42 research outputs found

    QTL for phytosterol and sinapate ester content in Brassica napus L. collocate with the two erucic acid genes

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    Improving oil and protein quality for food and feed purposes is an important goal in rapeseed (Brassica napus L.) breeding programs. Rapeseed contains phytosterols, used to enrich food products, and sinapate esters, which are limiting the utilization of rapeseed proteins in the feed industry. Increasing the phytosterol content of oil and lowering sinapate ester content of meal could increase the value of the oilseed rape crop. The objective of the present study was to identify quantitative trait loci (QTL) for phytosterol and sinapate ester content in a winter rapeseed population of 148 doubled haploid lines, previously found to have a large variation for these two traits. This population also segregated for the two erucic acid genes. A close negative correlation was found between erucic acid and phytosterol content (Spearman’s rank correlation, rs = −0.80**). For total phytosterol content, three QTL were detected, explaining 60% of the genetic variance. The two QTL with the strongest additive effects were mapped on linkage groups N8 and N13 within the confidence intervals of the two erucic acid genes. For sinapate ester content four QTL were detected, explaining 53% of the genetic variance. Again, a close negative correlation was found between erucic acid and sinapate ester content (rs = −0.66**) and the QTL with the strongest additive effects mapped on linkage groups N8 and N13 within the confidence intervals of the two erucic acid genes. The results suggests, that there is a pleiotropic effect of the two erucic acid genes on phytosterol and sinapate ester content; the effect of the alleles for low erucic acid content is to increase phytosterol and sinapate ester content. Possible reasons for this are discussed based on known biosynthetic pathways

    Legitimacy in the Multilevel European Polity

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    In order to be simultaneously effective and liberal, governments must normally be able to count on voluntary compliance – which, in turn, depends on the support of socially shared legitimacy beliefs. In Western constitutional democracies, such beliefs are derived from the distinct but coexistent traditions of “republican” and “liberal” political philosophy. When judged by these criteria, the European Union – if considered by itself – appears as a thoroughly liberal polity which, however, lacks all republican credentials. But this view (which seems to structure the debates about the “European democratic deficit”) ignores the multilevel nature of the European polity, where the compliance of citizens is requested, and needs to be legitimated by member states – whereas the Union appears as a “government of governments” which is entirely dependent on the voluntary compliance of its member states. What matters primarily, therefore, is the compliance-legitimacy relationship between the Union and its member states – which, however, is normatively constrained by the basic compliance-legitimacy relationship between member governments and their constituents. Given the high consensus requirements of European legislation, member governments could and should be able to assume political responsibility for European policies in which they had a voice, and to justify them in “communicative discourses” in the national public space. This is not necessarily true of “non-political” policy choices imposed by the European Court of Justice. By enforcing its “liberal” program of liberalization and deregulation, the ECJ may presently be undermining the “republican” bases of member-state legitimacy. Where this is the case, open non-compliance is a present danger, and political controls of judicial legislation may be called for.Um gleichzeitig effektiv und liberal sein zu können, ist staatliche Herrschaft auf freiwillige Folgebereitschaft angewiesen – die ihrerseits der UnterstĂŒtzung durch sozial geteilte LegitimitĂ€tsĂŒberzeugungen bedarf. In den demokratischen Verfassungsstaaten des Westens werden solche Überzeugungen aus den unterschiedlichen, aber komplementĂ€r zusammenwirkenden Traditionen der „republikanischen“ und der „liberalen“ politischen Philosophie hergeleitet. An diesen Kriterien gemessen erscheint die EuropĂ€ische Union – wenn man sie fĂŒr sich betrachtet – als eine „liberale“ politische Ordnung, der jedoch alle „republikanischen“ LegitimitĂ€tsmerkmale fehlen. Aber eine solche Sichtweise, die auch die derzeitige Diskussion ĂŒber ein „europĂ€isches Demokratiedefizit“ bestimmt, verkennt den Mehrebenencharakter des europĂ€ischen Gemeinwesens. In ihm sind es die Mitgliedstaaten, die Entscheidungen der Union gegenĂŒber den eigenen BĂŒrgern durchsetzen und auch legitimieren mĂŒssen, wĂ€hrend es fĂŒr die Union ihrerseits auf die freiwillige Folgebereitschaft ihrer Mitgliedstaaten ankommt. Dabei werden diese jedoch durch die normativen Grundlagen ihrer eigenen LegitimitĂ€t begrenzt. Politische Entscheidungen auf europĂ€ischer Ebene setzen breiten Konsens voraus, und die Regierungen sollten sie deshalb auch gegenĂŒber den eigenen BĂŒrgern in „kommunikativen Diskursen“ vertreten und dafĂŒr die politische Verantwortung ĂŒbernehmen können. Dies gilt jedoch nicht notwendigerweise auch fĂŒr Entscheidungen der europĂ€ischen Politik, die im nichtpolitischen Modus ohne Beteiligung des Rates und des Parlaments vom EuropĂ€ischen Gerichtshof bestimmt werden. Mit der gegenwĂ€rtigen Radikalisierung seines „liberalen“ Programms der Liberalisierung und Deregulierung des nationalen Rechts könnte der Gerichtshof in der Tat die „republikanischen“ Grundlagen der mitgliedstaatlichen LegitimitĂ€t unterminieren. In diesem Falle könnte die Union sich nicht lĂ€nger auf die Folgebereitschaft ihrer Mitgliedstaaten verlassen. Um diese Gefahr fĂŒr die europĂ€ische Integration zu vermeiden, sollte eine stĂ€rkere politische Kontrolle der richterlichen Rechtsetzung erwogen werden.1 Legitimacy Republican and liberal legitimating discourses Constitutional democracies – and the EU? 2 Legitimacy in multilevel polities 3 Legitimating member state compliance Political modes of policy making Non-political policy making 4 The need for justification 5 The Court is pushing against the limits of justifiability 6 The liberal undermining of republican legitimacy 7 Needed: A political balance of community and autonomy Reference

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