“‘We Can Go No Further’: Meaning, Use, and the Limits of Language”

A central theme in Wittgenstein’s post-Tractatus remarks on the limits of language is that we ‘cannot use language to get outside language’. One illustration of that idea is his comment that, once we have described the procedure of teaching and learning a rule, we have ‘said everything that can be said about acting correctly according to the rule’; ‘we can go no further’. That, it is argued, is an expression of anti-reductionism about meaning and rules. A framework is presented for assessing the debate between reductionist and anti-reductionist readings of Wittgenstein’s views about meaning and use. It is argued that that debate cannot be settled merely by reference to Wittgenstein’s general opposition to reductionism. An important argument for anti-reductionism about rules and meaning, from Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics, is discussed. Putative evidence of reductionism about meaning in the Brown Book is considered; an alternative reading is proposed. The nature of Wittgenstein’s anti-reductionism is examined. It is argued, first, that Wittgenstein accepts that semantic and normative facts supervene on non-semantic, non-normative facts and, second, that at many points his treatment of meaning and rules goes beyond the kind of pleonastic claim that is often taken to define non-reductionist, quietist, positions in philosophy

'Two Kinds of Use of "I"': The Middle Wittgenstein on 'I' and The Self

The paper discusses two aspects of Wittgenstein’s middle-period discussions of the self and the use of ‘I’. First, it considers the distinction Wittgenstein draws in his 1933 Cambridge lectures between two ‘utterly different’ uses of the word ‘I’. It is shown that Wittgenstein’s discussion describes a number of different and non-equivalent distinctions between uses of ‘I’. It is argued that his claims about some of these distinctions are defensible but that his reasoning in other cases is unconvincing. Second, the paper considers the distinction drawn in the Blue Book between the use of ‘I’ as subject and the use of ‘I’ as object. A number of commentators have contended that this Blue Book distinction between uses of ‘I’ is erroneous, that Wittgenstein soon realized that, and that he dropped the idea of such a distinction from his later work. Against those claims, it is argued that Wittgenstein’s distinction between the use of ‘I’ as subject and its use as object is correct and illuminating. And it is shown that, though we do not find the ‘as-subject’/’as-object’ terminology in Wittgenstein’s subsequent work, the essential point of the Blue Book distinction is not abandoned but remains in place in Philosophical Investigations

Wittgenstein, Scientism, and Anti-Scientism in the Philosophy of Mind

Part 1 of this paper sketches Wittgenstein’s opposition to scientism in general. Part 2 explores his opposition to scientism in philosophy focusing, in particular, on philosophy of mind; how must philosophy of mind proceed if it is to avoid the kind of scientism that Wittgenstein complains about? Part 3 examines a central anti-scientistic strand in Wittgenstein’s Last Writings on the Philosophy of Psychology volume II: his treatment of the ‘uncertainty’ of the relation between ‘outer’ behaviour and ‘inner’ experiences and mental states

Sensations, Natural Properties, and the Private Language Argument

Wittgenstein’s philosophy involves a general anti-platonism about properties or standards of similarity. On his view, what it is for one thing to have the same property as another is not dictated by reality itself; it depends on our classificatory practices and the standards of similarity they embody. Wittgenstein’s anti-platonism plays an important role in the private language sections and in his discussion of the conceptual problem of other minds. In sharp contrast to Wittgenstein’s views stands the contemporary doctrine of natural properties, which holds that there is an objective hierarchy of naturalness amongst properties, a hierarchy that is completely independent of our concepts or practices. Some authors have appealed to the natural properties view to offer an explicitly anti-Wittgensteinian account of sensation concepts. The paper discusses these competing views of properties and sensation concepts. It is argued that, if our account of concepts of conscious states starts from a commitment to natural properties, we are bound to recognize that our actual classificatory practices also play a crucial role in determining which properties our concepts pick out. On the other hand, if we start from the anti-platonist position, we are bound to recognize that we also need a notion of sameness of property that extends beyond our limited capacity to recognize similarity or sameness of property. The correct view, it is concluded, must occupy a middle position between an extreme anti-realism about properties and an extreme version of the natural properties view. It is suggested that Wittgenstein’s own view does just that

Wittgenstein, Seeing-As, and Novelty

It is natural to say that when we acquire a new concept or concepts, or grasp a new theory, or master a new practice, we come to see things in a new way: we perceive phenomena that we were not previously aware of; we come to see patterns or connections that we did not previously see. That natural idea has been applied in many areas, including the philosophy of science, the philosophy of religion, and the philosophy of language. And, in reflecting on the character of philosophy itself, Wittgenstein himself associates the introduction of a new concept in philosophy with the discovery of a new way of looking at things (PI §401), and says that the point of presenting us with an imagined example may be to change our way of looking at things (PI §144). The paper considers four interrelated questions about this association between seeing-as and change, novelty, or innovation. 1. Is there an important difference between the case where the change in someone’s way of seeing things involves the invention or discovery of a completely new concept, a completely new theory etc., and the case where it involves the person’s coming to understand an existing concept or theory? 2. Is there a special connection between seeing-as and conceptual or theoretical change or creativity: a connection that does not obtain between seeing-as and using or applying a familiar theory or system of concepts? 3. In cases where seeing-as is associated with novelty or creativity, is there any sense in which the fact that someone sees things in a new way can help to explain their conceptual or theoretical creativity? 4. To the extent that there is some association between seeing-as and novelty or creativity, why if at all does it matter that one experiences things in a certain way? Would someone who was aspect-blind be any worse off with respect to creativity or innovation than the rest of us? And if so, why

History of the town of Cornish, New Hampshire, with genealogical record, 1763-1910. In two volumes, vol. II- genealogy.

Births, marriages and deaths in Cornish recorded in v. 1, p. [347]-368.; v. 1. Narrative.--v. 2. Genealogy

History of the town of Cornish, New Hampshire, with genealogical record, 1763-1910. In two volumes, vol. I- narrative.

Births, marriages and deaths in Cornish recorded in v. 1, p. [347]-368.; v. 1. Narrative.--v. 2. Genealogy

A history of the Fifth Regiment, New Hampshire Volunteers, in the American Civil War, 1861-1865

Part II contains roster and summaries

The Dean Disordered: Jonathan Swift and the Humoral Body

This thesis focuses on the chronic illnesses that the great Irish satirist Jonathan Swift (1667-1745) complained about throughout his long life: “Giddyness,” deafness, and “Noise in [the] Ears.” In 1881, these were diagnosed as the symptoms of Ménière’s Disease, an idiopathic and incurable disorder of the inner ear identified clinically almost 120 years after his death. Swift’s modern biographers have almost universally accepted this diagnosis as the “truth” about his illnesses; his critics have read his imaginative works through this clinical lens. From the outset my own study challenges the retrospective diagnosis, arguing that we can appreciate Swift’s experiences as a sick person and his representations of those experiences in imaginative works like Gulliver’s Travels only by returning him to the humoral body and understanding of illness that he himself knew. Having returned Swift to his humoral body, this thesis considers first how he explained his own disorders and tried to restore and maintain humoral balances, especially through a regimen of diet and exercise. It considers next how he experienced illness socially as well as physically and how he performed and reimagined himself in the “sick role.” Finally, it considers how he represented his experiences as a sick person in Gulliver’s Travels. The study argues that all of these measures—humoral narrative, regimen, performance in the sick role, and imaginative representation in the Travels—were ways for Swift to make sense of and impose order upon his disordered body. By historicizing Swift’s chronic disorders and his lived experiences as a sick person, the thesis makes contributions to both our biographical understanding of the man and our critical reading of his imaginative writings