Voting on Punishment Systems within a Heterogeneous Group

We consider a voluntary contributions game, in which players may punish others after contributions are made and observed. The productivity of contributions, as captured in the marginal-per-capita return, differs among individuals, so that there are two types: high and low productivity. Every two or eight periods, depending on the treatment, individuals vote on a punishment regime, in which certain individuals are permitted, but not required, to have punishment directed toward them. The punishment system can condition on type and contribution history. The results indicate that the most effective regime, in terms of contributions and earnings, is one that allows punishment of low contributors only, regardless of productivity. Nevertheless, only a minority of sessions converge to this system, indicating a tendency for the voting process to lead to suboptimal institutional choice.voting, punishment, voluntary contributions, heterogeneity, experiment

A Market with Frictions in the Matching Process: An Experimental Study

We construct a laboratory market with the structure of the theoretical model of Burdett, Shi, and Wright (2001). The model is a simple and natural way to represent a market in which there is a friction in the matching process between buyers and sellers. Sellers first simultaneously post prices at which they are willing to sell their single unit of a good. Buyers then simultaneously choose a seller from whom to attempt to purchase a unit. If more than one buyer chooses the same seller, the good is randomly sold to one of the buyers. If a seller is not chosen by any buyer, his unit is not sold. Our experimental results show a broad consistency with the model of Burdett et al. and less support for an alternative model, which is analogous to the model of Montgomery (1991), and which has different assumptions on the strategic interaction between sellers. The main departures that we observe from the Burdett et al. model are that (a) price dispersion exists and is slow to decay, (b) prices exceed the equilibrium level when there are only two sellers, and (c) buyers’ purchase probabilities are insufficiently responsive to price differences when there are two sellers.

The Principles of Exchange Rate Determination in an International Finance Experiment

This paper reports the first experiments designed to explore the behavior of economies with prominent features of international finance. Two “countries,” each with its own currency, were created. International trade could take place only through the operation of markets for currency. The law of one price and the flow of funds theory of exchange rate determination were used to produce general equilibrium models that captured much of the behavior of the economies. Prices of goods, as well as the exchange rate, evolve over time toward the predictions of the models. However, both the law of one price and purchasing power parity can be rejected for reasons that do not appear in the literature. Patterns of international trade were as predicted by the law of comparative advantage

Equilibria in a multi-object uniform price sealed bid auction with multi-unit demands

In many existing markets demanders wish to buy more than one unit from a group of identical units of a commodity. Often, the units are sold simultaneously by auction. The vast majority of literature pertaining to the economics of auctions, however, considers environments in which demanders buy at most one object. In this paper we derive necessary and sufficient conditions for a set of bidding strategies to be a symmetric monotone Bayes-Nash equilibrium to a uniform price sealed bid auction using the "first rejected bid pricing rule" in an independent private values environment with two-unit demands. In any symmetric monotone Bayes-Nash equilibrium, all bidders submit one bid equal to their higher valuation and one bid lower than their lower valuation. We characterize the equilibrium and derive the exact amount of underrevelation in the lower bid

From the lab to the field: Cooperation among fishermen

We conduct a field experiment to measure cooperation among groups of recreational fishermen at a privately owned fishing facility. The parameters are chosen so that group earnings are greater when group members catch fewer fish, as in the Voluntary Contributions Mechanism (VCM). In a manner consistent with classical economic theory, though in contrast to prior results from laboratory experiments, we find no evidence of cooperation. We construct a series of additional treatments to identify causes of the di®erence. We rule out the subject pool and the laboratory setting as potential causes, and identify the type of activity involved as the source of the lack of cooperation in our field experiment. When cooperation requires a reduction in fishing effort, individuals are not cooperative, whether the reduction in fishing translates into more money or into more fishing opportunities for the group.

A Comparison of Multiple-Unit All-Pay and Winner-Pay Auctions Under Incomplete Information

This paper examines the properties of independent-private-value all-pay and winner-pay auctions when there are multiple units sold. We study bidding behavior, efficiency and revenue in a set of nine experimental sessions, each with six bidders. All-pay auctions were played in six of the sessions, three sessions with four units and three sessions with two units auctioned. A four-unit winner-pay auction was played in three of the sessions. Our data show that the all-pay auction and the winner-pay auction are empirically revenue equivalent and yield higher revenue than the risk neutral Bayesian equilibrium. Revenue is higher in the all-pay auction when K=2 than when K=4, despite the fact that Bayesian equilibrium revenues are identical for the two cases. Our evidence also suggests that the winner-pay auction is more likely than the all-pay auction to lead to a Pareto-efficient allocation. ZUSAMMENFASSUNG - (Ein Vergleich von All-Pay- und Winner-Pay-Auktionen mehrerer Einheiten bei unvollständiger Information) In diesem Aufsatz werden die Eigenschaften von independent-private-value all-pay- und winner-pay-Auktionen untersucht, bei denen jeweils mehrere Einheiten verkauft werden. Es wird das Gebots-Verhalten, die Effizienz und der Erlös in einem Set von neun Experimenten mit je sechs Teilnehmern betrachtet. In sechs der Experimente werden all-pay-Auktionen durchgeführt, wovon in drei Durchgängen je vier Einheiten und in den anderen drei je zwei Einheiten versteigert werden. In den drei restlichen Experimenten werden winner-pay-Auktionen durchgeführt, wobei je vier Einheiten versteigert werden. Das Experiment zeigt, daß all-pay- und winner-pay-Auktionen ähnliche Erlöse erzielen, die jedoch höher sind als der im Bayesianischem Gleichgewicht mit risikoneutralen Bietern spieltheoretisch vorausgesagte Gewinn. Bei all-pay-Auktionen ist der Erlös höher, wenn K=2 als im Fall K=4, während die theoretisch berechneten Gleichgewichtserlöse in beiden Fällen identisch sind. Diese Ergebnisse legen nahe, daß winner-pay-Auktionen eher zu einer Pareto-effizienten Allokation führen als all-pay-Auktionen. Classification_JEL:

Punishment, reward, and cooperation in a framed field experiment

We report a framed field experiment, in which we study the effectiveness of punishment and reward in sustaining cooperation in a social dilemma. Punishments tend to be directed at non-cooperators and rewards are assigned by those who are relatively cooperative. In contrast to the results typically found in laboratory experiments, however, we find that punishments and rewards fail to increase cooperation.Field experiment, public goods game, social preferences, punishment, reward

Normative Conflict & Feuds: The Limits of Self-Enforcement

A normative conflict arises when there exist multiple plausible norms of behavior. In such cases, norm enforcement can lead to a sequence of mutual retaliatory sanctions, which we refer to as a feud. We investigate the hypothesis that normative conflict enhances the likelihood of a feud in a public-good experiment. We find that punishment is much more likely to trigger counter-punishment and start a feud when there is a normative conflict, than in a setting in which no conflict exists. While the possibility of a feud sustains cooperation,the cost of feuding fully offsets the efficiency gains from increased cooperation.normative conflict; peer punishment; feuds; counter-punishment; social norms

From the lab to the field: Cooperation among fishermen

We conduct a field experiment to measure cooperation among groups of recreational fishermen at a privately owned fishing facility. The parameters are chosen so that group earnings are greater when group members catch fewer fish, as in the Voluntary Contributions Mechanism (VCM). In a manner consistent with classical economic theory, though in contrast to prior results from laboratory experiments, we find no evidence of cooperation. We construct a series of additional treatments to identify causes of the di®erence. We rule out the subject pool and the laboratory setting as potential causes, and identify the type of activity involved as the source of the lack of cooperation in our field experiment. When cooperation requires a reduction in fishing effort, individuals are not cooperative, whether the reduction in fishing translates into more money or into more fishing opportunities for the group.Public Goods Game, Field Experiment, Social Preferences

Charitable Giving, Emotions, and the Default Effect

We report an experiment to study the effect of defaults on charitable giving. In three different treatments, participants face varying default levels of donation. In three other treatments that are paired with the first three, they receive the same defaults, but are informed that defaults are thought to have an effect on their donation decisions. The emotional state of all individuals is monitored throughout the sessions using Facereading software, and some participants are required to report their emotional state after the donation decision. We find that the default level has no effect on donations, and informing individuals of the possible impact of defaults also has no effect. The decision to donate is independent of prior emotional state, unless specific subgroups of participants are considered. Donors experience a negative change in the valence of their emotional state subsequent to donating, when valence is measured with Facereading software. This contrasts with the selfreport data, in which donating correlates with a more positive reported subsequent emotional state