Institutional Moral Hazard in the Multi-tiered Regulation of Unemployment and Social Assistance Benefits. CEPS Special Report No. 137/April 2016 Wednesday, 27 April 2016

This paper studies eight countries in which the regulation of unemployment benefits and related benefits and the concomitant activation of unemployed individuals has a multi-tiered architecture. It assesses their experiences and tries to understand possible problems of ‘institutional moral hazard’ that may emerge in the context of a hypothetical European Unemployment Benefit Scheme

The European Commission’s SURE initiative and euro area unemployment re-insurance

The European Commission proposes a pan-European support for short-time work arrangements (SURE). This column discusses the relationship between this proposal and the idea of a European unemployment re-insurance scheme, to which the Commission also refers in its Communication on SURE. We sketch the merits of SURE and signal some caveats