United Airlines LOFT training

Line oriented training is used in a broader, more generic sense that as a specific program under FAR 12.1409 and AC 120-35. A company policy was adopted more than twenty years ago requiring that all pilot checks and recurrent training be conducted with a full crew occupying the seats they occupy on the line. Permission was obtained to reschedule the hours for recurrent proficiency training to include one and one-half hours of LOFT flight. The number of emergencies and abnormal procedures which could be undertaken were considered and the introduction of an a occasional incapacitation revealed which person is the most difficult to replace on the widebodies. By using the LOFT concept, every training period can be structured like a typical line flight. The use of LOFT in simulator syllabus development and problems that need to be refined are discussed

Nuclear Magnetic Resonance in Low-Symmetry Superconductors

We consider the nuclear spin-lattice relaxation rate, $1/T_1T$ in superconductors with accidental nodes. We show that a Hebel-Slichter-like peak occurs even in the absence of an isotropic component of the superconducting gap. The logarithmic divergence found in clean, non-interacting models is controlled by both disorder and electron-electron interactions. However, for reasonable parameters, neither of these effects removes the peak altogether.Comment: 10 pages, 5 figure

Offensive Non-Mutual Issue Preclusion Revisited

(Excerpt) Some forty years ago, in Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, the United States Supreme Court held that the rule of mutuality of estoppel was no longer an absolute bar to the invocation of issue preclusion for the benefit of a plaintiff who had been a stranger to the prior (F-1) litigation against a defendant who had been party to both the F-I and present (F-2) cases. In so ruling, the Supreme Court gave its imprimatur to Judge Traynor\u27s dramatic takedown of the mutuality rule in Bernhard v. Bank of America National Trust and Savings Association nearly four decades earlier. The outcome in Parklane was also foreshadowed by the Court\u27s earlier ruling in Blonder-Tongue Laboratories v. University of Illinois Foundation. There, the Court rejected mutuality where the stranger to F-I invoked the F-I decision holding a patent invalid as a defense to an infringement suit in F-2 involving the same patent. Blonder Tongue was consistent with the trend in many state and lower federal court decisions that had abrogated mutuality where preclusion was interposed defensively. Parklane, of course, involved offensive non-mutual issue preclusion, and at the time of the Blonder Tongue decision, many courts drew a line distinguishing defensive and offensive non-mutual preclusion, allowing the former but not the latter. Parklane acknowledged this bright-line distinction but rejected an outright ban on offensive non-mutual issue preclusion, leaving it to the trial courts to determine on a case-by-case basis when it should be applied. The Court in Parklane thus stopped short of a blanket approval of offensive non-mutual issue preclusion, and qualified its holding in three important respects: (1) a defendant must have had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the case in F- 1; (2) invocation of non-mutual issue preclusion must not produce an unfair result; and (3) the decision of whether or not to allow offensive non-mutual issue preclusion is left to the sound discretion of the trial court and thus is not a matter of right

De-Regulation of the Air Waves: Is Antitrust Enough?

(Excerpt) By enacting the Telecommunications Act of 19961, Congress mandated large-scale deregulation of the television, radio, telecommunications and cable industries. Having successfully de-regulated the airline, interstate transportation and energy industries, Congress sought to dismantle the tangled legal, administrative and regulatory structure that had governed broadcast media and telecommunications for decades and replace it with a competitive model. Its goal was to minimize the inefficiencies inherent in any regulatory scheme and allow participants to reap the economic benefits of the free market. Equally important, Congress wanted to be sure that the emerging cable, satellite and cellular technologies were not stifled by the incumbent regulatory structure, which many viewed as outmoded and ill-suited to the marketplace of the 21st century. To assure that competition would be preserved in the absence of regulation, Congress made clear that antitrust law principles would govern this newly deregulated market. Nowhere has the impact of the Telecommunications Act been more dramatic than in the radio field. The Act unleashed a merger wave which has dramatically altered the competitive landscape in radio. That merger wave has certainly benefited many station owners by permitting them to capture economies of scale that simply could not have been achieved under a regulatory regime which limited the number of stations any entity could own

The Bernstein Lectures: A Foreword (2000)

(Excerpt) In this issue, the St. John\u27s Law Review is pleased to publish the 1998 and 1999 Lewis Bernstein Memorial Lectures by Thomas E. Kauper, Henry M. Butzel Professor at Michigan Law School, and William E. Kovacic, Professor at George Washington University Law School, respectively

Teacher Curriculum: A Failed Paradigm of Practise and Proceedure

An examination of recent literature concerning teacher training suggests that in many parts of the western world it is constantly under review. Major Reports (Martin: 1964; Bell: 1971;James: 1972; The Senate: 1972; Williams: 1979; Coffey: 1980; Auchmuty: 1980) and the popular press have written and continue to write about various aspects of the teachers life. Some of these are anlyses of what is the case, others are about what could be the case whilst others dwell on the shortcomings of the teaching profession. The U.K. for example has its infamous Black Papers whilst in Australia the same concepts concerning standards occupy media space. Teacher unions continue to say what is lacking within educational bureaucracies, and State and Federal Governments respond in an ad hoc fashion to the pressures of budget, coercion and whim

Whatever Happened to Quick Look?

In California Dental Ass’n v. F.T.C. (hereafter “Cal Dental”), the Supreme Court observed that there is no sharp divide separating conduct that can be summarily condemned under section one of the Sherman Act as per se unlawful from conduct that warrants a more searching factual assessment to ascertain any anticompetitive effect and hence its legality. The Court further observed that not every antitrust claim falling outside the narrow ambit of per se illegality warrants the detailed Rule of Reason analysis prescribed in Chicago Board of Trade. The Court thereby eschewed any notion that section one analysis is dichotomous, i.e., that restraints of trade fall into one of two categories: per se violations, which are condemned out of hand; or Rule of Reason violations, which are condemned only after a detailed analysis of anticompetitive effects and procompetitive benefits. Rather, it suggested that conduct be adjudged on a sliding scale and that “the quality of proof required should vary with the circumstances.” In so ruling, the Court specifically acknowledged what it had held implicitly in three earlier decisions: that certain conduct, although falling outside of the narrow parameters of per se illegality, has such anticompetitive potential that absent proof of look” without a detailed market assessment. Accordingly, the Court acknowledged in principle the concept of a truncated Rule of Reason analysis. Ultimately, however, the Court concluded that “quick look” did not apply to the facts of the case and that a “less quick look” was necessary to assess defendant’s advertising restrictions because it was not intuitively obvious that these advertising restrictions by themselves would create anticompetitive effect and because the advertising restrictions may have actually promoted competition by eliminating unverifiable and misleading discount and quality of service advertising. Quick look is tailor–made for restraints that bear a close family resemblance to price–fixing but are of the type with which courts have little experience or are idiosyncratic in nature. Proponents of quick look argue that quick look “improves upon the traditional dichotomous approach by reducing and enforcement and adjudication costs, enhancing the accuracy of administrative and judicial determinations and improving deterrence of harmful restraints.” Yet, notwithstanding Cal Dental’s ruling that quick look applies “[where] an observer with even rudimentary understanding of economics could conclude that the arrangements in question have anticompetitive effect on customers and markets,” quick look has not caught on in the lower courts. Indeed, with the notable exception of the D.C. Circuit’s decision in Polygram Holding, Inc. v. F.T.C. (hereafter “Three Tenors”), the lower courts appear to have largely abandoned the quick look approach. This article analyzes the evolution of the Rule of Reason, the emergence of quick look analysis, and its precipitous decline. It argues that the traditional unstructured Rule of Reason analysis articulated in Chicago Board of Trade is unworkable in that it is costly, unpredictable, and has significant risks of error. This article further argues that the structured, nuanced, fact–specific inquiry utilized in Three Tenors would provide “more clarity, greater predictability, fewer errors and less expense in antitrust litigation” and that the lower courts should embrace—not shun—quick look. It concludes that widespread adoption of the quick look approach by lower courts is unlikely. In Cal Dental, the Supreme Court missed an opportunity to clarify how the Rule of Reason should be applied in antitrust cases. Moreover, its decisions since Cal Dental have sent mixed signals on quick look. As a result, the concept of quick look, outside a narrow range of FTC cases, has largely become a dormant doctrine

The Bernstein Lectures: A Foreword (2000)

(Excerpt) In this issue, the St. John\u27s Law Review is pleased to publish the 1998 and 1999 Lewis Bernstein Memorial Lectures by Thomas E. Kauper, Henry M. Butzel Professor at Michigan Law School, and William E. Kovacic, Professor at George Washington University Law School, respectively