Advocacy for Marriage Equality: The Power of a Broad Historical Narrative During a Transitional Period in Civil Rights

Article published in the Michigan State Law Review

Punitive Damages, Liquidated Damages, and Clauses Penale in Contract Actions: A Comparative Analysis of the American Common Law and the French Code Civil

Although American common law allows punitive damages for reckless or intentional torts, it will neither allow a jury to assess punitive damages for breach of contract nor permit enforcement of a contractual damages clause that is deemed to be punitive. This approach is rooted in an early Chancery practice of granting equitable relief from oppressive penal bonds and has been more recently justified as a means of facilitating efficient breach. Economic efficiency, however, can be accomplished even if punitive damages could be assessed for intentional breach, because the parties would have an incentive to negotiate a release from the first contract to enable both to share in the surplus offered by an intervening contractual opportunity. Moreover, negotiation of an enforceable penalty clause would allow some parties to maximize their utility by exchanging a signal of assurance of performance for a premium fee. Additionally, the French experience invites a fresh look, because – although it generally disallows punitive damages of a judicial origin for any civil wrong, tort or breach of contract -- it honors freedom of contract and the autonomy of the parties by enforcing a contractual penalty clause (although the court may reduce an excessive contractual penalty). Taking a cue from the French approach, American courts and legislatures should reconsider their refusal to sanction freely negotiated penalty clauses and enforce them to the extent that they permit the parties to maximize their collective utility

The Best and Worst of Contracts Decisions: An Anthology

Five hundred years ago, the common law of contract was without substance. It was form-procedure. Plaintiffs picked a form of action, and common law judges made sure someone besides themselves answered all the hard questions; the parties, a jury, or a ritual determined the winner and the remedy. Judges ran a switch on a conflicts-resolution railway. Thomas More, when Chancellor of England (1529-33), urged judges to lay tracks and control the trains. The problem, he said, was that the judges, by the verdict of the jury[,] cast off all quarrels from themselves. The judges soon assumed greater authority, taking responsibility for the law\u27s substance. The consideration requirement was in place by 1539, and judges afterwards imposed doctrine upon doctrine. Over centuries, they created the common law of contract. That law is now mature, more or less, meaning that judges have tools to fix what they want to fix, and feel free to do so. The law they created-the common law of contract-is a remarkable intellectual and political achievement