Incumbency, Party Identity and Governmental Lead: Evidence for Heterogeneous Incumbency Effects for Germany

Do incumbents in an election have an advantage, and if so, are these advantages heterogeneous across parties or government and opposition? We first present a theoretical discussion on the possible heterogeneity of incumbency effects in a pure two-party system. Then, we estimate the incumbency effect for the direct district candidates in German federal and state elections using a regression discontinuity design (RDD). When studying the heterogeneity in these effects, we find that incumbents from both large parties, the center-right CDU and the center-left SPD, have an advantage only if the SPD is in government. This effect is robust and shows even in state elections that are unrelated to federal elections - calling into question the findings of average incumbency effects in the literature. Because this effect is stronger in the East than in the West and only shows post reunification, we hypothesise that the emergence of the socialist party "The Left" may be behind this heterogeneity.incumbency advantage, regression discontinuity design, federal elections, state elections

Sharing the fiscal burden of the crisis - A Pandemic Solidarity Instrument for the EU

EU member states must share the burden of the fiscal costs of the COVID-19 pandemic. The Pandemic Solidarity Instrument delivers such burden sharing: The EU would borrow 440 billion euros in the market and would give it as grants to member states for specific spending in areas such as health care, short-time works schemes or stimulus packages; it would also give guarantees to the European Investment Bank to provide liquidity to European companies

Sharing the fiscal burden of the crisis: A Pandemic Solidarity Instrument for the EU. Bertelsmann Stiftung Policy Paper April 2020.

The debate over how Europe should cope with the fiscal costs of the COVID-19 pan- demic is in full swing. Adversaries and opponents of “Coronabonds” seem suddenly back in the trenches of the euro crisis. Our proposal attempts to build a bridge bet- ween the two camps: We do not propose a full-on Eurobond or any mutualisation of existing debt, as this is not how we should overcome the unique challenges of this crisis. Instead, we propose a Pandemic Solidarity Instrument that is tailored speci- fically to this crisis. The EU does not need another layer of market-access insurance, as the European Central Bank and the European Stability Mechanism are already in place for this. What it needs is an instrument to share the costs of the crisis. The main problem the EU faces now is that some member states have entered this crisis in a much weaker economic position and with higher debt levels than others. At the same time, all countries have a vital interest in all other countries being able to spend as much as necessary to fight the economic fallout of the pandemic. To ensure that this happens, we need a burden sharing of the fiscal costs of this crisis. The Pandemic Solidarity Instrument delivers this burden sharing. It should be set up as an EU instrument: The EU would borrow 440 billion euros in the market, ba- cked by the EU budget and by guarantees of the member states. As this would be EU debt, it would not count as debt of individual member states. The bonds issued by the EU would have long maturities and could be refinanced in the market at the end of their terms; otherwise, they would be repaid once they come due according to the future state of economic strength of member states. The funds would be used for four purposes: • Grants to member states to partially cover health-related costs; • Guarantees to the European Investment Bank to provide liquidity to European companies; • Subsidies to member states so that they can fund short-time work schemes and short-term unemployment benefits; • Co-financing of national stimulus packages once confinement measures have been lifted. The Instrument would be based on Article 122 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union. This article gives the EU wide discretion to act in emergency situations. In our legal analysis, we show how this article allows the EU to bor- row in this specific context and why our proposal does not conflict with the EU’s no-bailout clause

ErbB2/HER2-specific NK cells for adoptive cancer immunotherapy

Poster presentation: 28th Annual Scientific Meeting of the Society for Immunotherapy of Cancer (SITC) Significant progress has been made over the last decade towards realizing the potential of natural killer (NK) cells for cancer immunotherapy. NK cells can respond rapidly to transformed and stressed cells, and have the intrinsic potential to extravasate and reach their targets in almost all body tissues. In addition to donor-derived primary NK cells, also continuously expanding cytotoxic cell lines such as NK-92 are being considered for adoptive cancer immunotherapy. High cytotoxicity of NK-92 has previously been shown against malignant cells of hematologic origin in preclinical studies, and general safety of infusion of NK-92 cells has been established in phase I clinical trials. To enhance their therapeutic utility, we genetically modified NK-92 cells to express chimeric antigen receptors (CAR) specific for tumor-associated surface antigens. Such CAR were composed of a tumor-specific scFv antibody fragment fused via hinge and transmembrane domains to intracellular signaling moieties such as CD3 zeta chain, or composite fusion molecules also containing a costimulatory protein domain in addition to CD3 zeta. For development towards clinical applications, here a codon-optimized second generation CAR was constructed that consists of an ErbB2-specific scFv antibody domain fused via a linker to a composite CD28-CD3 zeta signaling domain. GMP-compliant protocols for vector production, lentiviral transduction and expansion of a genetically modified NK-92 single cell clone (NK-92/5.28.z) were established. Functional analysis of NK-92/5.28.z cells revealed high and stable CAR expression, selective cytotoxicity against ErbB2-expressing but otherwise NK-resistant tumor cells of different origins in vitro, as well as homing to ErbB2-expressing tumors in vivo. Furthermore, antigen specificity and selective cytotoxicity of these cells were retained in vivo, resulting in antitumoral activity against subcutaneous and intracranial glioblastoma xenografts in NSG mice. Ongoing work now focuses on the development of these cells for adoptive immunotherapy of ErbB2-positive glioblastoma

Mere criticism of the ECB is no solution

The eurozone remains in a deep, largely macro-economic crisis. A robust global economy and falling oil prices have supported Europe’s economy for some time, but by now it is clear that the eurozone will only be able to pull itself out of this crisis by means of more decisive action. One response, the recent easing of monetary policy by the European Central Bank (ECB), has, for the most part, been sharply and one-sidedly criticised in Germany. Monetary policy inaction seems to be the preferred option of many in Germany. The authors discuss the following question: What would happen if the ECB failed to respond to the excessively low inflation and the weak economy? And what economic policy would be suitable under the current circumstances, if not monetary policy

Vaccination expands antigen-specific cd4+ memory T cells and mobilizes bystander central memory T cells

CD4+ T helper memory (Thmem) cells influence both natural and vaccine-boosted immunity, but mechanisms for their maintenance remain unclear. Pro-survival signals from the common gamma-chain cytokines, in particular IL-7, appear important. Previously we showed in healthy volunteers that a booster vaccination with tetanus toxoid (TT) expanded peripheral blood TT-specific Thmem cells as expected, but was accompanied by parallel increase of Thmem cells specific for two unrelated and non cross-reactive common recall antigens. Here, in a new cohort of healthy human subjects, we compare blood vaccine-specific and bystander Thmem cells in terms of differentiation stage, function, activation and proliferative status. Both responses peaked 1 week post-vaccination. Vaccine-specific cytokine-producing Thmem cells were predominantly effector memory, whereas bystander cells were mainly of central memory phenotype. Importantly, TT-specific Thmem cells were activated (CD38High HLA-DR+), cycling or recently divided (Ki-67+), and apparently vulnerable to death (IL-7R?Low and Bcl-2 Low). In contrast, bystander Thmem cells were resting (CD38Low HLA-DR- Ki-67-) with high expression of IL-7R? and Bcl-2. These findings allow a clear distinction between vaccine-specific and bystander Thmem cells, suggesting the latter do not derive from recent proliferation but from cells mobilized from as yet undefined reservoirs. Furthermore, they reveal the interdependent dynamics of specific and bystander T-cell responses which will inform assessments of responses to vaccines