The evolution of new party systems: voter learning and electoral systems

How do new party systems evolve over time? This article argues that party system evolution requires the solution of coordination problems that voters face in early elections; this happens through a learning mechanism. Elections reveal information to voters, who update their beliefs about party viability and the distribution of voters’ preferences and adjust their behaviour. The institutional setting, however, strongly conditions the pace of learning. Restrictive electoral systems (single-member district) accelerate learning through the harsh penalties they impose on miscoordination, while permissive ones (proportional representation) prolong it. Testing the argument on a district-level dataset in new democracies provides ample support; voters learn to cast fewer wasted votes over time and this happens faster in single-member district systems. The findings point to a trade-off between consolidation and representation; while party system evolution is facilitated by restrictive electoral systems, the presence of distinct social groups in the political arena is better served by permissive ones

External sources of clean technology: evidence from the clean development mechanism

New technology is fundamental to sustainable development. However, inventors from industrialized countries often refuse technology transfer because they worry about reverse-engineering. When can clean technology transfer succeed? We develop a formal model of the political economy of North–South technology transfer. According to the model, technology transfer is possible if (1) the technology in focus has limited global commercial potential or (2) the host developing country does not have the capacity to absorb new technologies for commercial use. If both conditions fail, inventors from industrialized countries worry about the adverse competitiveness effects of reverse-engineering, so technology transfer fails. Data analysis of technology transfer in 4,894 projects implemented under the Kyoto Protocol’s Clean Development Mechanism during the 2004–2010 period provides evidence in support of the model

Executive control of bureaucracy and presidential cabinet appointments in East Asian democracies

This article examines the role of cabinet appointments in controlling the bureaucracy in presidential democracies. I demonstrate how administrative challenges stemming from the structure of the bureaucracy shape presidential choice of ministers. Analyzing a sample of four East Asian cases from 1986 through 2013, I find that presidents are more likely to select ministers from the civil service as bureaucracies are more professionalized, controlling for several political factors. Further evidence from qualitative interviews and case studies suggests that, in professionalized systems equipped with a sizable pool of talent but lacking responsiveness, presidents tend to promote ideologically aligned senior civil servants. However, in politicized systems, where presidents easily obtain responsiveness but face a low level of competence, policy experts tend to be selected from outside the bureaucracy. My findings have important implications for the regulatory governance and state capacity of East Asia, demonstrating the value of balancing between responsiveness and competence

Fostering support for non-democratic rule? Controlled political liberalization and popular support for non-democratic regimes

When the Cold War ended, many non-democratic regimes across the globe embarked on a course of controlled political liberalization, hoping to stabilize their autocratic rule by mitigating popular demands for democratization and increasing regime legitimacy. But does this strategy actually work? This article uses multi-level analyses to examine how the degree of political liberalization affects regime support in non-democratic political systems and to ascertain which mechanisms underlie this effect. Drawing on aggregate measures of political liberalization and comparative survey data from four regional survey projects and 31 non-democracies, the study's results indicate that the degree of liberalization has no decisively positive effect on regime support, suggesting controlled political liberalization might not be an effective legitimizing strategy after all.Nach Ende des Kalten Krieges haben viele nicht-demokratische Regime weltweit einen Kurs der begrenzten politischen Öffnung eingeschlagen, um öffentliche Forderungen nach Demokratisierung zu entschärfen und auf diese Weise die Legitimität ihrer autokratischen Herrschaft zu erhöhen. Doch ist diese Strategie tatsächlich effektiv? Der Beitrag verwendet Mehrebenenanalysen, um zu untersuchen wie der Grad an politischer Öffnung die Regimerunterstützung in nicht-demokratischen politischen Systemen beeinflusst. Auf Basis von Aggregatmaßen zur politischen Öffnung und Individualdaten aus vier regionalen Umfrageprojekten und 31 Autokratien kann kein klarer positiver Effekt des Grads der politischen Öffnung auf die Regimeunterstützung nachgewiesen werden, was eine begrenzte politische Öffnung als wenig effektive Legitimationsstrategie erscheinen lässt

The UN Goldstone Report and retraction: an empirical investigation

The United Nations Goldstone Report criminalized self-defense against state-sponsored or state-perpetrated terror. We use voting on the two UN General Assembly resolutions relating to the Goldstone Report to study whether support for the Goldstone principle of criminalization of self-defense against terror was influenced by countries' political institutions. Our results, using two different measures of political institutions, reveal systematic differences in voting by democracies and autocracies: as an example, based on the Chief-in-Executive measure of political institutions, a country with the highest democracy score was some 55 percentage points less likely to vote in favor of the second of the two UN Goldstone resolutions and some 55 percentage points more likely to abstain than a country with the highest autocratic score. The differences between democracies and autocracies in willingness to initiate symmetric welfare are therefore also reflected in differences in sensitivities to loss of life and harm in asymmetric warfare, through broad support by democracies, but not by autocracies, for legitimacy of self-defense against state-supported or state-perpetrated terror. The Goldstone Report is unique among United Nations reports in having been eventually repudiated by its principal author

The Self-Selection of Democracies into Treaty Design: Insights from International Environmental Agreements

Generally, democratic regime type is positively associated with participating in international environmental agreements. In this context, this study focuses on the legal nature of an agreement, which is linked to audience costs primarily at the domestic level that occur in case of non-compliance and are felt especially by democracies. Eventually, more legalized (\hard-law") treaties make compliance potentially more challenging and democratic leaders may anticipate the corresponding audience costs, which decreases the likelihood that democracies select themselves into such treaties. The empirical implication of our theory follows that environmental agreements with a larger share of democratic members are less likely to be characterized by hard law. This claim is tested using quantitative data on global environmental treaties. The results strongly support our argument, shed new light on the relationship between participation in international agreements and the form of government, and also have implications for the \words-deeds" debate in international environmental policy-making

Parliaments and Government Formation: Unpacking Investiture Rules

Under parliamentarism, the executive, typically termed ?the government?, comes from, and remains responsible to, the national parliament. Although government formation has long been recognized as a core function of national parliaments, and despite the prevalence of comparative scholarship on the politics of government formation, surprisingly little research has explored the precise role of parliament in the process of government formation. For instance, exactly what does ?come from? parliament mean in the context of government formation under parliamentarism? The focus of this book is on the parliamentary investiture vote. Investiture consists of a vote in parliament to demonstrate that an already formed or about to be formed government has legislative support. To better understand the degree to which parliamentary rules and procedures impact government formation, the book ?unpacks? the investiture procedure by identifying and categorizing the great variation in investiture rules in various parliaments and examine how investiture procedures operate in practice. The sixteen case studies are complemented with two cross-national chapters. The case studies and quantitative evidence suggest that scholars of comparative politics need to pay greater attention to the more nuanced details of institutional design. Broad institutional design matters, but the details of institutional design may matter even more

Government Selection and Executive Powers: Constitutional Design in Parliamentary Democracies

Provisions for a parliamentary investiture vote have become increasingly common in parliamentary democracies. This article shows that investiture provisions were largely introduced when new constitutions were written or old ones fundamentally redesigned. It also shows that the constitutions that endowed executives with strong legislative agenda powers also endowed parliaments with strong mechanisms to select the executive. It is argued that constitution makers? decisions can be seen in principal?agent terms: strong investiture rules constitute an ex ante mechanism of parliamentary control ? that is, a mechanism to minimise adverse selection and reduce the risk of agency loss by parliament. The findings have two broad implications: from a constitutional point of view, parliamentary systems do not rely exclusively on ex post control mechanisms such as the no confidence vote to minimise agency loss; parliamentarism, at least today and as much as presidentialism, is the product of conscious constitutional design and not evolutionary adaptation