Judicial Disqualification: An Analysis of Federal Law, Third Edition

Judicial Disqualification: An Analysis of Federal Law outlines the statutory framework of federal judicial disqualification law under statutes 28 U.S.C. §§ 455, 144, 47, and 2106. The monograph revises and expands on the previous editions, and analyzes the case law, with a focus both on substantive disqualification standards and procedural requirements.https://www.repository.law.indiana.edu/facbooks/1222/thumbnail.jp

Judicial Independence, Judicial Accountability, and the Role of Constitutional Norms in Congressional Regulation of the Courts

Symposium: Congressional Power in the Shadow of the Rehnquist Court: Strategies for the Future held at Indiana University Law School, February 1-2, 2002

Judicial Ethics: A New Paradigm for a New Era

As the preamble to the Model Code of Judicial Conduct indicates, traditional notions of judicial ethics operate within a rule of law paradigm, which posits that the “three I’s” of judicial ethics—independence, impartiality, and integrity—enable judges to uphold the law. In recent decades, however, social science, public opinion, and political commentary suggest that appointed judges abuse their independence by disregarding the law and issuing rulings in accord with their biases and other extralegal impulses, while elected judges disregard the law and issue rulings popular with voters, all of which calls the future of the three I’s and judicial ethics itself into question. The time has come to rethink the role of judicial ethics in light of a new legal culture paradigm that better accommodates changing conceptions of the judicial role

Adverse Publicity as a Means of Reducing Judicial Decision-Making Delay: Periodic Disclosure of Pending Motions, Bench Trials and Cases under the Civil Justice Reform Act

The modest objective of this article is to analyze §476 in light of the purpose it was designed to serve, and to evaluate the performance of that section during the two years that it has been in operation. To do that, it is useful to begin by placing §476 in the larger context of ongoing efforts to address and remedy indefensible decision-making delays. Section II will, therefore, summarize the causes of decision-making delay, dividing them among the defensible and the indefensible, and then review existing mechanisms for alleviating indefensible delay. The point worth underscoring is that while defensible delays-particularly delays occasioned by burgeoning caseloads-are undeniably the most significant source of decision-making delay, they are not the only source. Section 476 may properly be understood as the latest in a series of efforts to reduce indefensible delays-delays precipitated by nonstructural inefficiency, indecision, inertia, belligerence or disability. Section III will track the development and implementation of §476. While it is still too early to reach any firm conclusions as to the ultimate success of the section in reducing indefensible delay, preliminary findings are encouraging; delays are declining, and judges appear to be acknowledging that the impact of the section is salutary. Even at this early date, then, the evidence may be sufficient to justify Congress in lifting the sunset provision as it applies to §476

Adverse Publicity as a Means of Reducing Judicial Decision-Making Delay: Periodic Disclosure of Pending Motions, Bench Trials and Cases under the Civil Justice Reform Act

The modest objective of this article is to analyze §476 in light of the purpose it was designed to serve, and to evaluate the performance of that section during the two years that it has been in operation. To do that, it is useful to begin by placing §476 in the larger context of ongoing efforts to address and remedy indefensible decision-making delays. Section II will, therefore, summarize the causes of decision-making delay, dividing them among the defensible and the indefensible, and then review existing mechanisms for alleviating indefensible delay. The point worth underscoring is that while defensible delays-particularly delays occasioned by burgeoning caseloads-are undeniably the most significant source of decision-making delay, they are not the only source. Section 476 may properly be understood as the latest in a series of efforts to reduce indefensible delays-delays precipitated by nonstructural inefficiency, indecision, inertia, belligerence or disability. Section III will track the development and implementation of §476. While it is still too early to reach any firm conclusions as to the ultimate success of the section in reducing indefensible delay, preliminary findings are encouraging; delays are declining, and judges appear to be acknowledging that the impact of the section is salutary. Even at this early date, then, the evidence may be sufficient to justify Congress in lifting the sunset provision as it applies to §476

Considering Reconsidering Judicial Independence

In Reconsidering Judicial Independence, Professor Stephen Burbank revisits the nature of the relationship between judicial independence and judicial accountability—a relationship that he has elucidated over the course of an illustrious career. As Burbank emphasizes, the continuing success of this dichotomy depends on preserving a balance between its halves. But forces generations in the making have led to a new assault on the independence of the judiciary in the age of Trump, which has put the future of the independence–accountability balance in doubt. The age-old rule-of-law paradigm, which posits that independent judges put aside their personal biases and follow the law, has been debunked by data showing that judges are subject to ideological and other influences, undermining this traditional justification for judicial independence. To avert the erosion and collapse of judicial independence, we must defend it with recourse to a different paradigm—a legal-culture paradigm. The legal-culture paradigm appreciates that independent judges are acculturated to apply and uphold the law as best they can, but also recognizes that judges have discretion that is subject to extralegal influences—influences that better accountability can manage