecological fluctuations. Moreover, we find that the combination of the
two processes routinely reveals highly complex dynamics, which suggests common
occurrence in nature.Comment: 26 pages, 11 figure
Evolutionary Game Dynamics in Populations with Heterogenous Structures
Evolutionary graph theory is a well established framework for modelling the evolution of social behaviours in structured populations. An emerging consensus in this field is that graphs that exhibit heterogeneity in the number of connections between individuals are more conducive to the spread of cooperative behaviours. In this article we show that such a conclusion largely depends on the individual-level interactions that take place. In particular, averaging payoffs garnered through game interactions rather than accumulating the payoffs can altogether remove the cooperative advantage of heterogeneous graphs while such a difference does not affect the outcome on homogeneous structures. In addition, the rate at which game interactions occur can alter the evolutionary outcome. Less interactions allow heterogeneous graphs to support more cooperation than homogeneous graphs, while higher rates of interactions make homogeneous and heterogeneous graphs virtually indistinguishable in their ability to support cooperation. Most importantly, we show that common measures of evolutionary advantage used in homogeneous populations, such as a comparison of the fixation probability of a rare mutant to that of the resident type, are no longer valid in heterogeneous populations. Heterogeneity causes a bias in where mutations occur in the population which affects the mutant\u27s fixation probability. We derive the appropriate measures for heterogeneous populations that account for this bias
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Synergy and Discounting of Cooperation in Social Dilemmas
The emergence and maintenance of cooperation by natural selection is an enduring conundrum in evolutionary biology, which has been studied using a variety of game theoretical models inspired by different biological situations. The most widely studied games are the Prisoner's Dilemma, the Snowdrift game and by-product mutualism for pairwise interactions, as well as Public Goods games in larger groups of interacting individuals. Here, we present a general framework for cooperation in social dilemmas in which all the traditional scenarios can be recovered as special cases. In social dilemmas, cooperators provide a benefit to the group at some cost, while defectors exploit the group by reaping the benefits without bearing the costs of cooperation. Using the concepts of discounting and synergy for describing how benefits accumulate when more than one cooperator is present in a group of interacting individuals, we recover the four basic scenarios of evolutionary dynamics given by (i) dominating defection, (ii) coexistence of defectors and cooperators, (iii) dominating cooperation and (iv) bi-stability, in which cooperators and defectors cannot invade each other. Generically, for groups of three or more interacting individuals further, more complex, dynamics can occur. Our framework provides the first unifying approach to model cooperation in different kinds of social dilemmas.Mathematic
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