An Ounce of Prevention is a Ton of Work: Mass Antibiotic Prophylaxis for Anthrax, New York City, 2001

Protocols for mass antibiotic prophylaxis against anthrax were under development in New York City beginning in early 1999. This groundwork allowed the city’s Department of Health to rapidly respond in 2001 to six situations in which cases were identified or anthrax spores were found. The key aspects of planning and lessons learned from each of these mass prophylaxis operations are reviewed. Antibiotic distribution was facilitated by limiting medical histories to issues relevant to prescribing prophylactic antibiotic therapy, formatting medical records to facilitate rapid decision making, and separating each component activity into discrete work stations. Successful implementation of mass prophylaxis operations was characterized by clarity of mission and eligibility criteria, well-defined lines of authority and responsibilities, effective communication, collaboration among city agencies (including law enforcement), and coordination of staffing and supplies. This model can be adapted for future planning needs including possible attacks with other bioterrorism agents, such as smallpox

Zika virus: New clinical syndromes and its emergence in the western hemisphere

Zika virus (ZIKV) had remained a relatively obscure flavivirus until a recent series of outbreaks accompanied by unexpectedly severe clinical complications brought this virus into the spotlight as causing an infection of global public health concern. In this review, we discuss the history and epidemiology of ZIKV infection, recent outbreaks in Oceania and the emergence of ZIKV in the Western Hemisphere, newly ascribed complications of ZIKV infection, including Guillain-Barré syndrome and microcephaly, potential interactions between ZIKV and dengue virus, and the prospects for the development of antiviral agents and vaccines

Yellow fever in the diagnostics laboratory

Yellow fever (YF) remains a public health issue in endemic areas despite the availability of a safe and effective vaccine. In 2015-2016, urban outbreaks of YF were declared in Angola and the Democratic Republic of Congo, and a sylvatic outbreak has been ongoing in Brazil since December 2016. Of great concern is the risk of urban transmission cycles taking hold in Brazil and the possible spread to countries with susceptible populations and competent vectors. Vaccination remains the cornerstone of an outbreak response, but a low vaccine stockpile has forced a sparing-dose strategy, which has thus far been implemented in affected African countries and now in Brazil. Accurate laboratory confirmation of cases is critical for efficient outbreak control. A dearth of validated commercial assays for YF, however, and the shortcomings of serological methods make it challenging to implement YF diagnostics outside of reference laboratories. We examine the advantages and drawbacks of existing assays to identify the barriers to timely and efficient laboratory diagnosis. We stress the need to develop new diagnostic tools to meet current challenges in the fight against YF

Surveillance for Anthrax Cases Associated with Contaminated Letters, New Jersey, Delaware, and Pennsylvania, 2001

In October 2001, two inhalational anthrax and four cutaneous anthrax cases, resulting from the processing of Bacillus anthracis–containing envelopes at a New Jersey mail facility, were identified. Subsequently, we initiated stimulated passive hospital-based and enhanced passive surveillance for anthrax-compatible syndromes. From October 24 to December 17, 2001, hospitals reported 240,160 visits and 7,109 intensive-care unit admissions in the surveillance area (population 6.7 million persons). Following a change to reporting criteria on November 8, the average of possible inhalational anthrax reports decreased 83% from 18 to 3 per day; the proportion of reports requiring follow-up increased from 37% (105/286) to 41% (47/116). Clinical follow-up was conducted on 214 of 464 possible inhalational anthrax patients and 98 possible cutaneous anthrax patients; 49 had additional laboratory testing. No additional cases were identified. To verify the limited scope of the outbreak, surveillance was essential, though labor-intensive. The flexibility of the system allowed interim evaluation, thus improving surveillance efficiency

Epidemiologic Responses to Anthrax Outbreaks: A Review of Field Investigations, 1950–2001

We used unpublished reports, published manuscripts, and communication with investigators to identify and summarize 49 anthrax-related epidemiologic field investigations conducted by the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention from 1950 to August 2001. Of 41 investigations in which Bacillus anthracis caused human or animal disease, 24 were in agricultural settings, 11 in textile mills, and 6 in other settings. Among the other investigations, two focused on building decontamination, one was a response to bioterrorism threats, and five involved other causes. Knowledge gained in these investigations helped guide the public health response to the October 2001 intentional release of B. anthracis, especially by addressing the management of anthrax threats, prevention of occupational anthrax, use of antibiotic prophylaxis in exposed persons, use of vaccination, spread of B. anthracis spores in aerosols, clinical diagnostic and laboratory confirmation methods, techniques for environmental sampling of exposed surfaces, and methods for decontaminating buildings

Epidemiologic Observations from Passive and Targeted Surveillance during the First Wave of the 2009 H1N1 Influenza Pandemic in Milwaukee, WI

The first wave of the 2009 influenza H1N1 pandemic (H1N1pdm) in Milwaukee, WI has been recognized as the largest reported regional outbreak in the United States. The epidemiologic and clinical characteristics of this large first wave outbreak from April 28th 2009–July 25th 2009, studied using both passive and targeted surveillance methodologies are presented. A total of 2791 individuals with H1N1pdm infection were identified; 60 % were 5–18 years old. The 5–18 year and 0–4 year age groups had high infection (1131 and 1101 per 100,000) and hospitalization (49 and 12 per 100,000) rates respectively. Non-Hispanic blacks and Hispanics had the highest hospitalization and infection rates. In targeted surveillance, infected patients had fever (78%), cough (80%), sore throat (38%), and vomiting or diarrhea (8%). The “influenza like illness” definition captured only 68 % of infected patients. Modeling estimates that 10.3 % of Milwaukee population was infected in the first wave and 59% were asymptomatic. The distinct epidemiologic profile of H1N1pdm infections observed in the study has direct implications for predicting the burden of infection and hospitalization in the next waves of H1N1pdm. Careful consideration of demographic predictors of infection and hospitalization with H1N1pdm will be important for effective preparedness for subsequent influenza seasons

Isolated Case of Bioterrorism-related Inhalational Anthrax, New York City, 2001

On October 31, 2001, in New York City, a 61-year-old female hospital employee who had acquired inhalational anthrax died after a 6-day illness. To determine sources of exposure and identify additional persons at risk, the New York City Department of Health, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, and law enforcement authorities conducted an extensive investigation, which included interviewing contacts, examining personal effects, summarizing patient’s use of mass transit, conducting active case finding and surveillance near her residence and at her workplace, and collecting samples from co-workers and the environment. We cultured all specimens for Bacillus anthracis. We found no additional cases of cutaneous or inhalational anthrax. The route of exposure remains unknown. All environmental samples were negative for B. anthracis. This first case of inhalational anthrax during the 2001 outbreak with no apparent direct link to contaminated mail emphasizes the need for close coordination between public health and law enforcement agencies during bioterrorism-related investigations

Early-Season Avian Deaths from West Nile Virus as Warnings of Human Infection

An analysis of 2001 and 2002 West Nile virus (WNV) surveillance data shows that counties that report WNV-infected dead birds early in the transmission season are more likely to report subsequent WNV disease cases in humans than are counties that do not report early WNV-infected dead birds